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This thesis examines the relationship between Ulster unionists and the United States 
during the Home Rule era from 1880 to 1920.  As they fought to uphold the Union, Ulster 
unionists reacted to Irish-American involvement in the Irish nationalist movement with 
anxiety and fear of the impact on a potential Dublin parliament.  At the same time, unionists 
cultivated an image of a violent and extremist Irish-America in order to counter Irish 
nationalism and support their own movement.  Unionists condemned the American funding 
of Irish nationalism and United States government interference on the Irish question.  
However, they were also anxious to show that unionism had international appeal, seeking 
American support against Home Rule and promoting a self-image of close ties to the United 
States.  This thesis argues that Ulster unionists took a multifaceted and paradoxical approach 
to America, repudiating American involvement in the Irish nationalist movement while 
attempting to find opportunities to advance the cause of unionism in the United States.  
Throughout the Home Rule period, the Ulster unionist record of appeals and responses to the 
United States was marked by unevenness and contradictions which limited their 
effectiveness.  However, unionists increasingly used an idealized, imagined America to 
support their own movement.  They cited American historical and constitutional examples 
and fostered an Ulster identity based in part on Scotch-Irish heritage and Protestant 
connections.  Ulster unionists were less insular and more internationally focused than they 
are generally portrayed. 
Chapter I introduces the historical context and historiographic framework in which 
the thesis operates.  Chapters II and III provide an overview of the relationship between 
Ulster unionists and the United States from 1880 to 1920.  During this period, unionists 
attempted to garner American support for their movement while contemporaneously 
responding to Irish-American nationalism and the involvement of the United States 
government on the Irish question.  Subsequent chapters are arranged thematically, examining 
the elements of the Ulster unionists’ American strategy.  Chapter IV investigates Scotch-Irish 
ethnic revival and associational culture in the United States, analyzing continued links to 
Ireland and attitudes toward Irish Home Rule.  Chapter V provides case-studies of unionist 
visits to the United States as they endeavored to counter nationalist influence and build up a 
unionist following.  Chapter VI explores the interconnection of religion and politics in 
Ulster’s relationship with America.  Chapter VII examines the impact of American history 
and politics on the Ulster unionist movement.  Chapter VIII concludes that the inability of 
Ulster unionists to effectively deal with the United States in the present day has roots in the 
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 At Parliament’s Government of Ireland Bill Committee meeting of 18 June 1912, 
Robert McMordie argued against the third Home Rule Bill.  McMordie, Lord Mayor of 
Belfast and Unionist Member of Parliament for East Belfast, declared that Ulster’s unionists 
would not accept Home Rule on any terms, implying that they were seriously considering 
militant opposition if the bill passed.  McMordie asserted that Home Rule would sweep away 
available capital, thereby destroying the linen and shipbuilding industries in Ulster.  He also 
predicted that a large number of Ulster Protestants, faced with the conditions of Home Rule, 
would emigrate to the United States: 
They were driven there before, and they have made their mark there.  It was the 
Ulstermen in the United States who started and carried on the War of Independence 
to a successful issue.  You want to send some more there.  If this Bill passes, you 
will have disaster in commerce and in manufactures, and you will drive people 
abroad who will carry with them a hatred of this country as happened before.
1
 
McMordie’s argument was that links forged with the United States over two and a half 
centuries of migration from Ulster would continue to play important roles in Ireland’s future.  
McMordie emphasized the threat of renewed migration to America, which would drain 
Ireland of the Ulstermen whom he saw as the nation’s most industrious, economically-
successful citizens.  They would settle in the United States, a country which, with the help of 
Ulster emigrants, rivaled Britain as a world power in the years before the First World War.  
They would aid America in increasing its economic, technological, and military might.  
Moreover, Ulster emigrants in America provided an important precedent for the actions of 
the Ulster unionists:  Ulster emigrants had successfully defied the British during the 
American Revolution, and Ulstermen in Ireland would defy the British and Irish nationalists 
who attempted to force Home Rule upon them. 
 McMordie’s speech used the United States as a symbol to justify unionist actions 
and implicitly threaten the British.  America was intertwined with his arguments against 
Home Rule such as the dangers presented by self-government to Ulster’s economy.  
McMordie’s rhetorical use of America represents only a single aspect of the multifaceted 
Ulster unionist approaches and attitudes toward the United States.  During the Home Rule 
period from 1880 to 1920, Ulster unionists employed a complex combination of political 
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thought, rhetoric, and action involving the United States, which has yet to be fully addressed 
in scholarly study. 
International involvement in Irish nationalism has been frequently examined by 
historians.  However, historians have yet to scrutinize how Irish unionists reacted to and 
attempted to counter the involvement of the United States and other countries in the 
nationalist movement.  There is also a lack of historical analysis regarding the ways in which 
unionists actively pursued support from Protestant Irish groups in the United States and 
throughout the Empire. 
General studies of Irish unionism typically tell the story of a movement which was 
very insular compared to Irish nationalism.  Such studies depict a group primarily concerned 
with banding together against both the Irish nationalists and the British government, with 
less interest in the outside world.  The unionists themselves had diverse origins.  They 
combined the forces of Toryism, the Church of Ireland, landlordism, Orangeism, and 
Presbyterianism.  As Alvin Jackson describes, they developed at least in part as a reactionary 
body responding to the challenges of the nationalists and British government.
2
  By 1885, an 
Ulster party emerged in Parliament, representing uneasy alliances between northern and 
southern unionism, and between Liberals and Conservatives. 
Over the next three decades, the Ulster party managed to maintain a constant 
presence in the Westminster Parliament, returning at least nineteen MPs for each election 
between 1885 and 1918.
3
  The party continued to evolve as it responded to two Home Rule 
crises in 1886 and 1893, the devolution crisis of 1904-6, land reforms, and expansion of the 
electorate.  By the time of the third Home Rule Bill, Ulster unionism was beginning to set 
itself apart from the rest of Ireland.  The concept of a separate Ulster identity emerged at the 
same time as the revival of Scotch-Irish ethnicity was taking place in the United States.  Both 




 The historiography of Irish unionism has significantly expanded since the end of the 
1960s with a wide variety of research on specific themes within unionism, as well as several 
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longer studies of the movement as a whole.
5
  While historians have created a more complete 
view of the complex political, cultural, social, and religious elements of unionism during the 
Home Rule period, scholars have yet to fully explore the participation of unionists in the 
world beyond Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the Empire.  There are only limited 
references in these studies to the reciprocal relationship between Ulster unionism and the 
United States.  The details of this relationship remain to be discovered. 
 
 Across the Atlantic Ocean, Irish-American nationalist involvement in the 
movements for Irish Home Rule and independence has been well-documented.  As Kevin 
Kenny notes, the history of the American Irish is closely linked to developments in both 
Ireland and the United States.
6
  Nationalist leaders from Ireland frequently visited the United 
States to garner financial, political, and organizational reinforcement.  They mobilized Irish-
Americans in support of Irish independence.  Irish-American nationalism became so 
politically important that, as Alan Ward asserts, what was originally Britain’s “Irish 
problem” became an issue for successive American governments as well.
7
 
 In the United States, support for Irish nationalism was especially prominent 
compared to other Irish diaspora countries, in part because Irish Catholic immigrants retained 
close connections to their own ethnic community in the face of American anti-Catholic 
sentiment.
8
  Tight-knit Irish-American Catholic communities remained closely tied to their 
Irish roots.  They were drawn into Irish nationalist activities for several reasons: (1) they 
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believed a free Ireland would raise the status of the Irish in the United States; (2) nationalist 
organizations also furthered other social, political, and economic goals within American 
society; and (3) they believed in the cause of self-determination for Ireland.
9
 
Organizations such as the Clan-na-Gael, Ancient Order of Hibernians, Friends of 
Irish Freedom, and United Irish League of America worked for decades to raise funds, rally 
Irish-Americans to the causes of Home Rule and independence, and lobby the United States 
government.  Leaders of these organizations maintained close ties with nationalists in 
Ireland.  At times the same people directed movements on both sides of the Atlantic.
10
  
Kenny notes, “The experience of these individuals in the United States, combined with the 
material and political support of Irish Americans, accounts for the significant phrase in the 
proclamation issued by the new provisional government of Ireland on Easter Monday 1916, 




Scholarly accounts of the Irish in America during the Home Rule period detail the 
political, religious, economic, and social experiences of the Catholic nationalist immigrant 
community.  Previous studies have not focused on Americans who supported the cause of 
Irish unionism, many of whom were of Ulster Protestant heritage.  Approximately 360,000 
Ulster Presbyterians migrated to America from 1680 to the start of the nineteenth century, 
along with substantial numbers of Protestants from other parts of Ireland.
12
  The influx of 
Irish Protestants continued throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in a 
steady but decreasing flow.  This immigration reached such numbers that Donald Akenson 
has concluded that “the bulk of the Irish ethnic group in the United States is, and probably 
always has been, Protestant.”
13
  In his study of The American Irish, William Shannon 
dismisses the Scotch-Irish as not actually Irish.
14
  Thomas Brown, while not as explicit, 
focuses solely on Catholic Irish-Americans as he discusses how their American experiences 
contributed to their political and social views.
15
  Kenny’s American Irish sets out to tell a 
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more inclusive story of both Irish Protestants and Catholics in the United States, but 




The literature dedicated to the study of Irish Protestants in America emphasizes their 
role in the eighteenth-century colonial and revolutionary periods.  However, the number of 
Protestants leaving Ireland continued to exceed the number of Catholics until the mid-
1830s.
17
  Kenneth Keller asserts, “This seldom-studied, early nineteenth-century wave of 
emigration added a larger proportion of Ulster people to the overall American population 
than had the important colonial migrations.”
18
  The migration of Irish Protestants to the 
United States continued steadily until the 1920s.  Migrants from Ulster comprised almost 
one-fifth of all Irish immigrants to the United States from 1900 to 1909, and one-fourth of all 




Some studies maintain that Irish Protestants were fully assimilated into American 
society by the 1830s despite their continued migration.
20
  The Anglo-Irish, of English origin 
and Episcopalian religion, are almost entirely neglected in historical study.  The label 
“Scotch-Irish,” which originally applied largely to Presbyterians who had migrated first from 
Scotland to Ulster and then from Ulster to North America, has been applied to all Protestants 
of Irish origin.  Kerby Miller writes that the basis of this expansion of the “Scotch-Irish” 
term is unclear, “but surely it was associated with the dilution of Protestant denominational 
boundaries wrought by evangelicalism in both Ireland and America, and, in Ireland, the 
emergence of a pan-Protestant political bloc in opposition to Irish Catholic nationalism.”
21
  
Irish Protestants in America may have been similarly united through participation in anti-
Catholic and nativist movements, and in organizations such as the Know-Nothing party, the 
American Protestant Association, and the American Protective Association.  Some also 
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chose to participate in specifically Scotch-Irish associations such as the Scotch-Irish Society 
of America and the Loyal Orange Institution of the United States of America. 
The Scotch-Irish are notoriously difficult to track after the American revolutionary 
period.  They had diverse origins within Ulster and indeed all of Ireland.  Once they arrived 
in America, the Scotch-Irish became a difficult ethnic group to define because they were 
English-speaking, highly mobile, and highly adaptable.
22
  Keller notes, “When the Ulster 
folk came to America, they did not bring with them a pristine, traditional culture, but one that 
was new, changing, and derivative – a culture much like the one into which they were 
plunged in the diverse middle Atlantic colonies of North America.”
23
  The Scotch-Irish 
carried an amalgam of traditions from both Scotland and Ireland.  They were influenced by 
their encounters with other peoples in the two nations.  Their culture also changed through 
adaptation to their new lives in America.  Patrick Griffin concludes, “The Ulster settlement 
narrative reveals a process of identity formation bearing little resemblance to an inexorable 
march to ethnic consensus.  Identity was always malleable and conditional, comprised at 




Despite the difficulties in defining the Protestant Irish in America as an ethnic group, 
there are several indications of continued Scotch-Irish identity in the United States after the 
1830s: the continued emigration from Ulster; the isolation of many early Scotch-Irish 
settlements in the southern backcountry; the increasing popularity of the Loyal Orange 
Institution to the end of the nineteenth century and the prominence of Scotch-Irish 
participation in American nativist organizations; recurring conflicts between Protestant and 
Catholic Irish in such cities as New York, Pennsylvania, and Newark; and the revival of the 
Scotch-Irish identity in the 1880s and 1890s.
25
  These factors all indicate that the Scotch-
Irish were not simply and wholly absorbed into mainstream American culture after the 
revolutionary period. 
Some recent studies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Irish-America have 
attempted to integrate elements of the Protestant Irish experience with the more conventional 
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narrative of Catholic Irish-American nationalism.  Francis Carroll’s studies of diplomacy, 
politics, and opinion in the United States and Ireland mainly focus on Catholic Irish-
Americans, even when discussing diplomacy in Ulster.  However, at times Carroll sheds 
valuable light on the Scotch-Irish experience.
26
  Kevin Kenny also sets out to incorporate the 
Protestant Irish into the overall story of Irish-America.
27
  David N. Doyle and Kerby Miller 
investigate the development of a unique Scotch-Irish identity while maintaining the context 
of the expansion of Catholic Irish-America.
28
  Rowland Berthoff, in British Immigrants in 
Industrial America, also provides insight on the Scotch-Irish, in the context of the larger 
British migration to the United States.
29
 
In contrast to the historiography of Catholic Irish-Americans, however, these studies 
generally do not illustrate reciprocal links between Protestant Irish-America and Ireland.  For 
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there is little indication of continuing 
correspondence between Protestants in America and Ireland, interest of the ethnic group in 
Irish political movements, or comparison of experiences between Ireland and America.  One 
exception is Maldwyn Jones’s insightful article, “The Scotch-Irish,” in the Harvard 
Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, which provides the most comprehensive view of 
the Scotch-Irish as an ethnic group and their participation in organizations and political 




By the time of the first Home Rule Bill, the United States and Britain were 
experiencing profound changes in their relationship which would eventually lead to the 
United States overtaking Britain as a world power.
31
  America was seen as a rival to Britain 
as the world shifted in the late Victorian era.
32
  Economic globalization was increasing, 
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illustrated by the networks formed by the United States with Belfast’s shipbuilding and linen 
industries.
33
  By the 1850s, the United States accounted for over forty percent of Ulster’s 
linen exports, and repercussions were seen in Ulster from the ebbs and flows of the 
American economy.  The “cotton famine” during the American Civil War was a significant 
force in stimulating Ulster’s linen industry.  Conversely, the 1873 depression in the United 
States caused bankruptcies and factory closures in Ulster.
34
  Agricultural imports such as 
grain from the United States also impacted the development of Ulster’s rural economy.
35
  
Technological improvements, particularly in transportation, allowed goods to be transferred 
with greater ease, leading to increasingly integrated economies.  Most Irish export trade was 
carried on British vessels through British ports, highlighting the importance of the Union to 
commerce in the eyes of Ulster unionists.
36
 
Technological innovations also changed the ways in which individuals and 
organizations in Ulster and America remained connected with each other.  Developments in 
steam power, and iron and steel construction, meant that transatlantic travel was undertaken 
more quickly and with greater levels of comfort than ever before.
37
  Political and religious 
figures could embark on transatlantic visits in numbers previously unseen.  Transnational 
organizations such as the Triennial World Council of the Loyal Orange Institution and the 
Pan-Presbyterian Alliance were now practical undertakings.  With the successful laying of a 
transatlantic telegraph cable in 1866, transatlantic communications were also possible with 
greater speed and ease.
38
  Individuals and organizations were more quickly informed of news 
and events in other countries.  They could be in more frequent contact across the Atlantic, as 
illustrated by the numerous cables to Edward Carson from North American Orange well-
wishers during the third Home Rule crisis. 
Links between the British and American governments also increased by the end of 
the nineteenth century, aided by Anglo-American rapprochement.  The decisions of each 
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government could now have greater repercussions for citizens in the other country, 
particularly shown through the Irish situation.  Transatlantic linkages between Ireland and 
America grew increasingly important as Irish nationalists used American public opinion to 
pressure the British government over the issues of Home Rule and independence.  American, 
British, and Irish economic competition, technological innovation, and government 
interactions formed important contexts for the Ulster unionists in their views toward the 
United States. 
The present study analyzes the actions of the Ulster unionists in the face of these 
developments and in light of their historic connections to America.  Even though the study 
will focus on the unionist and Protestant elements within Irish society, it is not intended to 
perpetuate the divide between the “two traditions” of Catholic/nationalist and 
Protestant/unionist in Irish and Irish-American history.  Kerby Miller asserts that this model 
“ignores or de-emphasizes the similarities, common interests, and instances of co-operation 
between Protestants and Catholics.  Also, it un-historically homogenizes both traditions, 
slighting the diversity, the complexity, and the socio-cultural and (among Protestants) 
denominational conflicts within each group.”
39
  One of the problems inherent in a 
transnational study is losing sight of the different divisions, identities, and groups within 
each movement, each of which had diverse origins and religious and political traditions.   
While acknowledging the diversity within the movements, this study complements 
the scholarship on Irish nationalists and unionists, and the American Irish.  The study 
explores the Ulster unionist-American relationship to provide a more complete view of the 
interactions between Ireland, Britain, and the United States during the Home Rule period.  
This study does not examine the lives and times of the Scotch-Irish in the United States in 
general.  Their actions and rhetoric are reviewed only to the extent they were directly related 
to Ireland and the Irish political situation.  Rather, the study focuses on the Ulster unionists 
themselves, examining their paradoxical views toward the United States as they reacted to 
and attempted to harness support from America during the Home Rule period. 
Given the gaps in the current literature, several themes remain to be examined, 
which this study will treat in turn.  Each chapter examines an important element of the Ulster 
unionists’ American strategy during the Home Rule era.  Chapters Two and Three provide an 
overview of the relationship between the Ulster unionists and the United States from 1880 to 
1920.  During this time, unionists responded to Irish-American nationalism and the 
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involvement of the United States government on the Irish question, and attempted to garner 
support for their own movement.  Chapter Four turns toward the United States, investigating 
the revival of Scotch-Irish ethnicity and associational culture at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  Two organizations in particular, the Scotch-Irish Society of America and the Loyal 
Orange Institution of the United States, are analyzed in terms of their continuing links to 
Ireland and attitudes toward Irish Home Rule.  The chapter then looks at the ways in which 
Ulster unionists utilized Scotch-Irish identity and actions to aid in the formation of a separate 
“Ulsterman” identity.  Chapter Five provides case-studies of visits by unionists to the United 
States as they endeavored to counter nationalist influence and build up a unionist following.  
Chapter Six builds on the connections between the Ulstermen and the Scotch-Irish by 
exploring the impact of religion on the unionists’ relationship with the United States.  
Religion became a significant theme in interactions with America.  Religious institutions 
provided opportunities for the transatlantic promotion of unionism.  Chapter Seven examines 
the impact of American history and politics on the Ulster unionist movement as a whole.  
Examples from the United States were regularly employed to justify unionist stances and 
oppose the proposed Home Rule settlements.  Finally, Chapter Eight concludes that the 
inability of Ulster unionists to effectively deal with the United States in the present day has 
roots in the relationship between unionists and America during the Home Rule era. 
In analyzing the relationship between Ulster unionism and America, this study 
utilizes a wide variety of primary printed and manuscript sources.  In determining which 
sources to use, a balance was sought between examining the views of the unionist leadership 
and Members of Parliament, and popular unionism.  British and southern Irish unionist views 
are also included when they proved particularly illuminating on the relationship between 
unionism and America, as they help to provide the context in which Ulster unionists were 
working.  Such views are also included where they were giving speeches in Ulster or 
promoted in Ulster, such as Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union pamphlets disseminating the 
views of Joseph Chamberlain, the Marquess of Hartington, and George Goschen.  Archival 
sources are used from the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland and the Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, including previously underutilized materials on the American 
Orange Order.  A wide variety of other sources are also employed in an attempt to gain a 
representative cross-section of views on the relationship between Ulster unionists and 
America.  This includes government documents such as the Parliamentary Debates, 
organization minutes and reports, pamphlets and leaflets, journal articles and book sections, 
and books such as novels, historical and ethnic studies, memoirs, and political studies.  
Newspaper articles are also used to document editorial opinions, public and parliamentary 
11 
 
speeches, and to augment records that would be otherwise limited in their availability such as 
those of the American Orange Order and the Scotch-Irish Society of America. 
The examination of the political and intellectual interactions between Ulster 
unionism and America will allow a richer understanding of how Ulster unionists approached 
their own movement and how they responded to Irish nationalists.  This thesis explores the 
Ulster identity, the Scotch-Irish experience in the United States, and the links between Ulster 
and America.  Ultimately, this study illuminates the complex ties between Ulster unionists 
and America during the Home Rule era, which sparked a theme of United States involvement 




II. THE “EL DORADO” OF IRELAND: ULSTER UNIONISTS AND IRISH-AMERICAN 
NATIONALISM IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
“During the present century there has not been a parallel for the crimes perpetrated in 
the comparatively brief period to which we refer.  The Land League derived its 
strength from the liberality of American and Irish-American contributors to the fund; 
the conspiracies in this country were organized by agents from America; and the 
most serious assaults upon life and property were planned or perpetrated by men 
wearing American masks.” 
- Belfast News-Letter, 2 July 1883 
 
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Irish unionists increasingly 
associated Irish-America with violence and extremism.  Inspired by such figures as Patrick 
Ford, John Devoy, and Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa, Irish-American nationalists were heavily 
involved in the Fenian Brotherhood and Clan-na-Gael.  They conducted attempted invasions 
of Canada in the late 1860s and early 1870s, helped to orchestrate the dynamite campaign 
and land wars of the early 1880s, and supported the Home Rule movement, which 
culminated in two Home Rule crises in 1886 and 1893.  The extremist image of Irish-
America was so powerful that unionists began to associate the whole of Irish nationalism 
with the violence and separatism advocated by “men wearing American masks.” 
This chapter addresses gaps in the historical literature through an exploration of 
unionist characterizations of the United States and responses to Irish-America through the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century.  The chapter utilizes a wide variety of primary 
sources to examine views propounded by the unionist leadership, Members of Parliament, 
and popular unionism.  The dynamite campaign, land wars, and first two Home Rule crises 
provide the context for the unionist relationship with America during this period. 
Unionists denounced American funding of Irish nationalism, condemned Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP) connections to violence and crime, and feared the threat of 
separatism.  Unionists also emphasized the international appeal of their own movement as 
they attempted to draw support from the United States in their campaigns against Home 
Rule.  Ultimately, this chapter concludes that the unionists’ approach to the United States 
was paradoxical and multifaceted, as they attempted to condemn Irish-American influence 
and extremism while at the same time seeking American aid for their own movement. 
 
Irish-American Community, 1840-1880 
 As Irish Catholic immigration increased in the 1840s, the United States was a society 
in transition beset with economic turbulence and political tension.  An estimated 1.5 million 
13 
Irish immigrated to the United States between 1846 and 1855 as a result of the Great Famine.  
They were mainly poor, unskilled workers from rural areas.
1
  Irish immigrants arriving in the 
United States were faced with ingrained Protestant hierarchies and socioeconomic structures, 
during a time of Protestant revivalism.  Persistent nativism also pervaded, coming to a head 
with the Know-Nothingism of the 1850s.  Irish-Americans turned inward to their own 
community for support, developing a unique communal identity based on the Catholic 
Church, Democratic Party, labor movements, and nationalist organizations.
2
 
 The development of ethnic identity was central to national self-identification in the 
United States.  Kevin Kenny asserts that “in neither Britain nor Australia did ethnicity (Irish 
or otherwise) assume the historical importance it has had in the United States.”
3
  Assuming 
an Irish-American ethnic identity was an important step in assimilating to American society.  
Even as increasingly close ties with the Catholic Church and Democratic Party led to conflict 
with mainstream American society, these same organizations helped Irish-Americans to gain 
a foothold in their local communities.
4
  Participation in religious, political, and labor 
organizations was a means for eventual advancement in American society. 
 Throughout the country, Irish immigrants were closely associated with the 
Democratic Party.  In New York City, they fell under the influence of Tammany Hall 
machine politics.  From the 1840s, Tammany Hall lobbied for the support of prominent Irish 
constituencies in the city such as the police, volunteer fire companies, and saloon keepers.  
William “Boss” Tweed, though himself of Scotch-Irish descent, used a system of patronage 
to guarantee the support of New York City’s Irish.  A New York Times article in 1869 noted 
that the Tweed Ring gave only 46 city jobs to Germans, while the Irish received 754.
5
  The 
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patronage of the Tweed Ring allowed Irish-Americans to gain key leadership roles and 
significant positions within New York City politics. 
 The deadly Orange Riots of 1870 and 1871, arising out of festering ethnic and class 
divisions, led New York elites to join with Irish-American representatives in a reform 
coalition which forced the Tweed Ring out of power.
6
  Having supported city elites in their 
reform efforts, “Honest” John Kelly assumed Tammany Hall leadership in 1872.  The Irish 
themselves now had direct control over New York City politics.  New York City’s first Irish-
born Catholic mayor, William R. Grace, was elected in 1880.
7
  Irish-Americans also gained 
prominence in other major cities as they grew in size, income, and social status.  Boston’s 
first Irish-born Catholic mayor, Hugh O’Brien, was elected in 1884.
8
  The development of 
Irish-Americans as a more unified political group led the two main political parties to vie for 
Irish-American support on the national level. 
 The Irish were also closely associated with American labor movements.  Irish-
Americans were involved in the founding of such organizations as the American Federation 
of Labor and the Knights of Labor.  These organizations denounced the wage labor system 
and worked for educational programs, land redistribution, and cooperative enterprise.
9
  The 
Molly Maguires, a secret society of Irish mine workers in Pennsylvania, also protested 
against low wages, poor conditions, and military conscription in the 1860s.  They became 
extremist and violent, linked with a string of killings from 1862 to 1875.
10
  Based on the 
actions of the Molly Maguires, the attempted Fenian invasions of Canada, and Irish-
American rioting, Irish unionists would later foster an image of Irish-America as inherently 
violent, corrupt, and immoral. 
  Nevertheless, the participation of Irish immigrants in political and labor movements 
contributed to a unique Irish-American identity.  In many ways, involvement in these 
movements reflected a spirit of activism that was also present within the nationalist 
movement.  At times, activism over American political and socioeconomic conditions went 
hand-in-hand with the cause of Irish nationalism, such as through Patrick Ford’s prominent 
nationalist newspaper, the Irish World and American Industrial Liberator.  Ford was an 
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Irish-born journalist who immigrated with his family to Boston when he was four years old.  
After working under famed reformer William Lloyd Garrison, he founded the Irish World in 
1870.  Through its pages, Ford supported trade unions, strikes, and labor reform movements, 
at times backing the Greenback-Labor Party and even the Republican Party rather than the 
Democrats.  Ford believed that the labor struggle in the United States paralleled the struggle 
for land reform in Ireland, which grew in prominence throughout the 1870s.
11
 
 While participating in political and labor movements, Irish-Americans also built up a 
strong nationalist movement.  The development of Irish-American nationalism was based on 
two major components.  The first was genuine support within the immigrant community for 
Irish self-government, spurred by residual Anglophobia and perceptions that British actions 
had forced the Irish to emigrate.
12
  The second, as Thomas Brown describes, was a response 
to the poverty and weakness of Irish Catholic immigrants within American society.  
Nationalists hoped that through the betterment of Ireland itself, Irish-Americans could rise 
above nativist prejudices and gain acceptance, success, and prosperity in their new home.
13
 
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the United States was transforming 
from a primarily rural, agricultural society to a more urbanized, industrial world power.  As 
immigration levels soared, the country was home to immigrants not only from Western 
Europe, but all over the world.
14
  Between 1870 and 1930, 2.5 million more Irish immigrants 
arrived in the United States, ensuring that as momentous changes were occurring in 
American and Irish society, Irish-Americans would play significant roles in both the United 
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Coercion and Dynamite 
 Irish-American nationalist promotion of Irish Home Rule and independence was 
driven by a wide range of factors.  Many Irish-Americans worked for their own advancement 
within American society through their quest for Irish self-government.  Brown writes that the 
immigrants supported collective action through which they “would win Irish national 
freedom and thus the respect of Americans; and would also advance their material 
interests.”
15
  Following the Civil War, Irish-Americans swelled the ranks of nationalist 
organizations such as the Fenian Brotherhood, which attempted to invade Canada in 1866 
and 1870.
16
  Many joined the powerful Clan-na-Gael, formed in 1867 by Jerome Collins in 
reaction to Fenian factionalism.  By the mid-1870s, the Clan-na-Gael had 10,000 mainly 
working-class members, though it was under the control of middle class leaders such as John 
Devoy and Dr. William Carroll.
17
 
 Ford’s Irish World was also an important force in both Irish-America and Ireland, 
becoming the most popular Irish-American newspaper of the late nineteenth century.
18
  His 
promotion of political and social movements on both sides of the Atlantic made Ford an ideal 
ally for Michael Davitt, the Irish land reform leader.  Davitt visited the United States in 1878 
and 1880 to promote the cause of Irish land reform, exchange ideas with Ford and other 
Irish-American leaders, and help lay foundations for the American branch of the Land 
League.
19
  Ford became the single most valuable source of support for the Land League 
Fund, raising $345,072 between 1880 and 1881.
20
  In the minds of Irish unionists, Ford was 
the individual most associated with funding radical nationalist programs, symbolizing 
American monetary control over Irish nationalism. 
 In his 1882 book, The American Irish and Their Influence on Irish Politics, Philip H. 
Bagenal wrote that the root of American funding was the bitterness of second-generation 
Irish-Americans, who were often more “Irish” in sentiment than their parents.  Bagenal was 
an Irish civil servant and political writer who penned a number of books and pamphlets 
against IPP leader Charles Stewart Parnell, MP for Cork City, and his followers.  Bagenal 
described the “vast Irish democracy” in the United States, living in tenements or factory 
towns, working as miners or domestic servants.  He wrote, “It is these who form the 
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constituencies of anti-English demagogues, and who contribute their money to the various 
‘funds’ which have become, indeed, the root of all political evil in Ireland.”
21
  Bagenal 
maintained that “without the American Irish aid and that material assistance which always 
forms the real sinews of business as well as of war, the efforts of Mr. Parnell and his party 
must have been comparatively feeble.”
22
  According to Bagenal, Parnell recognized the 
potential of support from Irish-Americans who had been indoctrinated with anti-English 
attitudes and who were the driving force funding Irish nationalism and land agitation. 
By the end of the 1870s, Ford, Devoy, Carroll, and the Clan-na-Gael adopted a 
policy of close cooperation with Parnell and his followers in Parliament.  During his 1878 
American visit, Davitt worked with Devoy and Carroll to design the New Departure.  They 
called for peasant land agitation to rouse the Irish populace to fight for separatism.
23
  They 
hoped to pool the resources between the revolutionary side of the nationalist movement and 
the constitutional side, led by Parnell.  In his 1884 pamphlet entitled “Two Irelands; or, 
Loyalty versus Treason,” Edward Saunderson reflected that the New Departure was the 
turning point for Irish nationalism.  Saunderson, a Cavan landlord and politician, would soon 
after be elected MP for North Armagh and become the leader of the parliamentary Ulster 
Unionist Party.
24
  He wrote, “The happy family of Revolutionists in America quickly 
responded with money from the Fenian Treasury, while Mr. Parnell, the impoverished 
landlord of daring and unscrupulous temperament, having very little to lose and much to gain 
by the new move, threw himself heart and soul in with the others.”
25
  In fact, Parnell never 
formally agreed to the terms of the New Departure, preferring the benefits of keeping himself 
slightly detached from the proceedings while still profiting from American financial and 
political support.
26
  The New Departure reoriented the focus of Irish nationalism toward land 
reform, while making the movement ever more dependent on the tacit support of Parnell. 
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According to Saunderson, leaders of the New Departure deceived American donors 
as to the use of their money.  When they donated money for the relief of Irish rural distress, 
the funds were instead used to support Parnellite MPs and violent Land Leaguers.  
Saunderson wrote that Catholic clergymen had begged for funds to help their suffering flocks 
in distressed regions of Ireland, but received little aid.  “It was not for these purposes that the 
money was used, but in payment of the expenses of returning and keeping certain men in 
parliament, and in the providing of Captain Moonlight and others of that ilk with rewards for 
valour.”
27
  Interestingly, Saunderson chose to show sympathy toward the Catholic clergy 
rather than the typical hostility of an Orangeman.  This coincided with a strain of thought 
within unionism, which at times portrayed Irish and Irish-American nationalists as irreligious 
and anti-Catholic.  This underlined the immoral and violent tendencies symbolized by the 
savagery of “Captain Moonlight.”
28
  In Saunderson’s interpretation, the Irish and Irish-
American nationalist leaders were betraying their American donors, the Catholic Church, 
and, above all, the interests of the Irish people. 
The practices of the New Departure and the Land League were officially legal and 
nonviolent, though they were also linked with extremist rhetoric and a reliance on what R.F. 
Foster terms “implicit violence.”
29
  Parnell himself walked a thin line between promoting 
constitutional solutions to Ireland’s problems and flirting with militant extremism.  He 
arrived in the United States for a three month tour starting in January 1880, speaking in 62 
cities, addressing the House of Representatives, and raising $300,000 for the Land League.
30
  
Parnell’s own turn toward radical rhetoric was symbolized by his speech in Cincinnati on 23 
February, in which he reportedly declared that the Irish nationalists would never “be satisfied 
until we have destroyed the last link which keeps Ireland bound to England.”
31
 
 The Belfast News-Letter hoped that Parnell’s extremist language would turn the 
United States against him.  An editorial on 6 February 1881 reported, “There are 
unmistakable signs that the tide is completely turning against Mr. Parnell in America.  ‘The 
wretched agitator’… is now being universally condemned by the Press of the United States 
for his attacks upon the Duchess of Marlborough and the Mansion House committees, and it 
is stated that the strong language in which he has indulged regarding them will probably 
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complete the ruin of his mission.”
32
  However, in actuality Parnell became increasingly 
popular with Irish-America.  Through his use of extremist language, Parnell attempted to 
placate the revolutionary faction while steering Irish nationalist policy through a 
constitutional course.  At the same time, he personally became very important to Irish-
America as a leader and symbol of national unity.
33
 
 In Ireland, tensions increased over land disturbances.  Land League demands for 
tenant rights and redistribution of land led to the eruption of a land war, in which methods of 
boycotting and intimidation were utilized.  Though the Land League remained officially 
nonviolent, unionist writers characterized it as extreme and terroristic.  The root of Land 
League extremism, according to one unionist pamphleteer, lay in the United States: 
“Subscriptions were pouring into its coffers from America, meetings were being held, violent 
speeches were being made, and the system of terrorism had been instituted.”
34
  In another 
pamphlet, Bagenal presented rural distress in Ireland as being manipulated by Irish-
American separatists for their own purposes.  He wrote, “That agitation had its origin in the 
distress of the farmers of Connaught, which was skilfully used by American emissaries for 
the purpose of sowing the seeds of discontent and revolution.”
35
  According to Bagenal, 
Irish-American extremists were taking advantage of legitimate claims of rural distress to sow 
the seeds of rebellion and separatism. 
The mounting agrarian crisis led Prime Minister William E. Gladstone’s Liberal 
government to introduce coercive measures through the Protection of Persons and Property 
Act of 1881 and the Prevention of Crime Act in 1882.  Goldwin Smith, an English Liberal 
intellectual and journalist who had settled in Canada, wrote that the government’s coercive 
measures were actually the removal of Land League coercion.  He believed that the land 
movement would have died out were it not for American financial support. 
It is from the United States, not from Ireland itself, that almost the whole of the 
money for rebellion is drawn.  We cannot help admiring the love with which the 
heart of the Irish emigrant glows for his mother country; unselfish sentiment does 
honour to a race even though it may be misguided.  But observation and inquiry 
have satisfied me that the Irish character in America, as well as at home, while 
strong in affection is weak in independence, and that many of these people subscribe 
to Fenianism under pressure, and, if they were left to themselves, would be glad to 
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To Smith, Irish-Americans rather than the Irish themselves were driving land agitation.  Even 
the support of Irish-Americans was not genuine, however, as their actions were forced by 
intimidation and “social boycotting” from Fenian leaders.  The blame for Irish disturbances 
was laid at the door of a few Irish-American leaders who were not representative of opinions 
in Ireland or America as a whole. 
Along with coercion, the Gladstone government also attempted conciliation through 
the 1881 Land Law Act.
37
  The Belfast News-Letter complained that conciliatory measures 
had little impact but to spur on violence and boycotting.  “What they have been taught 
hitherto,” claimed an editorial of 9 July 1881, “is that they have only to agitate and organize 
and be violent, and concessions will follow.  The agitators, who find their countrymen in 
America contributing weekly their hundreds of pounds, are not likely to abandon so 
profitable a trade; and herein lies the source of many a future danger.”
38
  In this view, 
concessions from the British government would have the effect of increasing the Irish-
American donations which drove the land agitation.  Land agitation would not be abandoned 
as long as it remained lucrative for the perpetrators. 
The American government was drawn into the situation when some land agitators 
who were arrested under coercion claimed protection as United States citizens.  James 
Russell Lowell, the American minister in London, was charged with protecting the rights of 
United States citizens in Britain and Ireland.  While Lowell was sympathetic to Home Rule 
policies, he looked on Irish-American agitators as taking advantage of their American 
citizenship while their loyalties lay with a foreign country.  He wrote in a State Department 
dispatch of 14 March 1882, “Naturalized Irishmen seem entirely to misconceive the process 
through which they have passed in assuming American citizenship, looking upon themselves 
as Irishmen who have acquired American protection, rather than as Americans who have 
renounced a claim to Irish nationality.”
39
  Though the American government did not want to 
hamper the British government’s prosecution of criminals, the State Department insisted on 
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President Chester A. Arthur’s administration and the State Department worked to 
strike a balance between protecting the rights of citizens abroad, maintaining Anglo-
American relations, and addressing the concerns of Irish-American pressure groups.  
Through the end of 1881 and beginning of 1882, Lowell continued talks with the British 
government.  Ultimately, most of the prisoners were released after they agreed to return to 
the United States.  This did not stop a mass meeting of New York Irishmen led by Mayor 




A Tory writer in the Quarterly Review denounced Gladstone’s inability to deal 
constructively with the land war and his agreement to return prisoners to the United States, 
complaining, “He has filled the gaols with ‘suspects,’ and his one idea appears to have been 
to keep them there, but the United States have already caused him to release some of the 
most dangerous of prisoners – the American Fenians.”
42
  The writer saw no end to land 
agitation so long as money came in from America: “The funds with which the ‘social 
revolution’ is carried on come almost entirely from the United States, and now it is 
advertised to the world that plots against the British Government may safely be carried on 




The Belfast News-Letter also emphasized that the profitability of extremism meant 
that there could be no peace in Ireland as long as money was coming in from America.  An 
editorial on 26 September 1881 noted, “The paymasters of the League are at the other side of 
the Atlantic, and they will button up their pockets if they do not get what they look upon as 
value for their money.  An occasional landlord shot is an acceptable sacrifice to the dynamite 
Fenians.  A recalcitrant tenant boycotted or carded is a tribute to their generosity.”
44
 
The Land League’s American funding was connected to even more extreme 
elements within Irish-American nationalism, those who promoted dynamite campaigns in 
major British cities starting in 1881.
45
  The dynamite campaign was the work of the Clan-na-
Gael and Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa, an Irish nationalist who had permanently settled in the 
United States in 1871.  They were supported by the Skirmishing Fund, which had been set up 
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in 1875 to finance guerilla warfare against the British.
46
  The first dynamite attack came on 
14 January 1881 on Salford Barracks.  Further attempts were made in spring 1881 on the 
Mansion House, Liverpool Town Hall, and a Liverpool police station.
47
 
Even before these attacks, British diplomats were aware of the Skirmishing Fund, 
which was advertised in major Irish-American newspapers including the Irish World and 
Rossa’s United Irishman.  As the threat of further dynamite attacks loomed in 1881, the 
British government began to investigate Irish-American newspapers and pressure the 
American government to suppress the Skirmishing Fund subscription campaigns.
48
  The 
Belfast News-Letter complained, 
O’Donovan Rossa and others like him make their livelihood by advocating schemes 
of wholesale destruction and assassination; and it is impossible not to recognise the 
miserable fact that large numbers of Irish people in the United States are so utterly 
lost to all sense of rectitude and morality as to support and subscribe to assassination 
funds and journals which advocate the wholesale destruction of life and property.
49
 
American newspapers and journals were blamed for disseminating information about the 
funds, which led to the dynamite campaign itself. 
H.O. Arnold-Forster, in his 1881 pamphlet on “The Truth about the Land League,” 
held similar bleak views on the role of the Irish-American press.  He asserted, “The Irish 
World is the advocate of – 1. Private murder, 2. Rebellion and treason, 3. Mutilation, 4. 
Plunder and robbery, 5. Assassination on a large scale by means of explosives.”
50
  
Furthermore, he believed the Irish World and the Skirmishing Fund to be intimately 
connected with the Land League and Parnell.  Arnold-Forster was an apologist of his foster 
father, then-Chief Secretary for Ireland W.E. Forster, who was associated with strict 
protection of law and order.  Forster had Parnell arrested in 1881 and suppressed the Land 
League.  Both Forster and Arnold-Forster broke with Gladstone when Parnell was released 
from jail on 2 May 1882 upon agreement of the Kilmainham Treaty.
51
 
Just four days later, the new Chief Secretary for Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish, 
and the permanent undersecretary, Thomas Burke, were murdered in Dublin’s Phoenix Park.  
The murders were committed by a fringe nationalist group, the Irish Invincibles, which had 
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only nominal connections with the United States.  The Belfast News-Letter reported, “In all 
its aspects the tragedy was terrible and revolting; but those who know how widely spread are 
the ramifications of Fenianism, and how broadcast the seeds of sedition have been sown, 
have long been prepared to hear of some such desperate attempt to destroy life or property, 
or both, in pursuance of the villainous designs advocated by the men of the O’Donovan 
Rossa school.”
52
  The newspaper portrayed a growing atmosphere of violence in Ireland, 
fueled by Irish-American extremism.  The influence of America made an event such as the 
Phoenix Park murders tragically inevitable, even if Irish-Americans themselves were not 
directly responsible. 
For the time being, the Phoenix Park murders cut off any possibility of a constructive 
relationship between the IPP and the British government.
53
  Irish agrarian violence 
temporarily abated, but the raising of money for dynamite campaigns continued.  Initially, 
British remonstrances on Irish-American newspapers had little impact on the United States 
government, which could not act without explicit evidence of connections to actual acts of 
violence and was reluctant to risk alienating Irish-American voters.
54
  The Irish-American 
nationalist movement itself, however, was impacted by the dynamite campaign.  The 
violence and extremism of the campaign alienated potential American and British support for 
Irish causes.  The American public no longer sympathized with Irish-American 
revolutionaries, who because of their violent tactics were no longer associated with romantic 
nationalism as they had been during the 1860s.  Both the American public and the United 
States government increasingly supported Gladstone’s efforts in finding a moderate, 
constitutional solution to Ireland’s problems.
55
  In addition, disagreement over the use of the 
Skirmishing Fund led to factionalism within Irish-America.  The Chicago convention in early 
August broke up because of disagreements over dynamite, and Irish-American organizations 
suffered from internal divisions.
56
  The violence and extremism of the dynamite campaign 
also reaffirmed to unionists that the Irish could not be trusted to govern themselves. 
In response to the continuing threat of dynamite, the British government and 
consular officials in the United States hired Pinkerton Detectives and began early attempts at 
forming a secret service, gathering intelligence data and using undercover agents.
57
  Further 
dynamite attacks were made in Glasgow and London in 1883 and 1884.  The Belfast News-
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Letter believed that it was hopeless to look for help from the American government because 
of the influence of Irish-American voters.  The solidity of the Irish vote, the paper stated, 
“depends on the line of policy adopted by such leaders as Ford of the Irish World and 
O’Donovan Rossa, of Skirmishing Fund swindle notoriety.  For these reasons Republicans 




 On 24 January 1885, dynamite bombs exploded in Westminster and at the Tower of 
London.  Public opinion in America – as in Britain – was outraged, with newspapers 
denouncing the dynamiters, and congressmen condemning the events.
59
  The Saturday 
Review commented, “It must seem to every fair-minded Englishman slightly unreasonable to 
objurgate America for not restraining her Fords and her O’Donovan Rossas when we let 
agitators of every rank, from Mr. Parnell to the riff-raff of the Irish town councils, rave and 
insinuate as they please; which despite our knowledge that these men could break up the 
whole gang if they chose, we tolerate their toleration and wink at their connivance.”
60
  
Parnell was portrayed as having close control over all aspects of Irish nationalism, including 
the American organizations and the dynamiters. 
 With Gladstone’s conversion to Home Rule in late 1885, the dynamite campaign 
halted.  The Clan-na-Gael faced further organizational factionalism because of executives 
embezzling funds, which also impacted the dynamite campaign.
61
  When Parnell spoke in 
Parliament in support of the Home Rule Bill on 8 April 1886, he had to assure the House of 
Commons that the promise of such a bill would quell the extremism of Ford and the Clan-na-
Gael, and that the dynamite campaign was not a reflection of the Irish in general.
62
  
Nevertheless, Irish unionists seized on extremist images of Irish-America and the dynamiters 
as part of their campaign to counter the Home Rule movement. 
 
First Home Rule Crisis 
 Even before the first Home Rule crisis, unionists had developed an image of Irish-
America which emphasized its violence and extremism.  Unionists claimed that land 
agitation and dynamite outrages could never be stopped while Irish-America controlled the 
financing of the nationalist movement.  Nationalists committed these outrages not for 
ideological reasons but because that was what Irish-American extremists demanded in return 
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for their money.  Irish nationalism was discredited by being funded and controlled by a 
foreign power, and unionists claimed that nationalism had little genuine support in Ireland or 
indeed Irish-America.  Dynamite and agitation were seen as lucrative trades controlled by an 
extremist minority, which duped the average Irishman and Irish-American who only wished 
to help relieve rural distress.  This pattern of responses to Irish-American extremism would 
be utilized to an even greater extent throughout 1885-1886, as unionists formally organized 
for the first time in response to the Home Rule threat. 
 The November/December 1885 general election gave Irish nationalists the balance of 
power in the House of Commons.  Lord Salisbury and the Conservatives managed to stay in 
government for only a month before the IPP combined with the Liberals to throw them out of 
office, initiating Gladstone’s third ministry.
63
  With the imminent threat of Home Rule, 
unionists began to organize both in Ireland and the United Kingdom as a whole.  Dublin’s 
Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union (ILPU) formed in May 1885, leading the effort to spread 
information and propaganda for the unionist cause.  In Ulster, local organization developed 
through the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union (ULAU), a central association for registration 
and propaganda founded in January 1886.  Ulster Conservatives worked to forge an electoral 
alliance with local Liberals, who declared their support of Union in March 1886.
64
  In 
Parliament, Conservatives and Liberals joined in an uneasy alliance to form the Ulster 
Unionist Party, led by Saunderson.
65
 
 Gladstone introduced the first Home Rule Bill on 8 April 1886.
66
  In debates from 
April to June, the United States played a prominent role.  American historical and 
constitutional examples were frequently called upon, particularly by future Liberal Unionists 
such as Joseph Chamberlain, the Marquess of Hartington, and George Goschen.
67
  Many 
unionists also attacked the claims of the Liberal Chief Secretary for Ireland, John Morley, 
that dynamiters and assassins would be delighted if Home Rule was rejected.  Morley noted 
that the growth of Irish-America had drastically transformed Irish politics since the time of 
Daniel O’Connell, stating, “The growth of Ireland across the seas has given to the Irish 
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people at home a self-confidence, and a moral power, and a command of material resources 
of which O’Connell never dreamt.”
68
 
Goschen, the MP for East Edinburgh, condemned Morley’s arguments, stating, “The 
Chief Secretary continually recalls the Irish-Americans; and I trust the House will bear his 
warning constantly in mind, and then apply it to all of the analogies he used in favour of this 
bill.  When the analogy of the Colonies is put to us, we may ask whether in that case, we 
have the same danger, or the same influences of the Irish-Americans?”
69
  Unlike Morley, 
Goschen and other unionists were not worried about the reaction of Irish-America if Home 
Rule were defeated.  Rather they were concerned about the impact of Irish-America on a 
Home Rule government which would surely retain the high levels of American influence 
including incitement to violence. 
Unionists worried that this influence would extend to a new Dublin parliament.  
Lord Randolph Churchill, Conservative MP for South Paddington, emphasized that 
experiences of extremism, such as crime, outrage, assassination, and dynamite, had colored 
views against Home Rule.  He feared that Ford and other Irish-American extremists would 
find places in the Home Rule government.
70
  Goschen echoed this fear, asking, “Can we be 
sure that the new Irish Executive will not have a very difficult task to prevent the 
conspirators, dynamiters, and Nihilists from flocking into Ireland?... I say it will be a difficult 
task for those whose movement has succeeded, if it does succeed, through the subscriptions 
which have come to it from Irish Americans, it will be a difficult task for the new Executive 
to close the doors in Dublin on their allies from the other side of the water.”
71
  Irish-
American financial influence was feared because it would lead extremists to control the 
Dublin parliament. 
Francis Hughes-Hallett, Conservative MP for Rochester, feared that separation 
would be the next demand of the Irish-Americans: “Supposing the Parliament proposed by 
this Bill were established in Dublin, it seemed to him that the Representatives of the 
Nationalist Party now or in the future would be subject to wire-pulling by a Council sitting in 
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Chicago or New York.”
72
  The existence and influence of Irish-America meant that 
separatism would always be a threat.  Unionists argued that demands for further Irish 
autonomy would not stop if Home Rule was granted.  Complete separation would be the next 
step.  Unionists maintained that preserving a full connection within the Union was safer than 
granting a half-measure like Home Rule which would allow Irish-American extremists to 
seize power. 
Unionists also believed that Parnell and other IPP members held separatist aims 
which were concealed in Parliament but revealed in America.  William Johnston, famed 
Orangeman and MP for South Belfast, asserted, “Members knew what were the aims of the 
hon. Member for Cork.  The hon. Member had never concealed them from sympathetic 
audiences in Ireland, and still more in America, whence he recruited his treasury.  His aims 
were the disruption of the British Empire and the severance of the last link which bound 
Ireland to the British Crown.”
73
  Saunderson also accused Parnell of revealing his true 
separatist aims in America.
74
  Unionists cited IPP speeches made in the United States, with 
George Trevelyan and Edward King-Harman both quoting Parnell’s famous “Last Link” 
speech, as well as T.M. Healy’s 1881 “Begone Saxon” speech given in Boston.
75
 
 Unionists drew upon these speeches to illustrate the extreme rhetoric in which 
nationalists indulged while in the United States.  The Marquess of Hartington, Liberal 
Unionist MP for Rossendale and former Chief Secretary for Ireland, stated that even if 
Parnell did not personally advocate separatism, he still aggravated the situation by failing to 
denounce American extremism.  “He seems to set up America as the true and only friend of 
Ireland; but in all his references to America he has never found time to utter one word of 
disapproval or misgiving about what is known as the assassination literature of that 
country.”
76
  Unionists accused Parnell, with his wide-ranging personal influence over the 
nationalist movement, of never discouraging American extremism even if he claimed in 
Parliament that his only aim was a constitutional solution. 
 Unionists alleged that this ambiguity was due to the influence of American money.  
Saunderson in particular focused on the American funding aspect in his speeches, stating, 
Let me suppose – which, of course, is very hard to suppose – that Russia succeeded, 
by corruptly subsidizing a certain number of Members of this House, in getting a 
Bill passed, and the Bill was passed by a majority of the men so bribed, should we 
not be justified in employing all the power we possess in contending against and in 
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fighting against such a measure?  Well, Sir, what is the case at present?  There are 
85 Members of this House paid by America.
77
 
He was forced to withdraw the charges, but Saunderson’s accusation of bribery revealed the 
extent to which the IPP was perceived to be controlled by a foreign power, Irish-America, 
rather than representing Irish interests. 
 In fact, unionists argued, the cause of Home Rule did not appeal to most Irishmen at 
all.  King-Harman, a unionist who had formerly been a Buttite Home Rule MP, stated, 
In Mr. [Isaac] Butt’s time, the state of Ireland was very different from what it was 
now.  Freedom of opinion was allowed, for there was no National League, no 
‘Boycotting,’ and no American agitators; and yet Mr. Butt could not with all his 
eloquence arouse the slightest degree of enthusiasm for the cause he espoused, and he 
(Colonel King-Harman) ventured to say there was little more enthusiasm now in the 
hearts of the people than there was in Mr. Butt’s time.
78
 
American agitation and funding had made Irish nationalist causes more prominent, King-
Harman argued, but they did not have the support of the Irish people. 
 In addition, unionists maintained that Irish-American extremism and violence was 
not supported by Americans in general.  Hartington declared, “There is not an American that 
does not scorn it, and spurn it and loathe it, as you do.”
79
  While Republicans and Democrats 
vied for the Irish-American vote, Saunderson stated that he very much doubted “whether the 
language used at recent meetings in America is likely to gain either of these two Parties to 
the cause of Ireland.”  He asserted that violent language would not attract the sympathy of 
the “great American people.”  In so doing, Saunderson implied that the support of the 
American public would be with the unionists.
80
 
 Ulster was upheld as the one part of Ireland free from the degrading influence of 
Irish-America.  Lord George Hamilton, Conservative MP for Ealing, contrasted the 
extremism in the south of Ireland with law-abiding Ulster.  “I have lived a great part of my 
life among the people of the North of Ireland,” he said, “and I assert that no more meritorious 
people are to be found on the whole face of the earth…. They have expelled crime and 
outrage, and, at the instigation of the Prime Minister himself, have shown themselves 
supporters of law and order.”
81
  According to Hamilton, Ulster was at odds with the rest of 
Ireland, where nationalists were susceptible to resort to crime and outrage in return for 
American money. 
Just as in Parliament, Irish-American extremism also formed a significant portion of 
unionist discourse in the public realm, as shown in their leaflets, pamphlets, journal and 
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newspaper articles, and speeches.  Many of these were facilitated by the ILPU, which in 
1886 adopted an extensive program of public meetings throughout Britain and Ireland, and 
established a press bureau.  They published and circulated eleven million leaflets, half a 
million pamphlets, and over twenty thousand posters and maps in that year alone.
82
 
Unionists made similar arguments both in and out of Parliament.  Condemnation of 
American funding of Irish nationalism formed a major part of the anti-Home Rule campaign.  
Irish historian W.E.H. Lecky accused the Irish nationalists of being under the control of a 
foreign power, working for policies demanded by Irish-Americans in exchange for financial 
support.
83
  Reverend J.B. Crozier, speaking at a Holywood town meeting, asserted that any 
attempt to appease the American-paid nationalists with Home Rule would be as craven as a 
father throwing his children to wolves.  He cited Parnell’s 1880 speech at Troy, New York, 
stating, “Mr. Parnell had not scrupled to accept one hundred dollars from a person in 
America for the distressed Irish people on the stipulation that ‘thirty dollars were for bread 
and seventy dollars were for lead.’”
84
  Unionists closely monitored and reported on speeches 
of Irish nationalists in America, and scrutinized Irish-American newspapers such as the Irish 
World.  Parnell’s “Last Link” speech was frequently alluded to as proof of his true separatist 
intentions, which were closely guarded in Parliament but revealed in America.
85
  Healy’s 
“Begone Saxon” speech was also repeatedly referenced, with an entire ILPU pamphlet 
devoted to publicizing his comparison of the British to Satan.
86
 
Unionist pamphlet literature often recounted the history of Irish nationalist 
connections to Irish-America, through Devoy, Davitt, Ford, and Irish-American 
organizational treasurer Patrick Egan.  Pamphleteers asserted that American paymasters 
dictated separatist policy in return for their financial support.  If the British Parliament 
enacted Home Rule, it would be creating a perpetual source of weakness and eventually a 
hostile country on its neighboring island.
87
  Charles Lewis, then-MP for Londonderry City, 
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stated that establishing a Home Rule parliament would mean submitting the loyal population 
of Ireland to the “slavery of the Leaguers and dynamiters and Fenians of the United States of 
America.”
88
  As in Parliament, unionists in the public realm worried over the influence which 
Irish-Americans would maintain over a potential Home Rule government.
89
 
Unionists in the public realm also argued that the Irish and Irish-American 
nationalists were not representative of the Irish people as a whole.  They asserted that a 
“foreign conspiracy” – in the form of Irish-American influence – was propping up a 
movement which otherwise would have long since died off.
90
  Lecky wrote that much of the 
movement was of a superficial character driven by professional agitation, “which American 
subsidies have made peculiarly lucrative.”
91
  In a speech at Cardiff, Joseph Chamberlain, 
radical Liberal Unionist MP for West Birmingham, reminded his audience, 
Remember that you are not dealing now with the free opinion of the Irish people – not 
even the free opinion of those three and a half millions whose votes returned the 
eighty-six members to Parliament – but men who, it is notorious, receive the funds and 
therefore take their cues from the enemies of England in the United States of America.  
They take their cues from foreign paymasters.
92
 
Similarly, William Ellison-Macartney, MP for South Antrim, maintained that the Home Rule 
policy appealed to “every other intelligence except that of the people whose interests were at 
stake.”
93
  Unionists maintained that the quest for money was driving the Irish nationalist 
movement rather than the Irish people themselves. 
The American example was utilized by unionists to emphasize that the Irish were not 
fit for self-government.  Speaking in Belfast, Chamberlain described the power of the Irish 
vote in the major cities of America. 
The Government of New York – it was not called an Irish Parliament, it was known by 
the name of the Tammany Ring – that Government, according to all impartial 
American opinion, was the most corrupt, the most immoral, the most ineffective, with 
which a civilised people have ever been afflicted.  Gentlemen, the experience is not 
encouraging to us, and for my part I cannot accept as desirable or possible the 




Similarly, pamphleteer Henry Norton Palmer also argued that to judge by the example of 
New York, the Irish could never be peaceable, happy, or law abiding if granted self-
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  Tammany Hall was synonymous with government corruption and immorality, 
reflecting the inability of the Irish to govern themselves in any country. 
Another theme in unionist rhetoric was the insistence that Americans would not 
support Home Rule measures if they were attempted in the United States.  Goschen, in an 
interview with the New York Herald, stated,  
Mr. Gladstone’s bill provided for neither such an authority as the United States 
Supreme Court to decide on the unity of legislation, nor such an authority as the 
Federal Executive.  I do not believe that the American public would for one moment 
tolerate such a paralysis of the Central Executive in any American State as would have 
resulted in Ireland from Mr. Gladstone’s plan.
96
 
While analogies to American federal-state relations were part of an array of international 
examples used to support or condemn Home Rule, Goschen was here focusing on the United 
States in an effort to appeal to an American audience.  He attempted to relay to Americans 
how ill-planned and haphazard Home Rule would be.  He believed that the state of 
conspiracy and rebellion in Ireland would never be tolerated by an American government.  
ILPU pamphlets also renounced land agitation, arguing that British land policies in Ireland 
were far more generous than anything allowed by the United States.  They detailed how Irish 




 Unionists attempted to appeal to America for support, closely monitoring attitudes in 
the United States.  Both the Belfast News-Letter and the Presbyterian Witness reprinted 
articles on Home Rule from American newspapers, such as the pro-Union editorials of the 
San Francisco Argonaut and reports from the New York Evening Post and New York 
Tribune.
98
  The Belfast News-Letter also printed letters of support from American 
Orangemen and monitored the pro-Union actions of United States Orange Lodges.
99
 
Unionists such as Lord Rossmore, an Orange leader, declared that the “great Protestant 
nation” of America would hear unionist appeals just as well as those of Parnell.
100
  James 
McCalmont, MP for East Antrim, emphasized the continued loyalty of Irish Protestants after 
emigration. 
Mr. Parnell made a speech the other day in which he declared that all Irishmen as 
soon as they settle in the United States become disloyal.  He (the speaker) absolutely 
denied that.  His own family for the last two generations had been connected with 
the United States, but notwithstanding they would yield none in their loyalty to the 
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Queen.  (Applause.)  That was only one instance, but he felt sure every Protestant 




Unionists drew upon connections forged over two centuries of Ulster Protestant emigration 
to the United States to promote the anti-Home Rule campaign.
102
  This in itself was a policy 
laden with pitfalls, as the Irish-Americans were criticized for valuing Ireland more than the 
United States.  The Scotch-Irish certainly would not want to be associated with doing the 
same thing.  Organizations such as the United States Orange Order had to walk a fine line to 
show that they were not monarchists and anti-American.  Many Americans would have 
abominated the idea that the Scotch-Irish put Ulster or British interests before those of the 
United States, as McCalmont claimed. 
Based in part on the historic connections between Ulster and America, however, 
there was still hope in the potential for American sympathy and support for the Union.  Both 
the ILPU and the ULAU adopted policies of appealing to the United States and dominions.  
The ILPU printed pro-Union pamphlets especially for the consumption of foreign and 
colonial audiences and distributed their weekly newsletter, Notes from Ireland, to newspaper 
editors throughout the world.  The Executive Committee noted that America received special 
attention in their attempts to circulate pro-Union arguments.  They even sent propaganda 
materials to the pro-Parnellite press in the United States.
103
  Through the ULAU, Reverend 
Dr. Richard Rutledge Kane of Belfast’s Christ Church, the Grand Master of Belfast’s 
Orangemen, was authorized to correspond with loyalists in Canada and the United States, 
asking for their support during the Home Rule crisis.  Reverend Dr. Hugh Hanna 
corresponded with those in Australia.
104
  Kane was dispatched with George Hill Smith, a 
local barrister, to visit Canada and the United States on behalf of the ULAU to present the 
unionist cause to the people of North America.
105
 
The Loyal Orange Institution provided one of the points of connection between 
Ulster and the United States.  The Orange Order had grown in political importance in Ireland 
throughout the course of the first Home Rule crisis.
106
  In a speech to Irish and Canadian 
Orangemen, Kane asserted that Protestant and Orange principles had found local habitation 
in every part of the globe, including the United States. 
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When they think of how strong Orangeism was in the different parts of the British 
Empire and in America, they could afford to laugh at such figures of speech as were 
sometimes indulged in by men of the Michael Davitt type, who were very fond of 
talking about a certain ferocious animal which they called the wolf-dog, and who 
had his lair on the other side of the Atlantic wave, and who was ready, at the bidding 
of Fenian demagogues, to rush at the throat of Great Britain.  He [Kane] was 
perfectly sure that when the said wolf-dog had done with the greater Britain that was 
on the other side of the Atlantic, there would be little breath left for him in the 
purpose of performing the gigantic task that they had been told of.
107
 
According to Kane, when the Irish nationalist wolf-dog met with North American unionists, 
“greater Britain” would be the victor.  He felt sure that Americans with Protestant and 
Orange sympathies would join the fight against Irish-American extremism.  Kane and other 
prominent Orangemen such as Johnston frequently corresponded with Orange Lodges in the 
United States and Canada, receiving pledges of support for Ulster unionism.
108
 
 The Orange Order also helped provide the foundations of Ulster unionist 
preparations for armed resistance.  In general, unionist militancy lacked central coordination 
and was used largely for rhetorical purposes.
109
  However, some unionists believed that if 
they were forced to take up arms against the implementation of Home Rule, the Protestants 
and Orangemen of the United States would rise up to aid them.  T.G. Peel, at a demonstration 
in Richhill, asserted that arms were readily available in America.
110
  Edward Jenkins, at a 
meeting of Belfast’s Constitutional Club, declared that rather than giving way to priests and 
demagogues, the men of Ulster “would appeal to their brethren in the colonies and America, 
and say to them – ‘We have resolved that whatever any British Government may do, whether 
it be Tory or Liberal, if it is going to sell our liberties to the Nationalists we will stand up to 
the last, shoulder our guns, and turning into the streets, fight to the last man before we give 
way.’”
111
  These unionists believed that, if it came to fighting, the “great Protestant nation” 
of America would not allow them to be overrun by a despised Home Rule government. 
 
Aftermath, 1886-1892 
 The Home Rule Bill was defeated on 7 June 1886, triggering a general election that 
brought Salisbury back into power.  The National League initiated the Plan of Campaign, 
renewing land agitation.  Parnell attempted to keep himself removed from the revolutionary 
side of the nationalist movement, though he and other Irish nationalists again turned to Irish-
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American organizations for financial support.  As land disturbances and unrest intensified, 
the Times published a series of articles on “Parnellism and Crime.”  This series, published in 
March and April 1887, included a forged letter purported to have been written by Parnell 
condoning the Phoenix Park murders.
112
 
In response to Irish land unrest, the Conservatives instituted a new coercion act 
formulated by the Chief Secretary, Arthur Balfour.
113
  William Henry Hurlbert, a prominent 
American journalist who corresponded with Balfour, visited Ireland in 1888 and wrote 
Ireland under Coercion: The Diary of an American.  The “coercion” he described was not 
referring to the policy of the government but coercion by nationalists to make governance 
impossible.
114
  Hurlbert hoped to expose the true conditions of Ireland to his fellow 
countrymen because, he wrote, “I know that America is largely responsible for the actual 
condition of Ireland, and because the future condition of Ireland, and of the British Empire, 
must gravely influence the future of my own country.”
115
  Though he claimed to be 
supportive of Irish self-determination, his portrayal of Ulster and the unionists was much 
more sympathetic than the nationalists.  His book was promoted by the ILPU.
116
 
 Unionists in Parliament continued to denounce American funding of the nationalist 
movement.  In what he described as the “most desperate speech” he had ever attempted, 
Saunderson moved an amendment to the Address in Answer to the Queen’s Speech which 
emphasized the nationalists’ connections with American extremists.
117
  Saunderson argued 
that a divide remained between the nationalists’ parliamentary rhetoric, which emphasized 
constitutional methods, and the revolutionary policies propounded by their American 
paymasters.   
The Chicago and Westminster policies do not coincide.  America was the El Dorado 
of Irish politicians, where they got those supplies which were necessary.  He 
[Saunderson] understood that the advanced party found most of those funds, and 
amongst them there appeared to be a vision of action more dangerous, more perilous, 
and more heroic than moving the adjournment of the debate in the House.
118
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Saunderson contended that even as members of the IPP adopted constitutional methods by 
debating Irish policy in Parliament, the nationalist movement itself was being driven by 
Irish-American extremists who controlled the flow of funds.  Saunderson’s amendment was 
never put to a division, but his emphasis on the importance of this speech reveals that he was 
passionately concerned about the impact of Irish-American funding and extremism on the 
Irish political situation. 
 Accusations of links between Parnell, the IPP, and American extremists came to a 
head with the Special Commission of 1888-1889.  The Special Commission was held to 
investigate the claims made in the Times’ “Parnellism and Crime” series, which had 
attempted to link Parnell with rural violence and dynamiters.  Henri Le Caron, the 
pseudonym for English spy Thomas Beach who had infiltrated the Clan-na-Gael, blew his 
cover to testify against Parnell.  Le Caron was an associate of Devoy, Egan, Alexander 
Sullivan, and other Irish-American leaders, and had twice met with Parnell.
119
  He reported to 
Robert Anderson, who worked as a Home Office advisor on Irish political crime.  Anderson 




Le Caron’s testimony at the Special Commission shocked nationalists and led to 
threats against his own life.
121
  In his Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service, Le Caron 
wrote, 
To me no more satisfactory result could attend my disclosures than the realisation by 
the poor deluded Irish in the States of the way in which they have been tricked and 
humbugged in the past years.  For these poor weak people, animated by the purest, if 
the most mistaken of patriotic motives, who give their little all in the hope and trust 
that the day will come in their lives when Ireland will be a land flowing with milk and 
honey, I have the deepest and most sincere sympathy…. But, for the blatant loud-
voiced agitator, always bellowing forth his patriotic principles, while secretly filling 
his pockets with the bribe or the consequences of his theft, there can be no other 
feeling but that of undisguised loathing.
122
 
Le Caron portrayed the IPP as loathsome swindlers and tricksters.  However, while he 
illustrated the violent side of Irish and Irish-American nationalism, his evidence did not 
significantly advance the case against Parnell and the IPP.
123
 
 Sir Henry James, Liberal Unionist MP for Bury who addressed the Special 
Commission for twelve days, also attempted to closely link the role of Irish-American 
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extremism to the IPP.  He underscored that the New Departure had been initiated in America 
rather than Ireland, and that money for the Land League had come from Ford and the 
Skirmishing Fund.  He stated, “Everyone of the persons to whom he [Davitt] applied were 
members of the extreme or revolutionary party.”
124
  The Clan-na-Gael, James believed, was 
closely connected with Parnell and the funding of the IPP.  He accused the Clan-na-Gael of 
complicity in the dynamite campaign along with Rossa, only pausing their dynamite 
operation to see what opportunities the Home Rule policy of 1886 might bring them.  James 
stated, “I have instance after instance where the policy which controls the dynamiters in 
America is also controlling the men who in former times had no words to utter against 
outrage, but who are now, for policy’s sake, saying, ‘stay your hand.’”
125
  James portrayed 
Parnell and IPP members as having control over the revolutionary movement, but failing to 
halt the dynamite policies until it was politically expedient. 
The Special Commission was in many ways a disappointment for unionists.  Parnell 
was cleared of the charges made against him after Richard Pigott admitted to forging the 
letters that appeared in the Times.  However, the Special Commission’s report, published in 
1890, did find close links between Parnellites and Irish-American extremists.
126
  In light of 
the Pigott forgery revelation, the Commission findings were a double-edged sword for the 
unionists.  In the House of Commons debates over the Special Commission report, Lewis 
stated, “No doubt hon. Members have been able to clear themselves of some charges brought 
against them, but the Commission has been the means of unmasking a gross conspiracy, and 
of showing how Ireland has been the victim of gross intrigues hatched in some cases across 
the Atlantic.”
127
  Lewis felt that unionists had been vindicated after years of accusations of 
Parnellite extremism.  Another attack against Parnell’s exoneration came from young 
unionist poet Rudyard Kipling, who wrote in his poem “Cleared:” “They only took the 
Judas-gold from Fenians out of jail/They only fawned for dollars on the blood-dyed Clan-na-
Gael.”
128
  Kipling highlighted connections with Irish-American funding, accusing Parnell of 
inspiring murder and outrage.  Despite the inherent difficulties with the Commission’s 
findings, for years to come the Special Commission report was quoted in unionist speeches 
and pamphlet literature on the links between Parnell and Irish-American extremism. 
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 The revelations of the Special Commission, including the exposure of Le Caron’s 
infiltration into the Clan-na-Gael, shocked Irish-America.  With controversy also 
surrounding the murder of Dr. Patrick Henry Cronin in 1889, factionalism gripped Irish-
American organizations.
129
  After the O’Shea divorce trial, the IPP split in 1890, and the 
death of Parnell in 1891, the Irish-American movement was further ravaged by internal 
divisions.  The flow of money from America was severely diminished.
130
  The weakness of 
the Irish nationalist movement on both sides of the Atlantic would persist for a decade, and 
in America would not wholly recover until after the Easter Rising of 1916. 
 
Second Home Rule Crisis 
 The 1892 general election returned Gladstone to government, with the balance of 
power once again held by the Irish nationalists despite the split in the IPP.  Gladstone was 
committed to initiating new Home Rule legislation for Ireland, introducing the bill on 13 
February 1893.  With factionalism decreasing the importance of Irish-American influence, 
parliamentary unionists were much less focused on countering Irish-American extremism 
than in 1886.  David Plunket, MP for Dublin University, continued to emphasize that the 
influence of Irish-American extremism would mean that separatism would be the end result 
if Ireland was granted Home Rule.
131
  Edward Harland, MP for North Belfast, worried that 
Britain’s security would be threatened because Ireland would become a base for their Irish-
American enemies to use against them.
132
  While fears of Irish-American extremism 
decreased, usage of American examples in support of the unionist stance – such as the 




 In the public realm, Irish-American extremism remained an important theme, 
especially in the run-up to the general election including the Great Unionist Convention of 
17 June 1892.  The Convention was held in Belfast’s Botanic Garden, with speakers 
denouncing Home Rule and advocating passive resistance, though there were also allusions 
to militancy.
134
  In their speeches and pamphlet literature at this time, unionists again utilized 
themes of Irish-American funding and extremism, Irish-American control over Irish 
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nationalism and influence over a potential Dublin parliament, and lack for support for 
extremist policies across the United States as a whole.
135
 
 Unionists also appealed to their historic connections with the United States, though 
this was to a lesser extent than in 1886.  The Belfast News-Letter continued to publish letters 
of support and sympathy from American Orangemen.  The fraternal greetings of the United 
States Supreme Grand Orange Lodge were read out at the Great Convention.
136
  F.D. Ward, a 
Belfast businessman, believed that unionists had the support of Americans as they held the 
Convention.  He stated, “The eyes of the whole United Kingdom, as well as the eyes of their 
friends and sympathisers in America, were upon them at this time, and it, therefore, behoved 




 Taking a more militant stance, Kane emphasized that if the unionists were forced to 
consider civil war to halt the implementation of Home Rule, they would be able to count on 
the support of friends in America.  “If there was any attempt to put over them mastery other 
than that to which they owed and were willing to give allegiance they would have something 
to say, and this million and a half would have the sympathy and be effectually aided by 
brethren in the United Kingdom, Canada, and America.”
138
  Even as the influence of Irish-
America over the Irish nationalists was temporarily decreasing, it remained important for 
unionists to emphasize that they too had support coming in from the United States and 
dominions. 
 The second Home Rule Bill was passed by the House of Commons but quickly 
defeated in the House of Lords in September 1893.  The Liberals remained in power until 
1895, with warfare between Parnellites and anti-Parnellites continuing to divide the IPP.
139
  
Under the subsequent Conservative administration, with Gerald Balfour as Chief Secretary, 
unionists attempted conciliation in Ireland on the issues of land and local government 
reform.  The character of Irish unionist politics became increasingly popularized and 
localized as landed influence declined.
140
  In power for over a decade, unionists would not 
again face serious demands for Irish Home Rule until 1911. 
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Conclusion 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, unionists had cultivated an image of Irish-
America that was mired in violence and extremism.  Spurred by the dynamite campaign and 
land wars of the early 1880s, this image of Irish-America was propagated throughout the first 
Home Rule crisis and continued, though to a lesser extent, during the second Home Rule 
crisis.  The extreme view of Irish-America legitimized unionist opposition to Irish 
nationalism, providing a basis for which they could characterize the whole of the Irish 
nationalist movement.  Based on Irish-American extremism, they interpreted Irish 
nationalists as violent and unfit to govern Ireland. 
 Unionists characterized Irish nationalism as a foreign-run movement with little 
actual support in Ireland.  The promotion of nationalist views was due to Land League and 
National League coercion, with leaders driven by the quest for personal profit rather than 
ideals.  Unionists both in and out of Parliament emphasized the American funding of Irish 
nationalism.  They believed that outrages and agitation would never be stopped in Ireland 
until Irish-American financial support was cut off.  They also feared that if Ireland was 
granted Home Rule, Americans would flock to Ireland and control the Dublin parliament.  
The security of the British Empire would be threatened because Ireland would be used as a 
base for the enemies of England.  Ireland would be driven to separatism because of the 
continued influence of Irish-America. 
 Irish parliamentary leaders such as Parnell were accused of pandering to Irish-
American extremists to win their monetary support.  Unionists closely monitored Irish 
nationalist speeches on their trips to the United States, accusing IPP members of concealing 
their true separatist intentions at Westminster while revealing them in America.  The funding 
of the IPP was linked to Ford and the Skirmishing Fund, which also financed the Land 
League agitation and the dynamite campaign.  Unionists also kept a close eye on the Irish 
World and other Irish-American newspapers. 
 Experiences of extremism, such as crime, outrage, assassination, and dynamite, had 
colored unionist views of Home Rule.  Condemnation of Irish-American extremism came 
from all sides of the unionist movement.  Unionism in the mid-1880s was a diverse 
movement, and denunciation of extremism was used as a way to solidify their own 
movement.  The emphasis on extremism also fostered an atmosphere which legitimized the 
unionists’ own threats of militancy. 
Unionists closely monitored attitudes in the United States, and attempted to appeal 
for American support.  They corresponded with American contacts, including through the 
Orange Order, and developed propaganda materials for an American audience.  Kane and 
40 
Smith were also sent on a tour of the United States and Canada to promote the unionist 
cause.  Some unionists also went so far as to maintain that America could be counted on for 
support if the unionists were forced to fight against the implementation of Home Rule.  Even 
though unionism is generally portrayed as an insular movement, in reality unionists 
emphasized international support coming in from the United States throughout the first two 
Home Rule crises. 
Unionist views of the United States during the last twenty years of the nineteenth 
century were paradoxical.  On the one hand, they denounced American involvement in and 
funding of the nationalist movement.  They condemned nationalists for being controlled by a 
foreign power.  On the other hand, unionists themselves sought support for their own 
movement from the United States and emphasized the importance of international support.  
The complexities of their attitudes to America ultimately limited the effectiveness of the 
unionist campaign in the United States.  The paradoxical relationship of Ulster unionism and 
America would be further developed in the opening decades of the twentieth century, as the 
Irish political situation evolved through further Home Rule crises, the First World War, and 




III. THE THIRD HOME RULE CRISIS, WORLD WAR I, AND PARTITION 
 
 “And what about Irish feeling in America?  We know that the Nationalist Party have 
to depend on America for their funds, and we know that in America the idea and the 
dream of every Irish Nationalist is, not these devolution proposals of the right hon. 
Gentleman, not even a separate Parliament with an Executive responsible to it, but an 
independent and separate nation.” 




 Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, Irish unionists feared the 
influence of Irish-America on the Irish nationalist movement.  Even as the nationalist 
movements in both Ireland and America were recovering from divisions following the end of 
the Parnell era, Irish-America was seen as pushing the nationalist movement toward 
extremism and separatism through the power of finances.  As expressed by James Campbell, 
MP for Dublin University, the influence of Irish-America was an important factor in the 
reluctance of unionists to accept even limited forms of devolution for Ireland.  Unionists 
believed that such measures would open the door for separatists and extremists to sweep in 
against the wishes of the majority of Irish people and force the establishment of an 
independent nation.  The Irish-Americans were also able to influence their own government 
to put pressure on the British to find a solution to the Irish question. 
 At the same time, the decline of landed power and greater democratic involvement 
meant that Irish unionism was becoming increasingly focused on localities.  In time this led 
to greater concentration on a distinctive Ulster unionist identity separate from the rest of Irish 
unionism.
2
  Many unionists believed that constructive policies at the turn of the century had 
addressed the grievances of the Irish people.  This forced Irish nationalists to turn to Irish-
America for support and funding.  During the third Home Rule crisis, unionists portrayed 
Irish nationalists as unrepresentative of the Irish people because of the influence of their 
American paymasters.  As the passage of Home Rule became more and more likely, Ulster 
unionists turned to open militancy.  This was in part due to their fears of complete separation 
and the atmosphere of extremism.  The moves toward militancy were partially justified by 
the image of Irish-America which the unionists themselves had cultivated. 
                                                 
1
 Parliamentary Debates (hereafter P.D.) 4
th
 Ser., Vol. 174 (7 May 1907), 171-172. 
2
 Andrew Gailey, “Unionist Rhetoric and Irish Local Government Reform, 1895-9,” Irish Historical 
Studies (hereafter IHS) 24, no. 93 (May 1984), 59; David Burnett, “The Modernisation of Unionism, 
1892-1914?” in Unionism in Modern Ireland: New Perspectives on Politics and Culture, ed. Richard 
English and Graham Walker (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1996), 50-53. 
42 
 The outbreak of World War I made the United States government more influential 
on the Irish situation than it might otherwise have been.  Ulster unionists were also more 
likely to respond to America than they otherwise would have been because of the need for 
United States support in the war.  Unionists worried about nationalist propaganda in the 
United States, claiming that if Americans only knew the truth about the Irish situation they 
would never support the nationalists.  They were skeptical about the importance of American 
attitudes toward the Irish problem, calling for Americans to cease their meddling in another 
country’s affairs.  The fact that unionists urged American non-involvement may have hurt 
their own movement as supporters for Irish-American nationalism remained vocal.  The 
value accorded to American opinion by the British government helped add to the sense of 
betrayal felt by Ulster unionists.  Ulster unionists felt that they had proven their loyalty 
through sacrifice during the war years; this loyalty was rewarded by the British government 
placing more importance on American attitudes. 
 Unionists propagated negative views of American government and public opinion, 
and condemned the influence of Irish-America.  At the same time, unionists attempted to 
gain support from the United States for their own movement.  They conducted letter-writing 
campaigns, published propaganda materials for an American audience, attempted to get pro-
Union articles published in the American press, and even conducted publicity tours of the 
United States. 
This chapter will explore the contradictory Ulster unionist attitudes toward America 
during the first twenty years of the twentieth century.  The chapter particularly focuses on the 
third Home Rule crisis, the turn toward open militancy and threat of civil war, the outbreak 
of World War I, and the immediate aftermath of the war.  The unionist movement evolved 
during this period to become increasingly militant, Ulsterized, and gradually accepting of 
partition.  Unionists sought both to discredit Irish-America and appeal to the American 
people to support their own movement. 
 
Reemergence of Irish Nationalist Politics 
 Irish local government reform in 1898 brought into stark relief Ireland’s north-south 
divide as well as a nationalist-unionist divide within Ulster itself.
3
  The Local Government 
Act of 1898 was part of a wave of constructive unionist measures at the turn of the century 
under the Chief Secretaryships of Gerald Balfour and George Wyndham.  Constructive 
unionist policies were in many ways the natural result of the government responding to 
popular public demands.  At times these measures were more generous than those proposed 
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by the Liberals or Irish nationalists.  The policies were also admitted attempts to “kill Home 




Under the leadership of Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberals had adopted a 
similar approach of gradual reform rather than focusing on demands to implement Home 
Rule.
5
  The Liberals were unwilling to take a strong stance on Irish nationalism while split 
over the Boer War and faced with the disintegration of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP).  
The division of the IPP into Parnellite and anti-Parnellite camps in 1890 led to nationalist 
upheaval in both Ireland and Irish-America.  The nationalist breach was healed through the 
reunification of the IPP in 1900, with John Redmond, MP for Waterford City, emerging as 
Parnell’s successor. 
Redmond visited the United States in 1901 on a fundraising mission for Home Rule.  
On the model of the recently launched United Irish League, Redmond founded the United 
Irish League of America.  The new organization established 200 branches in its first year and 
raised at least £10,000 for the IPP.  Kevin Kenny writes that, “like his predecessor Parnell, 
Redmond deliberately blurred the distinction between his own moderate constitutional 
position and full-fledged republicanism, thereby generating further support in America.”
6
  
Redmond and other IPP members were able to frame their statements with enough ambiguity 




Unionist observers, however, believed that any constitutional stance that the IPP 
might take was ultimately to conceal their actual separatist intentions, which shone through 
in their American speeches.  This was confirmed by one of William Johnston’s Canadian 
correspondents, Hermann H. Pitts, who wrote him in 1901 to report, “Redmond and his aids 
are having a Triumphal Tour through the United States, howling out treason and blasphemy 
and denouncing everything British.”
8
  Pitts was the Orange Imperial Grand Secretary, and his 
Orangeism colored his views of Redmond’s visit.  He feared Catholic influence on the 
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nationalists, and condemned the extremism and separatism espoused in the Irish leader’s 
American speeches. 
 Meanwhile, as the Irish nationalists began to rebuild support within Ireland and 
America, Irish unionists were facing divisions of their own, in addition to the split between 
British Conservatives over tariff reform.
9
  First, the influence of labor within Belfast politics 
led to the challenge of the Belfast Protestant Association and the Independent Orange 
Order.
10
  Second, T.W. Russell, the Liberal Unionist MP for South Tyrone, created a splinter 
group of “Russellite” independent unionists, mainly on the basis of demands for compulsory 
land purchase.
11
  Third, the devolution debacle in 1904-1905, entangling Wyndham, 
permanent undersecretary Antony MacDonnell, and Lord Dunraven, led to increasing 
distrust of Ulster unionists for the British unionist elite and Dublin Castle.
12
 
 The Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) emerged out of a conference held on 22 October 
1904 to condemn Dunraven’s devolution proposals.
13
  The new central unionist organization 
had 200 members representing local unionist associations, the Orange Order, MPs, peers, 
and other prominent Ulstermen.  The first official meeting of the UUC was held on 3 March 
1905 at Ulster Hall in Belfast.  The creation of the UUC aided the increasing Ulsterization of 
the unionist movement.  However, it did join with its Dublin counterpart, the Irish Unionist 
Alliance (IUA), in the Unionist Joint Committee (UJC) formed in 1907.
14
 
 The unionist organizations closely monitored the treks of nationalist leaders across 
the Atlantic.  For example, the UUC scrutinized Redmond and Joseph Devlin’s September 
1908 trip to America in its Year Book.  During the tour, Redmond seemed assured of the 
impending proposal of a new Home Rule Bill in Parliament.  He stated in Boston that he 
believed the majority of British people would support a Gladstone-style measure.
15
  At 
meetings of the UJC, Secretary R.G. Carden reported that he had taken steps “to procure 
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verbatim reports of Messrs. Devlin and Redmond’s speeches in America,”
16
 which were used 
in unionist pamphlets, leaflets, and speeches to show the extremism of Irish nationalists. 
A unionist pamphlet of 1909 warned that Home Rule would still be paving the way 
to complete separation, as in the days of Charles Stewart Parnell.  “In America Mr. John 
Redmond has solemnly pledged himself that the Nationalist movement at home has no 
purpose inferior to the purposes and intentions of Owen Roe O’Neill, of Emmet, of Tone, 
Mitchel, Kickham, and all the fathers of Irish independence.”
17
  The pamphlet also noted the 
continued influence of Patrick Ford, concluding, “English readers can imagine for 
themselves how especially potent the Irish-American extremists might become after the so-
called constitutional party had won Home Rule and were, as they would surely be at some 
time or another, at a deadlock with the Imperial Parliament.”
18
  The pamphlet warned that 
Home Rule was only the first step on the road to complete separation, as proven by the 
American speeches of IPP members. 
The following year, the UUC was even more anxious that unionists not be 
complacent even though agitation throughout Ireland had decreased.  The 1910 Year Book 
noted that Irish nationalist MP T.P. O’Connor had been interviewed by the Chicago Tribune.  
O’Connor stated, “The next House of Commons, whatever party happens to win, will be 
compelled to face the Home Rule question immediately.”
19
  The nationalists hoped to hold 
the balance of power in Parliament, meaning that any party they decided to support would be 
forced to promote Home Rule. 
As the House of Lords had blocked Home Rule in 1893 and would surely block 
similar measures in the future, nationalists aimed to remove the veto of the House of Lords 
over House of Commons legislation.  The UUC noted that Redmond had sent a cablegram to 
the president of the United Irish League of America, stating, “A General Election is certain 
within the next few weeks.  In that election the veto of the House of Lords is at stake, and 
with the veto of the House of Lords will disappear the last obstacle to Home Rule.”
20
  At the 
IUA, the General Council expressed “the feeling of all Irish constitutionalists when they state 
that the present movement by Irish and Irish-American nationalists towards Home Rule by 
means of the removal of the Veto of the House of Lords, is a direct assault upon the integrity 
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of the United Kingdom.”
21
  Unionists saw the campaign for the removal of the House of 
Lords veto as a direct attack on the Union itself.  It would enable the Liberal-controlled 
House of Commons to push through a Home Rule Bill which would normally be halted by 
the more conservative Lords.  This attack on the House of Lords left some unionists 
searching for way to compromise without giving away Home Rule, leading to increasing 
appeals for a federal solution.
22
 
In Ireland, unionists once again began to amplify anti-Home Rule campaigning.  
They saw Irish-America as a significant driving force behind the Irish nationalists, and 
searched for ways in which unionists could make a greater impact in the United States.  The 
secretaries of the UJC “were authorized to see as to how far they could get articles in the 
American and Australian Press, on the Irish Question.”
 23
  They hoped to promote unionist 
counterpoints to the escalating nationalist presence in those countries. 
 In 1910, Walter Long resigned the chairmanship of the Irish Unionist Parliamentary 
Party.  The position was taken over by Edward Carson, Dublin-born barrister and MP for the 
University of Dublin.
24
  As the nationalists predicted, the General Elections in January and 
December 1910 did not give the Liberals clear victories, forcing them to rely on the support 
of both the Labour Party and the IPP.  The Parliament Act to remove the House of Lords 
veto was introduced by Prime Minister H.H. Asquith on 21 February 1911, and was passed 
in August of that year. 
As Alvin Jackson notes, the Parliament Act coupled with the desire to be identified 
as a popular movement meant that the unionists could no longer rely on Parliament as a 
venue to promote their cause.  Militancy was increasingly advanced as a way to protect 
against the implementation of Home Rule.  This in turn increased divisions between Ulster 
unionism and the rest of Ireland.
25
  In September 1911, plans were laid for the creation of an 
Ulster provisional government.  Small numbers of arms were imported from German 
dealers.
26
  A mass demonstration of Orangemen and Unionist Club members was held at 
Craigavon, home of prominent Unionist MP James Craig, on 25 September.
27
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 British unionist leaders also came out strongly against Home Rule.  Andrew Bonar 
Law famously pronounced at the Blenheim demonstration in July 1912 that there was “no 
length of resistance to which Ulster can go in which I should not be prepared to support 
them.”
28
  At an earlier demonstration in Belfast, Bonar Law emphasized that the worldwide 
trend toward closer union, as exemplified by the American Civil War, was being reversed by 
Home Rule policies.
29
  The United Kingdom would be going against the world-wide trend 
toward unity and centralization.  Moreover, in the eyes of unionists, they would be handing 
Ireland over to the control of extremists determined to destroy Irish liberty and prosperity.
30
  
British unionists like Bonar Law believed that a majority of the voters throughout the United 
Kingdom had no stomach for the Irish nationalist cause.  They attempted to force a general 




Third Home Rule Crisis 
 The Third Home Rule Bill was unveiled in Parliament on 11 April 1912.  When 
Redmond claimed the support of Irish-America and the British colonies, Craig emphatically 
countered that the true sympathy of Britain’s dominions lay with the “loyal men of Ulster.”
32
  
Craig denied that even a majority of Irish people supported Home Rule, because their 
demands had been satisfied through constructive unionist policies.  He explained that the IPP 
relied 
not so much upon the justice of the case, as upon a false cry or sentiment, which hitherto 
has kept them in power by the collection of dollars from American-Irish who have gone 
abroad.  If anyone doubts what I say let him read the hon. Member [Redmond]’s old 
speech.  He said that support for Home Rule in Ireland from a monetary point of view 
was quite insufficient to keep it going, and that if it were not for the Americans it would 
be impossible to proceed with the campaign for Home Rule.
33
 
Craig asserted that lack of support from Ireland forced the IPP to rely on American money to 
support their movement, as they had in the two previous Home Rule crises. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Lord Claud Hamilton, MP for South Kensington.  
He suggested that if MPs went to Ireland and looked for the real feeling of the Irish people, 
they would find support for Home Rule steadily decreasing.  He stated, 
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The greatest proof of that is, as hon. Members below the Gangway are bound to admit, 
that when they endeavoured a year and a quarter ago to collect money for Ireland from 
the farmers and peasantry to prosecute their campaign, they received a less sum than 
had ever been known to result from a similar application on their part, and the result was 
that they had to go to the United States in order to replenish the somewhat empty 
exchequer, as it was at that time.
34
 
Peter Kerr-Smiley, MP for North Antrim, concurred with Hamilton’s analysis in his 1911 
book, The Peril of Home Rule.
35
  Unionists portrayed constructive policies as successfully 
removing all legitimate grievances of the Irish people.  They also continued to emphasize 
that constructive unionist policies and land laws were more favorable to agricultural tenants 
than any which would be allowed in the United States.
36
  Unionists assumed that even those 
who would not normally support the Unionist Party, such as the laboring classes, were now 
satisfied to remain in the Union.  In the unionists’ view, this drastically reduced the amount 
of support for Home Rule, and forced Irish nationalists to turn to America for funding. 
 Unionists depicted the Irish nationalist movement as unrepresentative of the Irish 
people.  They insisted that a new Irish parliament would be equally unrepresentative, 
dominated by Irish-Americans.  Hamilton asserted that the moment Home Rule became law, 
the “godless conspirators who are now on the other side of the Atlantic” would “flock across 
to Ireland and in a very short time have complete control over Irish affairs.”
37
  The menace of 
Irish-Americans returning to Ireland was all the more threatening because of their extremism.  
Andrew Long Horner, MP for South Tyrone, quoted resolutions from the national conference 
of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, held in Portland, Oregon, in which they pledged to bring 
about complete and absolute separation from England.
38
 
Unionists alleged that leaders of Irish nationalism catered to Irish-American 
extremism.  Carson described Irish nationalists as resorting to “perverted rhetoric” to gain 
the support of Irish-America.
39
  C.C. Craig, MP for South Antrim, quoted Redmond’s 
October 1910 speech in Buffalo, when he pledged to get Home Rule first and then demand 
more.  Craig commented, “I wonder how the hon. and learned Member gets over that.  It 
seems to me that a man who uses that language is hardly likely to be content with what is 
contained in this Bill.
40
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Irish unionists in Parliament and in the public realm used examples of Redmond and 
other nationalist leaders in America to illustrate that they would never settle for simple Home 
Rule.
41
  Craig questioned,  
Can this Bill be said to comply with the description given to what they want?  
Obviously this Bill does not destroy the last link that binds them to England.  Therefore, 
either they were humbugging the Americans or else – and this I think is a much more 
probable explanation – they are humbugging the British public when they say that they 
will accept this Bill as a final settlement of the question.
42
 
Craig alluded to Parnell’s “Last Link” speech as indicative of the nationalists’ ultimate goal 
– total separation.  He urged British Liberals, who thought that Home Rule would be the 
final, peaceful solution to the Irish problem, to realize that it would only open the door to 
even greater turmoil. 
 According to unionists, not only were the nationalists dishonest about their true 
intentions regarding Irish independence, but they were also working against the interests of 
the Irish people.  Bonar Law stated in a speech in 1911,  
The keynote of the Home Rule policy for Ireland was given by Redmond in a speech in 
America when he said, ‘Ireland would prefer rags and poverty rather than surrender her 
national spirit.’  Well, she has lived up to that theory.  From the beginning to the end, 
the Nationalist agitators have realized that the real strength of their movement was in 
the misery of their people, and from first to last they have hindered every effort to raise 
and redeem the social conditions of Ireland.
43
 
He continued by describing a 1910 speech by Redmond in which he credited Irish-America 
with saving the IPP from bankruptcy.  Bonar Law questioned, “Well, why would it have 
been bankrupt?  If the Nationalists are so fond of Home Rule, why should they allow the 
leaders to become bankrupts?  It is not that they have not the money.”
44
  The Marquess of 
Londonderry also emphasized that nationalists failed to support the Land Act of 1903 
because they feared that solving the land problem would take away Home Rule support.
45
  
Unionists depicted nationalists as working against the interests of the Irish people to maintain 
support for the Home Rule cause. According to unionists, the lack of funding from Ireland 
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 Marquis of Londonderry, “The Ulster Question,” in Against Home Rule: The Case for Union, ed. S. 
Rosenbaum (London: Frederick Warne, 1912), 166-167. 
50 
reflected the unpopularity of nationalism, forcing nationalist leaders to turn to the United 
States. 
 Unionists also emphasized that the American example proved the Irish were 
incapable of self-government.  Lord Ernest Hamilton, former MP for North Tyrone, wrote 
that, 
Tammany, in America, stands for the most flourishing system of corruption and 
immorality on the face of the earth, and the reason that it intrudes upon the 
consideration of Ulster is because it is almost exclusively a Celtic Irish organization, 
and may, therefore, reasonably be taken as an indication of what might be expected 




Tammany became shorthand for Irish machine politics in cities across the United States.  In 
the face of the Tammany element, minorities were helpless.
47
  F.F. Moore asserted that 
Tammany acted “from generation to generation for the Ulstermen to point to as an example 
of the form of Home Rule which is the ideal of the Irishman.”
48
 
 Imperial foreign policy and defense would also be impacted by Irish-America’s 
influence on a potential Irish parliament.  Carson wrote that Irish Home Rule would open 
Britain up to additional threats during times of war, as Irish-Americans were avowed 
enemies of the Empire.  He emphasized, “We have only to imagine the element of weakness 
and disunion which would be introduced to our foreign policy.”
49
  Many unionist speeches 
and pamphlets quoted American naval expert Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote, 
“The ambition of the Irish separatists, realized, might be even more threatening to the 
national life of Great Britain than the Secession of the South was to that of the American 
Union…. The instrument for such action in the shape of an independent Parliament could not 
safely be trusted even to avowed friends.”
50
  An Ireland ruled by American-influenced 
separatists was seen as a jumping-board for the enemies of Great Britain. 
 As Home Rule advanced in the House of Commons, Ulster leaders began to actively 
prepare for the defense of their own movement.  The Carson Defence Fund was set up early 
in 1912 to carry out anti-Home Rule campaigning in English and Scottish constituencies.  
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American Orange Lodges were among those who donated.
51
  The events of Ulster Day, 28 
September 1912, achieved mythical status with its defense of unionism, creation of an Ulster 
unionist tradition, and signing of the Ulster Covenant.
52
  Just under half a million Ulstermen 
and women signed the covenant, pledging themselves to resist Home Rule by any means.  
While unionists concentrated in Ulster had the option of armed resistance against the 
implementation of Home Rule, in the south unionists were too scattered to consider the use 
of force. 
Unionists in the south were a dispersed minority and a fairly heterogeneous group.  
They were mainly characterized as Protestant, anglicized, propertied, and aristocratic, but 
also included Catholic landowners, Trinity College intellectuals, and Protestant businessmen.  
Southern unionism was increasingly divided from its Ulster counterpart, which was 
becoming a more democratic, popularized force.
53
  Ronald McNeill, Ulsterman and MP for 
St Augustine’s, wrote, 
The events of the last three months, and especially the signing of the Covenant, had 
concentrated on Ulster the attention of the whole United Kingdom, not to speak of 
America and the British overseas Dominions.  This was not of unmixed advantage to 
the cause for which Ulster was making so determined a stand.  There was a tendency to 




The position of southern unionists was downplayed in the eyes of Britain, the dominions, and 
the world as a whole.  Ulster unionists portrayed themselves as separate from the rest of 
Ireland, particularly through the signing of the Ulster Covenant and emphasis on militancy. 
 
Intensification of Militancy 
The combined forces of militancy and Ulsterization would only be amplified as the 
third Home Rule crisis wore on.  In fact, militancy became so pronounced in Ulster that 
George A. Birmingham wrote a novel, The Red Hand of Ulster, based on the seeming 
absurdity of fighting against the British to stay in the Union.  Hi novel drew on the 
mischievousness of American involvement in the Irish question.
55
  Birmingham was the 
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pseudonym of Belfast-born Church of Ireland clergyman James Owen Hannay, a prolific 
writer.  In his novel, the narrator, Lord Kilmore of Errigal, becomes involved with Joseph 
Peterson Conroy, an American millionaire who had associations with the Clan-na-Gael.  
Conroy, who is bored, decides he wants to start a revolution, focusing on the Ulster 
unionists.  The Ulstermen end up voting to fight against the British government to halt the 
implementation of Home Rule and form their own provisional government, but the British 
soldiers refuse to do battle.  Ultimately, the provisional government appoints Kilmore as 
their ambassador to the Prime Minister.  They tell Kilmore that their demands are to end all 
talk of Home Rule, and that the English must clear out of the country “and leave us a free 
hand to clean up the mess they’ve been making for the last hundred years.”
56
  Afterward, the 
Ulstermen insist that they will govern themselves, though maintain that they are thoroughly 
loyal and always have been.  The British government, of course, agrees to all of their 
demands. 
Birmingham’s novel highlighted real frustrations with Irish-American involvement 
and seeming contractions concerning Ulster militant policies.  In reality, the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) was established in January 1913, with the nationalist Irish Volunteers formed in 
response in November.
57
  The UVF brought together units that had been drilling since 1911, 
developing into a fairly sophisticated force of about 100,000 Volunteers.
58
  Hugh Morrison 
wrote of the UVF,  
The Volunteer Army on which Ulster’s Provisional Government will depend in the 
event of Home Rule being forced upon us, is a citizen army, drilled and armed on the 
system adopted by many of our forefathers when in the War for Independence in 
America they had to defend themselves against British aggression.
59
 
Morrison’s reference to the Revolutionary War illustrated the idea that, like the Scotch-Irish 
in America, the Ulster unionists too would fight against British aggression and coercion if 
Home Rule was forced on them.  This, however, would be a fight not to break ties with 
Britain but to remain in the Union.
60
 
By the start of 1914, civil war was increasingly likely.  One unionist pamphlet 
warned, “Civil war in Ireland would let loose these voracious vultures upon society…. Irish 
Americans of fighting breed would cross the Atlantic to the assistance of both sides.  
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Irishmen in Great Britain would hasten to the aid of their respective parties.”
61
  The same 
pamphlet also described Irish-American nationalists as a threat to cross the Atlantic if Irish 
Home Rule was granted. 
Fenianism – the Clan-na-Gael – the Land League, the plan of campaign of the United 
Irish League and the Ancient Order of Hibernians, proclaim the Irish in their native 
land to be the same born wire-pullers as their kith and kin in America, and to imagine 
that these secret societies will not continue to influence and in many cases wield 
autocratic sway over the Nationalist members of an Irish House of Commons is to 
imagine that the leopard will change his spots.
62
 
In this view, the same Irish-Americans who would fight against Ulster unionists in the event 
of civil war were driving the unionists to civil war because of fear of their influence over a 
potential Irish parliament. 
It was this fear of extremism in an Irish parliament that helped steer the paramilitary 
activities of the UVF.  In the spring, F.H. Crawford, posing as an American, went over to 
Germany to arrange for the delivery of guns to Ireland.  The Larne gun-running of 24-25 
April brought 25,000 rifles and 3 million rounds of ammunition into Ulster.
63
  At the same 
time, the Irish Volunteers were growing in significance.  Their own gun-running at Howth in 
July brought in about 900 rifles.
64
  Unionists were alarmed at the arming of the Irish 
Volunteers.  R.J. Herbert Shaw at the IUA wrote to Pembroke Wicks, Carson’s private 
secretary, in May, “It is practically impossible to know how many arms they have got, but 
we have every reason to believe that financial support has been promised from Irish 
Americans, and that they have promised a supply of arms and ammunition of the class that is 
being supplied to Mexico.”
65
  Mexico was at the time being offered arms by the German 
government in exchange for an alliance in the lead-up to World War I.
66
 
Even with increasingly open militancy in Ireland, partition began to be considered 
seriously as a constitutional solution for the first time.  Ulster unionists realized that it might 
be their only option to avoid coming under the rule of a Dublin parliament.
67
  Many 
unionists, like MP for South Birmingham L.S. Amery, continued to view Home Rule as only 
an “instalment of the large policy, a stepping stone to the ‘great goal of national 
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independence,’ to quote a recent phrase of Mr. Redmond’s.”
 68
  In Parliament James 
Campbell reminded his fellow MPs that the Home Rule Bill would not satisfy nationalist 
demands: 
It was proclaimed for it that it would be a settlement, and that it would satisfy and 
conciliate Irish-American sentiment, but we know now that the Clan-na-Gael and the 
Ancient Order of Hibernians in the United States have exploded and repudiated that 
idea, and we know as every week passes in Ireland itself Nationalist orators and 
newspapers reecho that denial.  It was hailed as a message of peace to Ireland, and yet 
every line of it contains the seeds of certain harvest of future friction and trouble.
69
 
Campbell emphasized the inadequacy of Home Rule proposals because of the extremist 
influence of Irish-America.  Home Rule, if implemented, would not bring peace to Ireland 
but only further trouble. 
By early 1914, the principle of special treatment for Ulster was solidifying.  
Proposals for four-, six-, or nine-county exclusion, Home Rule-within-Home Rule, and 
federalism were debated.  Ulster unionists did not want Home Rule-within-Home Rule or 
temporary exclusion.  The county option, wherein each county would vote on exclusion and 
would have likely resulted in four-county partition, was deemed unrealistic for 
implementation.  Nine-county exclusion would result in too precarious of a position for 
unionists.  Debates over partition, mainly between Bonar Law, Carson, and Redmond, 
developed over time from October 1913 to July 1914.
70
  Gradually, six-county exclusion 
came to the fore, with the emphasis on partition solidifying the divide between Ulster and 
southern unionism.
71
  Southern unionists, however, retained a significant influence over the 




To resolve the issue of partition, the Buckingham Palace Conference was held in 
July, but was ultimately unsuccessful.  Horace Plunkett, a prominent moderate, wrote,  
To all the plans of Devolution, Federation and Suspension, each no doubt admirable in 
itself, one object may be taken; none of them meets the exigencies of the immediate 
situation.  Some would be rejected by the Home Rule coalition for the simple reason 
that they break the bond which holds it together.  All of them leave utterly unsatisfied 
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the Home Rule sentiment in Ireland and, what is to my mind – I might almost say 
within my own knowledge – equally important, the sentiment of the great majority of 
the Irish people in the United States and throughout Europe.
73
 
Plunkett cautioned against the proposed solutions, reminding that, importantly, these would 
not satisfy the majority of the worldwide Irish diaspora.  Irish and Irish-American 
nationalists generally saw Ireland as an indivisible entity.  They rejected any unionist 
suggestions that the island was composed of two nations, not just one.
74
 
The plight of Ulster unionists did attract sympathy, however, from supporters in 
Britain, America, and the dominions.  Backing for the Ulstermen came from the British 
League for the Support of Ulster and the Union, which in March 1914 organized the signing 
of the British Covenant as a counterpart to the Ulster Covenant.  Mass meetings were held in 
Canada, particularly among the Orangemen, and in the United States, Scotch-Irish and 
Orange gatherings expressed solidarity with Ulster.
75
  Unionists also made direct appeals to 
the United States and dominions, attempting to counter nationalist propaganda. 
One such appeal was made by Wicks, who wrote The Truth About Home Rule in 
1913, specifying that it was for an American audience.  He emphasized inconsistencies in 
nationalist policies on either side of the Atlantic, with a side-by-side comparison of speeches.  
Wicks also used American historical examples to justify the unionist position.  He asserted 
that unionists were passionate in their defense of Union, while the rest of Ireland was 
apathetic to Home Rule.
76
  The New York Times review of his book observed that Wicks 
“produced the impression that what is now proposed can never work, and that what has been 
heralded as a settlement is likely to result in utter confusion.”
77
 
Both Irish-American nationalists and the United States Orange Lodges became 
increasingly active on the Home Rule question.  The British Ambassador to the United 
States, Cecil Spring-Rice, wrote to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey that conflict in Ireland 
might cause unrest in America.  Irish-Americans continued to have a significant influence 
within the Democratic Party, leading some American politicians to excuse extreme 
nationalist tactics.
78
  However, the forces of Protestantism also influenced views, for 
example Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan sympathizing with Ulster because of his 
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With the threat of war looming, Asquith’s government decided to pass the Home 
Rule Bill but suspend implementation for the length of the war.  They hoped in part that this 
course of action would help them cultivate American goodwill.
80
  In the House of Lords, 
George Curzon, representative peer for Ireland, condemned the government’s decision.  He 
accused the government of valuing the loyalty of the United States above its own citizens in 
Ulster.  “If you are considering the feelings of Ireland and the undesirability of disappointing 
any section of the Irish population in either this country or abroad, why not consider the 
feelings of Ulster?  Why should Ulster be disappointed?  In a word, why should the loyalty 




World War I 
 In the opening years of the twentieth century, Americans generally pushed for a 
solution to the Irish question because they thought it would improve Anglo-American 
diplomatic relations and American domestic tensions.
82
  The outbreak of World War I 
created temporary unity between Ireland and Great Britain, with Redmond pledging loyalty 
to the British Empire.  For the majority of Americans, the importance of the Irish question 
significantly diminished in the face of war.  One aspect of Irish-American nationalism was 
specifically impacted by the war’s outbreak.  Redmond’s controversial loyalty to Great 
Britain devastated the United Irish League in America and the constitutional segment of 
Irish-American nationalism.  For the moment, control of Irish-American nationalist 
organizations was assumed mainly by radical separatists.
83
  However, Spring-Rice reported 
that the majority of Irish-Americans were sympathetic to the Allied cause.
84
 
 The British Foreign Office and War Propaganda Bureau at Wellington House agreed 
at the start of the war that propaganda was needed to ensure that the United States did not 
enter the war on the side of the Central Powers.  Britain competed with German propaganda, 
but aimed to avoid American suspicion and resentment by limiting the amount of propaganda 
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materials flooding the country.  For the first eighteen months of war, emphasis was laid on 
personal propaganda through individual contacts.  Sir Gilbert Parker was appointed head of a 
special branch at Wellington House to deal specifically with British propaganda in the 
United States.  He made several American visits during the war.
85
  Britain recognized the 
Irish situation as requiring intensive counter-propaganda in America.
86
 
As both unionists and constitutional nationalists rallied to the cause of Great Britain 
in the opening months of the war, extreme nationalists in both Ireland and America were 
alienated from the Home Rulers.
87
  Just as the German government worked with the 
revolutionary nationalists in Ireland, German-Americans were in close cooperation with 
Irish-Americans during the war.
88
  For nationalists in Ireland, Redmond’s position on the war 
split the Irish Volunteers, though by far the great majority remained with him as part of the 
National Volunteers.
89
  The division within nationalism was reflected in unionist reports that 
Irishmen who could potentially serve in the army had to be prevented from fleeing to 
America when they mistakenly thought that conscription had been implemented.
90
 
 For unionists, the war was an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to 
British and imperial values.  The separate 36
th
 “Ulster” Division gained the mass enlistment 
of the UVF.
91
  The new division was overwhelmingly Protestant and unionist, and was given 
permission to have the “red hand” of Ulster on uniforms.  The UUC passed resolutions 
pledging support for the war effort, but also vowed to maintain the UVF to resist the 
implementation of Home Rule if necessary.
92
  At the outbreak of war, the UVF Headquarters 
Council offered the War Office a hospital to be set up in the Belfast Exhibition Hall.
93
  The 
UVF Hospital initially had 100 beds, but was eventually expanded through the Samaritan 
Hospital and an additional wing erected onto the Exhibition Hall.
94
  Several American 
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individuals, as well as the Pennsylvania Scotch-Irish Society, donated money to the UVF 
Hospital during the war.
95
 
Carson accepted office with the first British coalition government formed in May 
1915.  He served as Attorney General until resigning in October.
96
  After Asquith’s 
resignation in December 1916, Carson returned to office as First Lord of the Admiralty.  He 
gave an interview with the New York Sun in March 1916 to appeal to American sympathy for 
the war effort.  Carson urged all parties to observe a truce in Irish affairs.  He stated, “I am 
well aware that John Redmond is having his own difficulties with the extreme anti-English 
factions in Ireland, and do not wish in the slightest measure to add to his trouble by 
emphasizing the deplorable facts which have facilitated against recruiting in Ireland for the 
war.  For them he is no wise responsible.”
97
 
Carson’s portrayal of Redmond was sympathetic, as they were each attempting to 
satisfy the demands of their separate segments of the Irish population while throwing all of 
their support behind the British war effort.  He continued, “Is it not true that Irishmen are 
great enough, noble enough, have pride and common sense enough, to let men realise it is 
wisest and most honourable for them to fight out their domestic battles amongst themselves, 
upon a lofty plane, without comforting the international assassin of the high seas and of 
Belgium, of the Balkans, and North France?”
98
  Carson emphasized that if nothing else, the 
Irish ought to be able to put their differences aside when facing an even greater enemy in the 
war.  He hoped internal Irish problems would not impact upon the fighting of World War I.  
In just the following month, however, rebellion broke out in Dublin. 
 Even before the Easter Rising, unionists linked extreme nationalists with “rampant 
and unchecked pro-Germanism.”  The IUA newspaper, Notes from Ireland, described a 
nationalist lecture from early 1916 at which the audience “might have been composed of 
Irish-Americans their sentiments were so anti-British; at one point a voice cried out, ‘Gott 
strafe England,’
99
 and the sentiment was loudly applauded.”
100
  The Freeman’s Journal 
reported that some Germans in America established a “Defence of Ireland” fund.  The article 
stated,  
Having exhausted apparently all other means of collecting money from their dupes the 
German agitators here (New York) have established a fund for the ‘Defence of 
Ireland.’  Neatly printed subscription cards soliciting donations to the fund have been 
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despatched all over the country.  The New York Herald has traced the origin of these 
cards to a German newspaper office.  Apart from enriching German ‘patriots’ who 
have inaugurated the movement the purpose of the fund is not made clear.
101
 
The creation of such a fund recognized the potential of Irish-American support for German 
causes, and underlined the links between the two groups. 
Notes from Ireland reported a January 1916 lecture in Cork by Reverend Michael 
O’Flanagan, CC, of County Roscommon.  The article noted that when the speaker related his 
experiences in America and remarked, “‘I met a few Germans there,’ he was greeted with 
‘loud cheers’ from his audience.”
102
  The report went on, “In his peroration the rev. 
gentleman continued to employ this easy method of fanning the fires of sedition amongst his 
Irish Volunteer audience.  He spoke of the American Irish having effectively prevented an 
English alliance with the United States.”
103
  O’Flanagan’s Cork audience was not 
representative of the region as a whole, however, particularly in the months following the 
sinking of the Lusitania.  On 10 May 1915, just three days after the disaster, the Cork County 
Coroner opened an inquest into the events, at which Captain William T. Turner testified.  
The jury, composed of twelve locals, returned a strongly anti-German verdict of “wilful and 
wholesale murder” on the part of the submarine officers and the German Emperor and 
government.
104
  The focus of Notes from Ireland on the O’Flanagan example illustrated the 
determination of Irish unionists to portray Irish and Irish-American nationalists as 
overwhelmingly extreme, pro-German, and anti-British despite evidence to the contrary. 
The outbreak of the Easter Rising in 1916 had several ties to Irish-America.  Major 
American newspapers condemned the activities of the revolutionary nationalists.  They 
viewed the Rising as foolish and futile in a time of war.  With the news of the rebel leaders’ 
swift executions, public opinion in both America and Ireland came out strongly against the 
British.
105
  The United States consul had used his influence to protect Americans involved in 
the Rising, including Éamon de Valera and Diarmuid Lynch.  The Rising signaled the final 
death toll for the cause of constitutional nationalism amongst Irish-Americans.  Huge 
numbers flocked to join or support the revolutionary side of the movement.
106
  Some 800,000 
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Irish-Americans joined nationalist organizations.  They raised over $10 million in support of 
Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
107
 
Following the Easter Rising, Irish-American nationalism gained a real vitality that 
had not been seen since the days of Parnell.  By this time, much of Irish-America was 
American-born and economically well-off.  However, new immigrants still arriving from 
Ireland helped to keep alive connections with Ireland and discontent with Britain which may 
have motivated their involvement.  At the same time, Irish-American nationalist goals 
accorded with the rhetoric of President Woodrow Wilson.  Wilson promoted ideas of 
democracy and self-determination for small nations.  Wilson himself sympathized with the 
Home Rule cause, but he was not willing to jeopardize Anglo-American relations.
108
  With 
the Home Rule Act already having been passed in 1914, though delayed from being enacted 
for the duration of the war, the period following the Easter Rising provided a chance for Irish 
nationalism to achieve significant headway on the goal of Irish independence.
109
 
 The Report of the Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland linked the Easter 
Rising to Irish-America.  It stated, “It is now a matter of common notoriety that the Irish 
Volunteers have been in communication with the authorities in Germany and were for a long 
time known to be supplied with money from Irish American societies.”
110
  The report 
confirmed connections between the Clan-na-Gael and Irish Volunteers, continuing, “In a 
report submitted on the 13
th
 July, 1915, it was stated that information had been received from 
a reliable source that a sum of 3,000 dollars had been recently sent from America to the 
Council of the Irish Volunteers.”
111
  In the aftermath of the Easter Rising, the British and 
American secret services began to keep routine surveillance on Irish-American activities, 
sharing intelligence and coordinating counterterrorism operations.
112
  British propaganda in 
the United States was renewed in an attempt to curb anti-British sentiment.
113
 
Unionists maintained that if only the British government had paid attention to the 
statements of nationalist leaders in America, they would not have been surprised by armed 
rebellion.  Notes from Ireland of 1 July 1916 reported, 
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The Arms Act was repealed at the desire of the Redmondite Party – perhaps it is truer 
to say at their command.  For it was at about this time that Mr. Redmond declared in 
New York that he and his Party ‘maintained an office in Dublin in which practically 
the government of Ireland was carried on.’  And it was during this American visit that 
he glorified his efforts in effecting a free trade in firearms all over Ireland.”
114
 
In part, the IUA was downplaying the UVF’s own role in fomenting armed rebellion by 
placing the blame back on the British government.  Unionists also placed blame on Irish-
American extremism, which helped to create an atmosphere of militancy and contributed to 
the arming of both unionists and nationalists in Ireland. 
Major American newspapers condemned the British government for failing to reach 
a settlement on Irish Home Rule after the Easter Rising, and for the continuing conflict over 
the question of “temporary” partition.
115
  The United States Senate passed a resolution in 
July, coinciding with the trial of Roger Casement, appealing to the British to exercise 
clemency in the treatment of Irish political prisoners.
116
  This did not prevent the execution 
of Casement, further inflaming opinion against the British.  President Wilson, who was of 
Scotch-Irish ancestry, had his own troubles with the Irish-American community.  He was 
seen as committed to pro-English stances and had attacked hyphenism among immigrants 
during the 1916 presidential campaign.
117
  Behind the scenes, however, Wilson was 
attempting to influence a solution to the Irish problem.
118
 
 David Lloyd George, then Minister of Munitions, was very aware of the impact of 
American support and supplies on the British war effort.  He was deputed to find a 
compromise on the Irish situation.  Lloyd George met with Carson and Nationalist MP 
William O’Brien at the Hotel Metropole on 30 May.  He made clear his belief that the war 
would be lost if American support was not reined in.
119
  O’Brien recorded Lloyd George 
saying, “In six months the war will be lost,” to which Carson replied, “If the war is lost we 
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are all lost.”  Lloyd George explained, “The Irish-American vote will go over to the German 
side.  They will break our blockade and force an ignominious peace on us, unless something 
is done, even provisionally, to satisfy America.”
120
  After further meetings with Lloyd 
George, Carson felt under pressure from the apparently unanimous support of the entire 
Cabinet for forcing through some measure of Home Rule.  He agreed to go to the UUC and 
urge them to accept six-county partition.  The UUC’s official position since the signing of 
the Ulster Covenant was the protection of all nine counties.
121
 
Liberal unionist landowner and UUC member Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery of 
County Tyrone was shocked at the turn of events.  He wrote to his correspondents that James 
Craig had been sent to him to explain the reasoning behind the push for a settlement: 
The most serious part of it was that the Cabinet were quite unanimous in considering it 
necessary to give Redmond Home Rule at once, in spite of all the obvious dangers 
which were implied.  Sir Edward Grey insisted upon this as absolutely necessary to 
enable him to get over difficulties in his dealings with America and other neutrals.
122
 
Montgomery believed that the Cabinet was “Asquixiated.”  He asserted that “all the ground 




Montgomery was stunned by the choice that the UUC had to make, as he believed 
they were turning their backs on the Ulster Covenant and giving up hope of finding another 
solution.  He wrote: 
The choice we had was really between all Ireland being placed under a Home Rule 
Parliament, or all Ireland minus six counties and I believe, odious as the position is, that 
we choose right.  What is difficult to understand is (1) how the American pressure to 
which the Cabinet had unanimously yielded can be strong enough to justify their action, 
and (2) how it is possible that the sort of Home Rule it is proposed to give can satisfy the 
feeling that is at the back of this pressure.
124
 
Ronald McNeill later reported that, while meeting with the UUC, Carson: 
outlined the representations that had been made to him by the Cabinet as to the injury 
to the Allied cause resulting from the unsettled Irish question – the disturbance of 
good relations with the United States, whence we were obtaining vast quantities of 
munitions; the bad effects of our local differences of opinion in Allied and neutral 
countries.  He admitted that these evil effects were largely due to false and hostile 
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propaganda to which the British Government weakly neglected to provide an antidote; 
he believed they were grossly exaggerated.
125
 
Commitment to winning the war and staying in the good graces of the neutral United States 
forced the unionists to reconsider their official position on Home Rule.  With much regret, 
the UUC formally gave up claims on Cavan, Donegal, and Monaghan, committing itself to 
six-county exclusion. 
 Ultimately, the settlement was scuttled by a poorly-defined period of partition.  
Carson believed that partition would only end if the British Parliament formally decided 
against it after the war’s end.  Redmond was under the impression that partition was 
temporary.
126
  British Conservative backbenchers rose up in opposition to an immediate grant 
of Home Rule.  British and southern unionist forces within the Cabinet shut down the 
possibility of settlement.
127
  A statement issued by southern unionists read, 
It is common knowledge that they [the IPP] do not even now represent to the full 
extent the views and feelings of their constituents…. It might be suggested that it was 
worth the gamble if the so-called settlement would satisfy the Irish Nationalists at 
home or political Irish-American feelings: it will do neither one nor the other.
128
 
The southern unionists emphasized that Sinn Féiners and Irish-American extremists would 
not be satisfied with any deal that included partition.  They explained that the settlement 
would “in our view be regarded by Irish American opinion with even greater contempt than 
in Ireland, and will be tolerated only on the ground that it will give the forces of disloyalty 
free scope for further efforts.”
129
  According to southern unionists, this measure of Home 
Rule and exclusion would only open the door to further trouble in Ireland.  Sinn Féiners and 
Irish-American extremists hoped to ultimately achieve a far greater measure of self-
governance. 
 Though it was unlikely that Irish and Irish-American extremists would have been 
satisfied with the proposed settlement, this attempt at negotiating for Home Rule helped to 
mollify the opinion of the American public in general.
130
  Wellington House and the Foreign 
Office also attempted to counter some of the extremist propaganda in the United States.  
Charles Hubert Montgomery, who worked at the Foreign Office and later traveled with the 
Marquess of Reading on his mission to the United States in 1918, wrote to his father, 
There is a lot of rubbish being talked in America about distress in Ireland which is said 
to need relieving.  I believe collections are even being made for the ostensible purpose 
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of relieving it and no doubt those who collect the money will have no bother in finding 
a use for it.  We are trying to arrange ways of disposing of these myths.... My 
impression is that the farmers are having the time of their lives and that there is no 
distress in any quarter.
131
 
Montgomery believed that Irish agricultural distress had been relieved.  The plight of the 
rural Irish was still being used to gain funding for entirely separate nationalist activities. 
 While there were British attempts to appeal to American opinion and counter 
extreme nationalist propaganda, the relations between Ulster and Britain were somewhat 
worsening.  The high number of casualties faced by the Ulster regiments, particularly after 
the Battle of the Somme, was seen as part of their sacrifice for the empire.  The casualties of 
war became martyrs for Ulster Protestant freedom.  The Somme was paralleled with the 
Battle of the Boyne in Ulster unionist mythology, adding to the sense of separateness in 
Ulster.
132
  For Britain, as the war went on, frustration built with Ulster always standing in the 




In March 1917, after Redmond and the IPP stormed out of the House of Commons 
when it failed to enact the immediate extension of Home Rule, Irish nationalists issued a 
manifesto to President Wilson.  The manifesto explained their position and appealed to the 
president to intervene to resolve the Irish question.  Wilson refrained from commenting.
134
  
Irish nationalists were hopeful that America’s entry into the war might gain them sympathy 
in the postwar reorganization.
135
   
After the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917, Wilson for the 
first time instructed his London ambassador, Walter Hines Page, to cautiously urge the 
British government to implement self-government in Ireland.  Though Page himself was 
sympathetic to the unionists, Irish-American opinion in favor of a settlement had gained 
substantial popular backing.  Wilson attempted to appease them to win support for the 
American war effort.
136
  Page received a memorandum from the White House instructing, 
The President wishes that, when you next meet the Prime Minister, you would explain 
to him that only one circumstance now appears to stand in the way of perfect 
cooperation with Great Britain.  All Americans who are not immediately connected 
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with Germany by blood ties find their one difficulty in the failure of Great Britain so 
far to establish a satisfactory form of self-government in Ireland.
137
 
Furthermore, Page was to impress upon Lloyd George that “If the British Government 
should act successfully on this matter, our American citizens of Irish descent and to a great 
extent the German sympathizers who have made common cause with the Irish, would join 
hands in the great common cause” with the Allies in fighting World War I.
138
 
The British government continued to make efforts to influence American opinion 
over Ireland.  E.M. House, Wilson’s foreign policy advisor, and Sir William Wiseman, a 
British intelligence officer who liaised between Britain and the United States, prepared a 
memorandum to be presented at the March 1917 Imperial Conference.  The memorandum 
asserted that the Irish question was “one of the greatest obstacles to a good understanding 
between Britain and the United States,” but that “the Unionist side of the question is little 
understood and never presented…. There are, however, many reasonable and intelligent 
Americans of Irish extraction who feel very strongly on the subject, and who might be 
persuaded to lend their assistance with all honesty to the settlement of this question at the 
end of the war.”
139
  The British Foreign Office prepared propaganda materials for the United 
States, circulating pro-British views in the press.  British-American organizations were 
prominent in the United States, particularly in New England and mid-Atlantic cities.  Scotch-
Irish organizations joined the ranks of other groups such as the Sons of St. George, the Order 
of Scottish Clans, and the Daughters of the British Empire.  These organizations promoted 




Notes from Ireland reported that Americans had been forced to change their stance 
on Ireland once they allied with Britain.  A New York Times article was quoted, stating, “As 
the friends of Germany and the enemies of England, Sinn Féin in Ireland and its abettors in 
the United States are necessarily enemies of the United States.  They are doing all in their 
power to beat America, whose cause cannot be separated from any of her associates in the 
war.”
141
  Arthur Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, went on a mission to the United States in 
1917.  Balfour spent four weeks in Washington as part of the British War Mission to liaise 
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with the United States government and obtain further war loans.
142
  He was instructed to 
telegraph back to Britain the attitudes in America regarding Ireland.  Balfour had a private 
meeting with Secretary of State Robert Lansing on 6 May, addressed Congress, and met with 
a delegation of leading Irish-Americans.  In his report to the British Cabinet, Balfour 
minimized the importance of Ireland to the United States.
143
 
 Back in Ireland, Montgomery was also skeptical about the importance of American 
attitudes.  He wrote to Sir James Stronge: 
My feeling is that, while it is on the whole wise for us to stick to the offer we made this 
time last year, it can do us no good in the public estimation to offer to make the setting 
up of a Parliament in any part of Ireland more easy than it is at this moment, that is to 
give a Parliament in which the majority, if not Sinn Féiners, will go in dread of Sinn 
Féiners power to assist the German submarine to command safe bases in all the Harbours 
and creeks of the West Coast.  No doubt the attitude of a great part of the Press is most 
disquieting, but a great deal of the arguments with regard to the attitude of Americans is 




Montgomery recognized that the previously-agreed UUC policy of six-county exclusion was 
probably the best course for the Ulster unionists.  He revealed his frustrations with the 
continual way that the opinions of the American government and public were driving Irish 
policy.  Montgomery believed that reports of the strength of American opinion were 
baseless, but were being used to support an agenda that went against the interests of Ulster 
unionists. 
As talks progressed for organizing an Irish Convention, Ulster unionists recognized 
that in a time of war, the United States was one of the driving factors influencing the British 
government.  Unionist MP for South Tyrone, William Coote, wrote to Montgomery, “I 
believe this whole Conference question is intended as window dressing for the Americans 
and a diplomatic move on the part of Lloyd George to ship the Responsibility from the 
House of Commons to Ireland.  It is however fraught with great danger to Ulster and we will 
require to be very diplomatic.”
145
  A unionist memorandum on the Irish Convention took the 
view that any coup to Home Rule would be dangerous to the war effort – a fact Americans 
would soon recognize: 
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It is suggested that it is necessary to agree to some form of Home Rule in order to 
placate American opinion.  It must be clear to intelligent Americans that the 
establishment of any effective form of Home Rule within Ireland would be equivalent 
to furnishing the Germans with a convenient Naval Base for attack upon the United 
States.  If Irish unionists continue their resistance to any form of Home Rule till the 
American public generally understand better what Home Rule means, the desire to see 
Home Rule established in Ireland will disappear.
146
 
Unionists aimed to counter the influence of Irish nationalist propaganda.  They hoped that if 
Americans were fully educated on the Home Rule question, there would no longer be 
demands from the United States for a solution to the Irish problem.  However, though the 
United States was a significant rhetorical target throughout the period of the war, unionists in 
actuality never fully committed to executing wide-ranging propaganda in America.  Instead 
they remained partially reliant on the efforts of the British government and Foreign Office. 
 
Partition 
Even though they deplored Home Rule, by mid-1917 Ulster unionists expressed 
openness to the idea of partition.  The Observer credited Ulster unionists for doing their 
utmost to aid the war effort and accommodate the United States through their willingness to 
accept a partition settlement.  An editorial on 6 May commented, 
For the sake of the Allies’ cause, and with honest regard for American opinion, [Ulster] 
has gone further, we believe, than would have been thinkable even a few weeks ago.  
Unionist Ulster has stretched out her hand.  Is there a sane Irishman alive who does not 
realise what that means and what it might be made to mean by courageous and generous 
action, by responsive and reconciling statesmen, on the Nationalist side?  Is the 
proffered hand of Unionist Ulster to be left ungrasped or flung back?
147
 
World War I had made American opinion on the Irish situation more important than it would 
otherwise have been.  At the same time, Ulster unionists were more responsive to America 
because of the ways in which the war effort, the Irish situation, and the United States were 
entangled. 
 The Irish Convention met from July 1917 to May 1918 under the chairmanship of 
Horace Plunkett.
148
  Plunkett was a former Unionist MP who had converted to Home Rule by 
1911.
149
  As a correspondent of Woodrow Wilson, Plunkett was influential in Irish-American 
relations, and had experience in the United States through his efforts in cooperative 
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  The Convention has been depicted as a way to conciliate American opinion, 
but was also a genuine attempt to solve the Irish problem.
151
  President Wilson decided to 
refrain from commenting on the Irish situation while the Convention was in session.
152
 
The Convention had separate representatives for Ulster and southern unionists, who 
were led by Lord Midleton and Protestant Archbishop of Dublin John Henry Bernard.  
Federalist proponents F.S. Oliver and Lord Selborne hoped to use the Irish Convention as an 
opportunity to launch the federal idea as a solution.  They drew up a draft plan, which won 
over a few converts, but were unable to make much of an impact beyond the unionist 
elites.
153
  With Sinn Féin unrepresented and difficulties finding common ground between 
Ulster, southern unionists, and nationalist representatives, hopes for the Convention soured 
by early 1918.  The government linked the Convention’s report with conscription, which was 




 The conscription crisis in April 1918 generated bitter anti-Irish sentiment in the 
United States.
155
  The British Foreign Office again felt this was a time in need of delicate 
propaganda efforts, which they directed toward American Catholics in particular.
156
  Irish 
nationalists sent a letter to Wilson to justify their views of conscription.  Ulster unionists 
responded by writing a letter of their own to admonish the nationalists.
157
  McNeill 
described,  
In the Nationalist letter to President Wilson reference was made more than once to 
the sympathy that prevailed in Ireland in the eighteenth century with the American 
colonists in the War of Independence.  The use made of it was a good example of the 
way in which a half-truth may, for argumentative purposes, be more misleading than 
a complete falsehood…. No mention was made of the fact that the members of the 
‘banished race’ in Washington’s army were Presbyterian emigrants from Ulster, who 
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McNeill went on to write that, conversely, it was the Ulster Presbyterians “who best in 
Ireland can trace their kinship with the founders of the United States, and who are entitled – 




 The unionists’ own letter to President Wilson was signed by Carson, the mayors of 
Belfast and Londonderry, and representatives of Ulster labor and commerce.  The letter was 
transmitted to Washington with the help of Walter Hines Page, who embedded it into an 
official telegram from the embassy.
160
  In the letter, unionists refuted the nationalist claim to 
American sympathy, stating: 
The Nationalist party have based their claim to American sympathy on the historic 
appeal addressed to Irishmen by the British colonists who fought for independence in 
America a hundred and fifty years ago.  By no Irishmen was that appeal received with 
a more lively sympathy than by the Protestants of Ulster, the ancestors of those for 
whom we speak to-day – a fact that was not surprising in view of the circumstances 
that more than one-sixth part of the entire Colonial population in America at the time 
of the Declaration of Independence consisted of emigrants from Ulster.  The 
Ulstermen of to-day, forming as they do the chief industrial community in Ireland are 
as devoted adherents to the cause of democratic freedom as were their forefathers in 
the eighteenth century.  But the experience of a century of social and economic 
progress under the legislative Union with Great Britain has convinced them that under 




The unionist appeal to the United States was based on shared history, and love of freedom 
and liberty.  They emphasized their role in Ireland’s industrial economy.  Unionists believed 
that liberty and economic progress would best be achieved through continued participation in 
the Union.  They therefore felt the maintenance of Union was consistent with the values they 
shared with America. 
 As well as the historical and ideological connections between Ulster and the United 
States, the unionists appealed to self-determination and wartime sacrifice.  They also further 
attempted to discount the nationalists.  They stated, 
The claim of these men, in league with Germany on the one hand, and with the forces of 
clericalism on the other, to resist a law passed by Parliament as necessary for national 
defence is, moreover, inconsistent with any political status short of independent 
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sovereignty – a status which could only be attained by an act of secession from the 
United Kingdom such as the American Union averted only by resort to civil war.
162
 
Unionists’ appeal against separatism would have been limited in its effectiveness for 
Americans, who would have been familiar with Irish-American calls for total independence 
over the four previous decades.  Anti-clericalism was also a delicate subject in an American 
setting.  While Americans repudiated clerical involvement in government, they also did not 
primarily view the Irish question in terms of religious conflict. 
 As president, Wilson was reluctant to take an open stance on the Irish question.  He 
did not want to imperil Anglo-American relations.  Other American politicians, however, 
were not under the same constraints.  Many congressmen and senators strongly supported 
pro-nationalist measures, causing resentment among unionists in Ulster.
163
  As the war was 
coming to an end, Irish and Irish-American nationalists found in Wilson’s calls for a new 
international order based on self-determination a possible route to achieve their own goals.
164
  
McNeill commented, “President Wilson’s coinage of the unfortunate and ambiguous 
expression ‘self-determination’ made it a catch-penny cry in relation to Ireland.”
165
  The end 
of the war allowed Irish-American nationalists to resume vigorous work for Irish 
independence, without the insinuation that they were weakening the United States’ war 
effort.  They viewed the Paris Peace Conference as an ideal place for Irish causes to finally 
win international attention, as the Allies would be considering democracy and self-
determination for small nations.
166
 
 Dáil Éireann selected Éamon de Valera, Arthur Griffith, and Count Plunkett to 
represent Irish nationalists at the peace conference, to ask for international recognition of the 
Irish Republic.  When they were not permitted to go to Paris, Irish-American nationalists 
selected three of their own leaders to promote the Irish cause.  Frank P. Walsh, Edward F. 
Dunne, and Michael J. Ryan were chosen at the Irish Race Convention held in Philadelphia 




 The commission members hoped to ask the British for safe-conduct passes for the 
Dáil Éireann representatives.  When that failed, they sought to present Ireland’s claims to the 
peace conference themselves.  They traveled to Ireland to “inspect conditions.”  To the 
embarrassment of the Wilson administration, the delegates were vocally supportive of the 
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republican government.  In part because of their blunders, they were not allowed to present 
their cause to the peace conference.  To Wilson’s further embarrassment, the United States 
Senate resolved by an overwhelming margin that Dáil Éireann representatives should be 
permitted to supplicate the powers at Versailles.
168
 
 The IUA passed a resolution admonishing the Senate resolution, stating, “That this 
Committee of Irish Unionists, representative of both North and South, indignantly resent the 
intervention of the American Senate in pressing the Irish problem on the notice of the Peace 
Conference, as the questions of Irish Government and administration are, in the opinion of 
this Committee, purely domestic ones for the decision of the Imperial Parliament.”
169
  
Unionists also specifically addressed the allegations about conditions in Ireland made by the 
American Commission on Irish Independence.  One UUC pamphlet entitled “The State of 
Ireland: American-Irish Allegations Refuted” corrected each point made in memoranda 
published by the Irish-Americans during their visit to Ireland.
170
 
Carson directly appealed to the United States in a speech at Belfast’s Wellington 
Hall on 2 September.  He stated, 
A word to Americans.  Now, let us see what are the elements that the real statesman has 
to consider.  He must first consider what it is we are asked to give up if we accept Home 
Rule, and this is very often forgotten.  May I say to our American cousins they nearly 
always forget.  We are depicted to them as having no constitutional government at all in 
this country.  What have we got? … Full and equal rights in the greatest Parliament that 
ever existed…. We are on equal terms, and we decline anything subordinate.
171
 
He went on to criticize the Irish-Americans’ calls for Irish self-determination, which went 
against the example of history in America itself: “Self-determination is, in my opinion, one 
of the most misleading phrases that has ever been put forward, and it is being run, you know, 
for all they knew in America.  Would they allow the South of America, the Southerners, self-
determination for themselves?  Why not?”
172
 
Unionists repeatedly asserted that if Americans only realized the true conditions of 
Ireland, that it was not oppressed by British rule, that the Irish were in fact over-represented 
in the British Parliament, then their interference would come to an end.  Notes from Ireland 
remarked, 
The truth of the matter is that America is beginning to learn that the traditional Ireland, 
‘under the brutal heel of the oppressor,’ is the greatest bluff in history.  A great nation 
cannot suddenly intervene in a great European struggle without learning something.  
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American soldiers have visited Ireland and looked in vain for signs of oppression.  
Many of them have gone home and informed their friends that the bluff has been called, 
and that there is ‘nothing doing.’  The more America knows of the truth about Ireland, 
the less, we confidently prophesy, will she be inclined to interfere.
173
 
Unionists hoped that the United States’ experience with Ireland during the war would have 
created a more realistic picture of the Irish situation for the American public.  The 
conscription crisis and willingness of the unionists to compromise on partition were also 
war-driven events which the unionists hoped would impact upon the views of the American 
public. 
 The unionists themselves made attempts to reach out directly to the American public.  
They tried to take advantage of the attitudes of those Americans who believed the United 
States had gone too far in its involvement in the Irish question.  President Wilson received 
letters from both sides of the Atlantic urging him to ignore the demands of Sinn Féiners.
174
  
The Ulster Women’s Unionist Council (UWUC) and the Women’s Committee of the IUA 
were both involved in letter-writing campaigns to the United States.
175
  The minutes of the 
UWUC Executive Committee recorded on 6 July 1920, 
Mrs. Allworthy [Chair of the UWUC Literature Committee] reported that four meetings 
of the Literature Committee had been held at which over 200 Newspapers had been sent 
to Women’s Clubs in America… That several members had responded to the appeal for 
papers, and she hoped that when the Committee met again in September, it would not be 
necessary to make a further appeal.
176
 
Branches of the UWUC were linked with fifty-three American women’s clubs who were sent 
leaflets and local newspapers.
177
 
Later in the year, the UWUC Executive Committee weighed its options for whether 
to continue with propaganda work.  Dehra Chichester commented “that it was almost too late 
now but a great deal might still be done if proper steps were taken.  She read a letter from a 
friend in America testifying to the value of the Newspapers and literature sent out there 
combating the Sinn Féin Campaign.”  The secretary, John M. Hamill, was instructed to write 
to the Loyal Coalition, a pro-unionist organization in Boston, Massachusetts, to arrange for 
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coordinated propaganda in the United States.
178
  In the south, the IUA Women’s Committee 
took on similar work.  An IUA Annual Report stated, “The Women’s Committee undertook 
to carry on special propaganda work in America, and much useful work has been done by 
them by a regular supply of articles and letters.  Many successful meetings were also 
arranged by the Women’s Committee.”
179
 
Edward Carson wrote to UUC Secretary Richard Dawson Bates about the 
establishment of an active propaganda department.  He stated, 
I have had numerous letters from America pointing out how active our opponents are in 
that country in the Press and on the Platform in trying by the grossest misrepresentation 
to bring about an anti-English feeling in relation to Ireland.  I am convinced that the 
time has come when we should establish an active propaganda department by which the 
true facts as regards Ireland and especially as regards Ulster should be made known.
180
 
Bates confirmed that there was a branch of the London-based unionist operation at 25 
Victoria Street which dealt with the American press.
181
  He also wrote that a Mr. McClure 
had been employed by Carson to put Ulster’s case before America.
182
  This was likely 
Samuel S. McClure, Ulster immigrant, journalist, and former proprietor of McClure’s 
Magazine.  He would later appear in a Carnegie Hall debate against an Irish-American 
nationalist opponent, in opposition to Irish independence.
183
 
Sinn Féin propaganda in America was a particular concern of Hugh Montgomery.  
He wrote to one of his correspondents, “I have received a lot of literature from America 
which makes me feel rather uncomfortable at the apparently growing strength of the Sinn 
Fein view of matters there.”
184
  He frequently corresponded with one of his former tenants, 
John E. Gunn.  Gunn had immigrated to America and became the Catholic Bishop of 
Natchez.  Montgomery wrote an impassioned letter to Gunn in early 1919, arguing: 
If Americans, who now appreciate the importance for the freedom and progress of the 
world, of the British Empire remaining united and powerful, can only persuade the Irish 
at home and abroad to devote themselves to abandon their struggle for national 
independence which will be no benefit to Ireland, and undoubtedly cripple the British 
power, they would confer an immense benefit on this country and on mankind.  Irish and 
English Unionists are really fighting for the same cause as President Lincoln fought for, 
and which I imagine all Americans, whichever side their fathers fought on in the sixties, 
are now practically agreed was the right course.
185
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In this letter, Montgomery revealed a hope that America might be the key to convincing Irish 
nationalists that independence would not benefit Ireland.  He emphasized that the fight for 
national unity, embodied in American history, should have greater resonance for Americans 
in their views on the Irish situation.  If Americans had learned anything from the experience 
of the Civil War and World War I, they would realize that the Ulster unionists were fighting 
in the same spirit of national unity. 
Montgomery also sent packages of unionist literature to Gunn.  This included 
Richard Dawson’s Red Terror and Green, which emphasized Bolshevik ties in Ireland, and 
Rodolphe Escouflaire’s Ireland: An Enemy of the Allies?, which asserted that America had 
suffered from the “ill-timed jests” of Irish nationalists during the war.
186
 
In turn, Montgomery read Gunn’s recommendations on typical pro-Sinn Féin 
literature being circulated in the United States, including George Peel’s “Reign of Sir 
Edward Carson.”
187
  Montgomery was also alarmed by Judge Cohalan’s pamphlet, “The 
Freedom of the Seas,” and the “Congressional Record,” which contained a large amount of 
material for Irish-American consumption.  He worried that neither the IUA nor the unionists 
at 25 Victoria Street had “taken effective measures to get themselves supplied from America 
with all these things.”  Therefore, they might not be aware of the dire influence of Sinn Féin 
in the United States.
188
  The materials recommended by Gunn were in parts incendiary and 
unrepresentative of Irish-Americans in general, the majority of whom were pro-Ally and 
reluctant to heavily criticize Britain during the war.  Montgomery believed that the British 
government’s pursuit of Home Rule policies leading up to the new Government of Ireland 
Bill would only strengthen the anti-British propaganda released by Sinn Féin in America.
189
 
In the United States, Irish-Americans actively lobbied against the Versailles Treaty 
and the League of Nations at Senate hearings.  Alan Ward writes that “the Irish became the 
leading weapon of the anti-League forces.”
190
  American supporters of Ulster unionism also 
attempted to influence the hearings.  They submitted a brief of protest arguing against 
attempts by the Sinn Féin party to have the “so-called Irish question thrust into the discussion 
in the Senate of the peace treaty and the league of nations.”  Seven Scotch-Irishmen signed 
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the brief, which was also published in pamphlet form and circulated by the UUC.
191
  
Nevertheless, the Treaty of Versailles was defeated on 19 November, with Irish-Americans 
having played a vital role.
192
 
As a draft of the Government of Ireland Bill was prepared in the closing months of 
1919, British statesmen considered American attitudes.  The measure was designed to pave 
the way for a single united Irish parliament, with partition in place which would theoretically 
be temporary.
193
  Unionists in the south protested against what they saw as the government 
acting with the excuse of placating Americans.  Notes from Ireland exclaimed, 
American Opinion!  The apologists for the Statute [the Government of Ireland Bill] 
would have us to believe that some such Act was necessary to placate public opinion 
in the United States.  We fail to see the necessity – or indeed the efficacy – of the 
means to promote the end.  The anti-English party in the States is not going to 
welcome a half-way house to Irish independence; and our friends in the Republic are 
content to allow us to manage our own affairs.
194
 
Notes from Ireland highlighted one of the major points of difficulty for unionists regarding 
the United States.  Irish-American nationalist supporters were vocally in favor of measures 
far surpassing those offered in the Government of Ireland Bill.  Those Americans more in 
sympathy with unionists merely urged the United States to refrain from involvement in the 
Irish question.  Unionists in Ireland supported such a stance: they consistently expressed 
disapproval of the high levels of American influence.  However, they may have been more 
successfully aided if they had gained greater outright support for their own movement from 
the American public. 
The Irish-American nationalist movement was wrought with factionalism, making 
the movement largely ineffectual by 1920.
195
  As a result, when Éamon de Valera, president 
of the Dáil Éireann, secretly arrived in New York City in June 1919 to stay for eighteen 
months, he was able to take advantage of the power vacuum.  He established the American 
Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic in November 1920.  This allowed him 
to control the Irish-American side of the nationalist movement.  De Valera also initiated a 
bond-certificate drive for Sinn Féin, which raised $5.5 million.  He was unable to achieve his 
ultimate goal of securing official American recognition for the Irish republic.
196
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As with previous nationalist visitors to the United States, Irish unionists closely 
monitored de Valera’s activity.  Notes from Ireland portrayed him as a comic figure, 
commenting, 
What a figure of fun, according to all accounts, is de Valera cutting in the United 
States.  One can picture this self-centred poseur, sitting in his ‘State’ apartments in a 
New York Hotel, talking in the King Cambyses vein about his new ‘Republic,’ and the 
Irish loan to be raised by the issue of Republican bonds ‘of small denomination to 




De Valera was likened to Falstaff in Henry IV, Part I, when he speaks in the “King 
Cambyses vein.”  The unionists portrayed him as a fool playing the role of a majestic king.  
However, the unionists in actuality took de Valera very seriously.  A delegation was sent 
from Ulster to America, led by William Coote, to represent the views of Irish unionists in the 
face of the de Valera propaganda.
198
 
Philip Whitwell Wilson, a special correspondent of the London Daily News, wrote a 
book for the consumption of the American public entitled The Irish Case before the Court of 
Public Opinion.  He reiterated the Coote deputation’s accusations that the American press 
was pro-nationalist, not giving fair hearings to unionist viewpoints.
199
  Wilson equated the 
citizens of the United States to a jury, “sitting in solemn judgment on the great case of 
Ireland versus England.”  He believed that Ulster unionists needed unbiased consideration in 
the United States.
200
  Wilson recognized Ireland as an international question with the United 
States particularly interested in its solution.  He also condemned Irish-American extremism.  
“There is all the difference between study and incendiarism.  For responsible American 
Citizens to aid and abet revolution in Ireland is improper.  For them to aid and abet 
revolution in India in order to force England’s hands, they think, in Ireland, is surely worse 
than a mere impropriety.”
201
  Wilson portrayed American citizens as an irresponsible jury 
condoning extremism, failing to consider the situation without bias and treat all parties in 
Ireland justly. 
The Government of Ireland Act was passed on 23 December 1920.  The Act created 
separate devolved parliaments for six counties in Ulster and for the south, continued 
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representation at Westminster, and formed an all-Ireland council.
202
  The UUC had wanted 
straightforward exclusion from Home Rule.  However, they accepted their new parliament as 
more secure than being under direct rule from Westminster, especially given the increasing 
sense of betrayal they felt toward the British since the end of the war.
203
  Initial elections in 
Northern Ireland produced huge Unionist majorities.
204
  As the north attempted to cope with 
its newfound Home Rule status, the south degenerated into chaos with fighting between the 
British and the IRA. 
Anglo-Americans attempted to counter the increasing violence by emphasizing the 
extremism of Sinn Féin and the IRA.  In the early 1920s, both the British and American press 
regularly described Irish guerilla violence as “terrorism.”  The American consul in Dublin, 
Frederick Dumont, sympathized with the British.  He enumerated for the State Department 
the outrages and attacks committed against British forces by Irish nationalists.
205
  The British 
and American governments began to work together to an extent to counter terroristic forces 
in both countries, though British reprisals in Ireland were also condemned.
206
 
In the midst of the Anglo-Irish War at the end of 1920, Irish-Americans founded the 
American Committee for Relief in Ireland, chaired by Judge Michael J. O’Brien.  An eight-
member delegation, including several Quakers with previous relief work experience, was 
sent to Ireland to investigate conditions.  They toured Ireland from 12 February to 31 March 
1921, determining that the country faced widespread destruction.  When they returned to the 
United States, the committee initiated a national fundraising campaign for Irish relief, led by 
Captain John F. Lucey.  The campaign attempted to make this a non-partisan exercise, 




The American Committee for Relief in Ireland raised $5,123,640.  They dispersed 
the money in Ireland through the Irish White Cross.  By the end of March 1921, Dumont sent 
reports to the State Department questioning the validity of the delegation’s descriptions of 
destruction in Ireland.  He feared they had been exploited by the Irish White Cross, an 
organization with close ties to Sinn Féin.  In short, he thought that American relief funds 
were going straight into Sinn Féin coffers.
208
  The British government was angered to find 
that President Harding had endorsed an organization that was inadvertently funding Sinn 
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Féin separatism.  Anglo-American relations were already strained due to tensions over the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance and American naval building activities.  It is possible at this time 
that the United States government threatened to recognize the Irish Republic to force 
Britain’s hand in the other areas of diplomatic strife.  This marked the first time that the 




 In June 1921, controversy was generated when Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims, 
the Commander of United States Forces Operating in European Waters during World War I, 
addressed a London meeting of the English-Speaking Union.  In his speech, Sims accused 
Sinn Féin sympathizers in America of having “the blood of English and American boys on 
their hands.”  Sims stated that Irish-Americans who tried to interfere in Anglo-American 
relations “are like zebras, either black horses with white stripes or white horses with black 
stripes, but we know they are not horses, they are asses.  But each of these asses has a vote, 
and there are lots of them.”
210
  These anti-Irish-American views accorded with his statements 
on Sinn Féiners in Ireland in Sims’ Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Victory at Sea.  In the 
book, he described his experiences in Queenstown during the war.  He stated that Sinn 
Féiners “were not only openly disloyal; they were openly pro-German.”
211
  Sims accused 
them of attacking American soldiers at Queenstown and taking attention away from the war 
effort, effectively prolonging the war.
212
 
 Sims was condemned for his “jackass” speech by politicians and Irish-Americans.  
Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby publicly reprimanded the Rear Admiral for overstepping 
diplomatic relations.
213
  Sims found strong support from Protestant churches and clergy, 
including Reverend Dr. Frederick Brown Harris, Reverend Harry Knight Miller, and 
Methodist Bishop Edwin Holt Hughes.  The New York Times, New York Herald, and 
Christian Science Monitor defended Sims.  He was also backed by such organizations as the 
Loyal Coalition, the American Protestant Federation, the Loyal Orange Institution, and the 
Allied Loyalty League.  Prominent individuals such as Harvard President Charles W. Eliot, 
eugenics theorist Madison Grant, Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, former United 
States Attorney General George W. Wickersham, and others rallied to Sims’ defense.
214
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 Overall, the response of the American public revealed frustration with the Irish 
question after World War I.  According to Francis Carroll, the Sims incident illustrated to the 
British that they need not be swayed by American Congressional and Senate resolutions on 
Ireland.  The American public was frustrated with the Irish-German relationship during the 
war and the prominence of the Irish situation in American politics.  The climate of the United 
States following the First World War, with resurgent nativism, anti-Catholic and anti-
immigrant ferment, and pseudo-scientific racism, helped to sway Americans in general 
against the cause of Irish independence.
215
  The same impulses which influenced views of the 




 The signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 largely satisfied Irish-American 
demands.
217
  An Irish Free State with dominion status was created.  On the treaty’s adoption, 
George Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, stated that the Irish question had been a disrupting 
factor in British relations with the United States for the past fifty years.  He hoped that if they 
“could wipe off from the slate here this Irish question, I know of no obstacle to impair the 
completeness of the understanding, and the closeness of the co-operation that should prevail 
in future between America and ourselves, and which is equally demanded by the traditions, 
the sentiments, and the need of these two great branches of the English-speaking race.”
218
  
Curzon argued that settling the Irish question was the key to good relations with the United 
States. 
Many Irish-American nationalists felt that their goals had been achieved with the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty and Ireland was finally free.  The subsequent outbreak of civil war 
therefore came as a shock.  The war received little support from an Irish-American 
nationalist movement that lacked motivation to fight another Irish battle.
219
 
Even after the creation of the Irish Free State, Ulster unionists remained concerned 
about attitudes in America.  The UUC continued its efforts to spread pro-unionist 
propaganda to the United States.  The Year Book for 1923 noted that the press bureau was 
active in sending out “articles and letters on the Irish situation” to counteract “the false 
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Conclusion 
 Ulster unionists conducted a contradictory policy toward the United States from 
1900 to 1920.  As in the first and second Home Rule crises, unionists emphasized the 
extremism of Irish-America.  They painted a picture of Irish-America as violent and 
separatist, refusing to settle for Home Rule as a final solution to Irish problems.  At worst, 
Irish-America was a den for the cultivation of hatred against England, carrying everlasting 
bitterness from the Famine and the sense of exile from their homeland.  Irish-Americans 
sought to exact revenge through separatism and consorting with Britain’s enemies.  Unionists 
believed that constructive policies had removed the grievances of the Irish people. Unionism 
therefore had taken away demands for Home Rule, and thus nationalists had to increasingly 
rely on fanatical Irish-America for support.  The Irish nationalists were seen as working 
against the interests of the Irish people themselves.  Instead, they would do anything to 
pander to their American paymasters. 
 Unionists also condemned the role of the American government in the Irish problem.  
It is clear that the United States did have some influence over the British government’s Irish 
policy.  During World War I in particular, the American government felt pressure from its 
own Irish population against allying with the British.  Fears generated by this pressure helped 
lead to the first outright acceptance of partition by Ulster unionists.  Ulster unionists’ loyalty 
to the British Empire meant that they were forced to consider American opinion because of 
the circumstances of the war.  However, they were resentful of American involvement in 
what they saw as a British domestic issue. 
Unionists also responded to what they saw as deceitful nationalist propaganda in the 
United States by attempting their own counter-propaganda.  They were far more active, 
however, in attempting to discredit the Irish-American influence in speeches, pamphlets, 
leaflets, and letters within the United Kingdom itself. 
 On the other hand, it is clear that the unionists wanted to develop their own support 
base in the United States.  They wrote and publicized anti-nationalists books directed toward 
American audiences, and conducted extensive letter-writing campaigns as well as private 
correspondence.  They worked, to a limited extent, with pro-British groups in the United 
States.  A few visits were also conducted to America. 
Unionist attitudes toward Irish-America were complex and it is difficult to tell 
exactly what the unionists thought they would gain by either discrediting or appealing to 
American views.  At times, they were skeptical about the importance of American attitudes, 
wondering why another country should have any influence over British domestic policy.  
Unionists constantly urged the United States to cease its involvement in the Irish question.  
81 
They hoped that the more America knew of the truth of the Irish situation, the less inclination 
there would be to interfere.  There also appeared to be a vague and distant hope, emerging 
when it seemed that there may be no other way to hold the Union together, that America 
might be the key to convincing the Irish that national independence would not benefit 
Ireland. 
The Irish unionist movement grew increasingly militant and Ulsterized during the 
first twenty years of the twentieth century.  While unionists remained interested in engaging 
with Americans, their sometimes-contradictory policies and uneven approach to the United 
States meant that Ulster-American networks were not as fruitful as they might have been.  
This had the effect of making unionists appear increasingly isolated and entrenched in Ulster 




IV. THE SCOTCH-IRISH IN AMERICA: IDENTITY FORMATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD IRISH 
HOME RULE 
 
 The term “Scotch-Irish” represents the combination of three identities: the Scottish 
and the Irish in an American setting.
1
  In Ireland, Irish Protestants were members of different 
groups with varied backgrounds and traditions.  The Ulster Scots were relatively recent 
settlers in Ireland, having been “planted” in Ulster starting in the early seventeenth century.  
Their experiences with cultural adaptation were similar to what they would later encounter in 
the American colonies and subsequent republic.
2
  The difference of experience between 
those who settled in the southern backcountry in the early eighteenth century and those who 
joined the California gold rush in the mid-nineteenth century would have been drastic.  In 
addition to their diverse origins and migration experiences, their language, mobility, and 
adaptability within American society made the Scotch-Irish a particularly difficult group to 
define.  This was especially the case as the characterization of “Scotch-Irish” widened to 




 Historians of ethnicity emphasize the reciprocal interactions between immigrants and 
their host societies, as immigrants navigated the dynamic ground between ethnic resistance 
and assimilation.
4
  In the United States, as Kevin Kenny describes, ethnicity assumed an 
historical importance as immigrants emphasized their ethnic identities to become more fully 
“American.”
5
  The role of ethnicity fluctuated depending on the challenges that a particular 
ethnic group presented to assimilation or acculturation to American society.  The Scotch-
Irish, for example, would have been affected when the mood of the country was anti-Irish or 
Anglophobic. 
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 As the volume of United States immigration increased throughout the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, both American and ethnic identities were expressed through civic and 
associational culture.
6
  Associational culture became an increasingly important part of 
American civic life during the nineteenth century.  After the Civil War, this culminated in a 
“golden age of fraternity.”  Many Americans expressed their individuality through joining 
what Jason Kaufman describes as “self-segregating” organizations based on gender, race, 
ethnicity, or religion.
7
  At times these associations allowed “friends” to join who did not 
claim membership of that ethnic group, such as Henri Le Caron’s participation in the Clan-
na-Gael. 
 In the mid-nineteenth century, expressions of ceremonial citizenship were changing.  
As Mary Ryan describes, during the first half of the century major American cities spawned 
hundreds of voluntary organizations, leading to the pluralization of civic society.  By joining 
such groups, individuals were able to take part in parades and other civic ceremonies which 
were an important part of city life.
8
  After the Civil War, societal elites withdrew from 
participation in these civic ceremonies.  Increasingly crowded and chaotic conditions in cities 
led to clashes between different ethnic and religious groups.  This was epitomized by the 
New York City Orange Riots of 1870 and 1871.  The Orange Riots marked a turning point in 
American civic culture, as celebrations of public holidays became more private and less 
participatory.
9
  However, ethnic societies continued to flourish, emphasizing shared national 




 Irish-Americans had long celebrated their heritage through ethnic associations, as 
part of what Ryan terms “a textbook case of ethnic sociability.”
11
  They participated in 
church groups, temperance groups, mutual benefit societies, and nationalistic political 
organizations.  They faced discriminatory attacks from nativist associations which were also 
prominent in the mid-nineteenth century.  Along with nativist organizations, native-born 
white Americans joined associations dedicated to the celebration of Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
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heritage.  Such associations generally barred membership of people of other races, 
ethnicities, and religions.
12
  The Scotch-Irish played prominent roles in and alongside nativist 
organizations and claimed places within Anglo-Saxon associations.  However, many chose to 
separate ethnically from the “native” Americans by forming their own ethnic societies, such 
as the Scotch-Irish Society of America (SISA) and the Loyal Orange Institution (LOI).  
These organizations allowed the Scotch-Irish to celebrate combined Anglo-Saxon, Scottish, 
and Irish backgrounds, promote their historic contributions to American society, and 
preserve ties to Ireland. 
 This chapter will first focus on the immigration and identity formation of the Scotch-
Irish in America during the nineteenth century.  The chapter will next explore two 
organizations prominent at the end of the nineteenth century which explicitly celebrated 
Ulster Scots origins and connections: the SISA and the LOI of the United States.  While 
work remains to be done on many aspects of Scotch-Irish life within American society 
during this period, this chapter will look particularly at their ties to Ireland and their 
involvement in the Ulster unionist cause during the Home Rule era.  Irish-American 
nationalists during this time were prominent within the movement for Irish self-government, 
influencing the attitudes of Americans of non-Irish backgrounds and United States 
government policy.  This chapter examines the ways in which the Scotch-Irish responded to 
these calls for Irish Home Rule and independence, attempted to support the unionists, and 
remained connected to Ireland. 
 Along with the reciprocal interactions between the Scotch-Irish and their American 
host society, connections with the society of origin remained important.  The Scotch-Irish 
were influenced by and remained interested in conditions in Ireland.  In addition, the Ulster 
Scots themselves were affected by the actions and legacy of the Scotch-Irish in the United 
States.  Their use of the Scotch-Irish heritage to help form their own “Ulsterman” identity 
will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 
Immigration and Identity 
 From the late seventeenth century onward, Protestants were over-represented in the 
numbers of emigrants from Ireland to America.
13
  By the early nineteenth century, as Donald 
Akenson and Kevin Kenny have emphasized, Irish-America was largely a Protestant place.
14
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There is no indication that Irish Protestants would have felt socially threatened by the 
minority Irish Catholics up to this time.  Kerby Miller suggests that the social and political 
issues that engaged Irish immigrants transcended religious divisions in the early American 
republic, leading to a broad, “positive” Irish identity.
15
 
 Early nineteenth-century Irish emigration was mainly motivated by economic 
distress.  The emigrant group also included a number of professional men, political refugees, 
and others who were relatively well-off compared to earlier phases of migration, which had 
included large numbers of indentured servants.
16
  The flow of emigrants to America was 
temporarily halted by the War of 1812.  Immediately after the war’s end, an economic crisis 
in Ireland between 1815 and 1818 drove 35,000 to emigrate.  These emigrants were mainly 
Irish Protestants of various denominations, the majority coming from Ulster. 
 Through their ancestral connections, new immigrants were drawn to already-
established Scotch-Irish settlements in the southern backcountry.  Significant numbers also 
settled in cities along the eastern seaboard, particularly Philadelphia and New York.
17
  The 
peak of emigration from Ulster came between 1815 and 1847, during which time 
approximately 500,000 came to America.
18
  During this period, the number of Catholics 
leaving Ireland first exceeded the number of Protestants.  The region of departure also shifted 




Identity formation processes in America were gradual and multidimensional.  As 
early as the 1820s Irish Protestants were prominent members of nativist and anti-Catholic 
organizations.  Contrastingly, as late as the 1840s, some Scotch-Irish immigrants revealed 
anti-British and radical sentiments in their letters.
20
  Irish Presbyterians were known as 
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consistent supporters of Jeffersonian Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats, parties also 
supported by Irish Catholics.
21
  Miller cites Ulster Presbyterian immigrant letters revealing 
liberal and radical sentiments.  These letters suggest that Irish-Americans inherited the ideals 
of the United Irishmen – or perhaps the mass migration of Irish political radicals from Ulster 
to America.
22
  The transference of the United Irishmen’s nonsectarian ideals across the 
Atlantic was illustrated by Irish Protestant aid to newly-arrived, impoverished Irish Catholic 
immigrants, and by their membership in nonsectarian ethnic organizations.
23
 
Miller argues that a particularly “Scotch-Irish” identity developed between 1790 and 
1820, before the Catholic Irish played any significant role in American society.  Genteel and 
conservative Irish Protestants used “Scotch-Irish” identity while attempting to undermine 
radical support for Jeffersonian Republicans, and to gain acceptance and influence in Anglo-
American society.  This mirrored similar struggles in Ulster following the failure of the 
United Irish rising.
24
  They hoped to dissociate themselves from Scottish immigrants, who 
were viewed negatively as loyalists to the British.  Anti-Scots sentiment in America lasted 
into the nineteenth century.
25
  In addition, the term “Scotch-Irish” was used to invoke shame 
with being associated with the Catholic Irish.  The desire to be dissociated from the Catholic 
Irish would only increase as the nineteenth century brought huge numbers of new Irish 
Catholic immigrants.  The “Irish” identity in both Ireland and America was becoming more 
exclusively associated with Catholicism.  These increased divisions between separate Irish 
communities were exemplified by New York City’s first Orange-Green riots in 1824.
26
 
 By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Irish Protestants in America were 
assuming increasingly defensive stances against the large numbers of Catholics flooding into 
the country.  As Thomas Brown describes, the term “Scotch-Irish” became more prominent.  
Irish Protestant immigrants attempted “to make it clear to all Americans that in religion, 
culture, and capacity for assimilation into American life they were very different” from the 
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  Irish Protestants were also closely associated with the waves of nativism 
and anti-Catholicism that engulfed America in the 1840s and 1850s. 
 Nativism and anti-Catholicism were rooted in several different factors: (1) religious, 
economic, and social resentment felt toward immigrants; (2) fear of foreign radicals and 
attacks on foreign symbols; (3) the doctrinal concept of Anglo-Saxon superiority; and (4) 
uncertainties associated with times of change to traditional socioeconomic patterns.
28
  For the 
Scotch-Irish, nativism and anti-Catholicism could also be used as a means of assimilation 
into American society.  In addition, the very existence of these organizations made the 
Scotch-Irish even more likely to seek to distance themselves from Irish Catholics, thus 
increasing sectarian fervor and divisions within the Irish community.
29
 
 The Know-Nothing movement of the mid-nineteenth century was the second such 
wave of nativism in American history, following the time of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 
the 1790s.  John Higham also identifies two other major periods of nativism: the late 1880s 
and during the First World War.
30
  The deepening sectarian sentiment was symbolized by the 
Philadelphia riots of 1844, when nativist attacks were made against the Catholic Church 
because of controversy surrounding the use of the Bible in public schools.  In 1852, the 
Order of the Star Spangled Banner was formed in New York City, and the “Know-Nothing” 
movement spread rapidly thereafter.  The Know-Nothings made significant political gains 
including electing numerous congressmen and state officials, but they never achieved their 
ultimate goals of tightening restrictions on immigration and naturalization.
31
  The movement 
died out by the end of the 1850s. 
The Scotch-Irish were closely associated with the Know-Nothings, as well as other 
nativist organizations such as the American Protestant Association, the Order of United 
Americans, and the American Protective Association.  Higham writes that the significant 
participation of the Scotch-Irish in these nativist organizations was due to their 
overwhelming hatred of the Catholic Irish.
32
  Ultimately, however, there is no way to 
definitively say what the levels were of Scotch-Irish participation in nativist organizations, or 
how the fact of their “Scotch-Irishness” influenced their participation. 
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 By the mid-nineteenth century, many Scotch-Irish families had been in America for 
a century and a half.  James Leyburn argues that these families had assimilated into the 
overarching American culture by 1800, with the story of the Scotch-Irish people as a distinct 
group in America ending with the Revolutionary War.
33
  Known as pioneering 
backwoodsmen, the Scotch-Irish had founded towns, colleges, and churches on the American 
frontier.  The majority converted from Presbyterianism to denominations which were more 
easily transferable to frontier life, becoming Baptists or Methodists.
34
  In addition, the 
election of Andrew Jackson as President of the United States in 1828 represented the 
pinnacle of Scotch-Irish achievement as they assimilated into the overarching American 




The election of Jackson, the son of Ulster Presbyterian immigrants, illustrated the 
degree to which the Scotch-Irish had shed their ethnic distinctions and were identified simply 
as Americans.  There is scholarly debate over the level of Scotch-Irish acculturation and 
assimilation into mainstream American culture from the 1830s onward.
36
  How “Scotch-
Irish” did they remain?  At what point can they be considered to have been “totally” 
assimilated? 
 Akenson argues that ethnic groups are a multi-generational phenomenon, and it is 
impossible to tell how long a sense of ethnicity will be passed on through the generations.
37
  
For the Scotch-Irish, cultural continuities certainly existed in isolated backcountry 
settlements, where intra-marriage within the community was common.
38
  Their sense of 
ethnicity was also renewed through continued emigration from Ulster.  There were a 
significant number of newer arrivals, with a steady but declining stream of Ulster Protestant 
immigrants coming to the United States up to the 1920s.  By the turn of the century, Ulster 
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immigrants accounted for nineteen percent of all Irish immigrants to the United States.
39
  
Half of these were Catholic, meaning that about ten percent of all Irish immigrants were 
Ulster Protestants – not an insignificant number. 
Newcomers played important roles in filling the ranks of the LOI of the United 
States.
40
  Even in the SISA, which is generally associated with more distant Ulster ancestry, 
at least twenty percent of members, and perhaps many more, had themselves emigrated from 
Ireland.
41
  Undoubtedly, with waves of migration lasting over centuries, the levels of 
acculturation and assimilation into American society were extremely varied.  Their 
perceptions and experiences of Ireland would encompass a wide range of views, as Irish 
Protestants themselves were a diverse group.
42
  By the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, their views and experiences of the United States also differed dramatically. 
 In his now-classic work on Irish-American nationalism, Brown posits that the great 
motivating factor behind enthusiastic interest in Irish nationalism lay in American political, 
social, and economic conditions.
43
  Like their Catholic counterparts, the Scotch-Irish were 
also motivated by American circumstances and their quest for advancement within American 
society.  Even those who promoted the celebration of the Scotch-Irish ethnic heritage 
anxiously emphasized their allegiance to America first and foremost.
44
 
 As white Protestants whose families had originated in Great Britain, the Scotch-Irish 
could choose to join the legions of “invisible immigrants” in the United States.  The Anglo-
Irish, who probably made up the overall majority of Irish Protestant immigrants, were likely 
subsumed as “invisible immigrants,” as there is little indication of their collective fate in the 
historiography.
45
  For both the Anglo-Irish and Scotch-Irish, cultural differences were 
masked by common language and their ability to move more quickly into higher-paid jobs 
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than most immigrants because of the industrial nature of British society.
46
  They could 
emphasize Anglo-Saxon or Scottish ties, joining numerous popular organizations which 
celebrated Anglo-Saxonism and promoted closer British-American relations.  The Loyal 
Coalition, English-Speaking Union, Ulster League of North America, British-American 
League, and others promoted pro-British, though not always anti-Irish nationalist, agendas.
47
  
Membership in Anglo-Saxonist and nativist organizations could also encapsulate anti-
Catholic viewpoints.  Many Scotch-Irish joined such organizations as the American 




As emigrants from Ireland, the Scotch-Irish could continue the traditions of their 
United Irish forebears and forge ties with Irish-American nationalism in spite of its close 
association with the Catholic Church.  Indeed, for years Irish Protestants had led such 
organizations as the Irish Society of Boston and the Society of Friendly Sons of St. Patrick.  
With their diverse backgrounds, coming out of Ireland throughout a wide period of time and 
representing a multitude of different political and social viewpoints, the Scotch-Irish were in 
a unique position among American ethnic groups.  Those who joined such organizations as 
the SISA and the LOI were choosing to celebrate and promote a specifically Scotch-Irish 
ethnic heritage. 
 
Scotch-Irish Society of America 
 Throughout the late nineteenth century, Americans celebrated their ethnic heritage 
though the formation of historical associations commemorating the achievements of their 
ancestors.  Especially popular were groups asserting older American roots against a newer 
tide of emigration from eastern and southern Europe.
49
  Seeing the ways in which such 
groups as the New England Puritans, Dutch-Americans, and German-Americans 
memorialized their contributions to American development, several Scotch-Irishmen were 
driven to form their own society. 
                                                 
46
 Charlotte Erickson, Invisible Immigrants: The Adaptation of English and Scottish Immigrants in 
Nineteenth-Century America (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972); Rowland Tappan Berthoff, 
British Immigrants in Industrial America, 1790-1850 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); 
Blethen and Wood, “Introduction,” 2-4. 
47
 Francis M. Carroll, American Opinion and the Irish Question, 1910-23: A Study in Opinion and 
Policy (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978), 170-171, 278-279; Berthoff, British Immigrants, 200-205. 
48
 Kenny, American Irish, 158-159; Jones, “Scotch-Irish,” 906.  On relationship between Anglo-
Saxonism and Home Rule, see L.P. Curtis, Jr., Anglo-Saxons and Celts: A Study of Anti-Irish 
Prejudice in Victorian England (Bridgeport: University of Bridgeport, 1968), 90-101. 
49
 Schlesinger, “Biography of a Nation,” 19; Philadelphia Inquirer 27 May 1890. 
91 
Colonel Thomas T. Wright, a Nashville businessman, was credited with the initial 
idea of an organization to “record and make history of the achievements of the Scotch-Irish 
race.”
50
  He contacted the Governor of Tennessee, Robert Love Taylor, and received an 
enthusiastic response to his proposition of forming a Scotch-Irish society.
51
  Around the same 
time, other Scotch-Irishmen also discussed the formation of an ethnic society.  In July 1884, 
preliminary meetings were held in Belfast, where several prominent Scotch-Irishmen were 
gathered for a meeting of the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance.
52
  Princeton University President 
James McCosh, a transplanted Scotsman, encouraged New York Presbyterian minister John 
Hall and Princeton biology professor George Macloskie to seek to bring together America’s 
Scotch-Irish into greater community.
53
  Hall’s close friend Robert Bonner, owner and 
publisher of the New York Ledger, was to be the society’s first president.  Governor Taylor 
put Wright in contact with Bonner and they corresponded extensively, eventually planning 
the first mass meeting. 
With the aim of celebrating the history and achievements of the Scotch-Irish in 
America, the planning for the first Scotch-Irish congress began in 1888.  Governor Taylor 
supported the congress by issuing hundreds of invitations to prominent Scotch-Irishmen and 
publishing a general call in a thousand leading newspapers.
54
  The SISA was formed at the 
congress, held from 8-11 May 1889 in Columbia, Tennessee.  At the first congress itself, 
newspapers reported anywhere from 6,000 to 10,000 attendees. 
Bonner emphasized that the society was nonpolitical and nonsectarian, with 
membership open to anyone with Ulster Scots ancestry regardless of religion.  Despite 
celebrating ties to Ireland and Scotland, society leaders were determined that the 
organization would be thoroughly American, involving itself in the affairs of no other nation.  
Society members hoped to promote social networking amongst Scotch-Irishmen, particularly 
encouraging “a better acquaintance between northern and southern members of the race.”
55
  
Twenty-four years after the end of the Civil War and twelve years after the end of 
Reconstruction, sectional divides were still strongly felt in the United States.  Many members 
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of the SISA had proudly participated on one side or the other during the Civil War, but 
hoped the society would help to erase persisting sectional divides.  Tennessee itself was 
chosen as the location of the first congress because of its historic role as a place of settlement 
for the Scotch-Irish and home of perhaps the most famous Scotch-Irishman, Andrew 
Jackson, as well as its central location between north and south. 
 The society worked to advance the study of Scotch-Irish history, believing that their 
“race,” while greatly contributing to the formation of America, was behind other ethnicities 
in the celebration of “race pride.”
56
  Throughout each of the ten congresses held from 1889 to 
1901, speakers recounted the history of the Scotch-Irish during ancient times, the plantation 
of Ulster, the emigration across the Atlantic, and the foundation of the American republic.  
Colonel E.C. McDowell claimed ancient Irish roots for the Scotch-Irish ethnicity.  “In the 
sixth century, a colony of these Irish-Scots migrated to Northern Britain,” from Ireland, he 
stated in the first congress’s opening address, “and settling in what is now the county of 
Argyle, established a kingdom, subjugating the Pictish tribes that were before them, and 
ancient Caledonia was thenceforward the land of the Scots, and Scotland it remains today.”
57
  
Far from rejecting the Irish part of their identity, the Scotch-Irish claimed to be twice Irish, 
because the settlers of Scotland had originally migrated from Ireland. 
 Characteristics attributed to the Scotch-Irish “race” were described as combining the 
best elements of both the Scottish and the Irish.  Dr. D.C. Kelley explained, “We have thus 
the indomitable, prudent, calculating, metaphysical, God-fearing, tyrant-hating Scotch, 
brought by marriage into blood relationship with the brave, reckless, emotional, intuitive, 
God-loving, liberty-adoring Irish.”  This was an ideal combination, he continued, because 
“we find these people the cautious builders of free constitutional government, and, at the 
same time, the pioneers of American civilization.”
58
 
 Many speeches throughout the congresses were exercises in self-congratulation for 
Scotch-Irish achievements.  “If you are asked, where have the Scotch-Irish been, and where 
are they now,” explained Colonel A.K. McClure of Philadelphia, “the answer is, where have 
they not been, and where are they not?  If you asked what they have done, the answer of 
every intelligent citizen must be, what have they not done?”  McClure continued by 
explaining that the Scotch-Irish were the pioneers of civilization, building log cabins, school 
houses, and log churches in the American backcountry.
59
  As they struggled against the odds 
in the backcountry, the Scotch-Irish fought for American freedoms.  William Wirt Henry of 
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Virginia, the grandson of Patrick Henry, recalled the high compliment George Washington 
paid to the Scotch-Irish “when, in the darkest moment of the Revolution, he said that if all 
others failed around him, he would plant his standard on the Blue Ridge of Virginia, rally 
around him the people of that valley, and make his last stand for the liberties of America.”
60
 
Though the society was able to attract thousands of attendees in its early years, in 
many ways it was driven by Bonner, Hall, and Philadelphia Reverend John S. MacIntosh as 
individuals.  Bonner grew up in Ramelton, County Donegal, and immigrated to the United 
States in 1839 where he eventually became the owner and publisher of the New York Ledger.  
He was reelected president of the society every year until his death in 1899.
61
  Bonner was a 
member of the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church in New York City, where Hall served as 
minister.  Hall was born in rural County Armagh.  He worked as a Presbyterian missionary in 
County Roscommon during the latter years of the Famine, then became the pastor of the 
Presbyterian church in the city of Armagh.  He came to America as part of an Irish 
Presbyterian deputation in 1867, and soon after was called to the pastorate of the Fifth 
Avenue Church.  He had been in the United States for twenty-two years at the time of the 
first congress.
62
  MacIntosh was born in Philadelphia in 1839 to Scotch-Irish parents.  He 
moved to Ireland with his family when he was very young, and was educated in Belfast, 
Edinburgh, and Germany.  He worked as a minister at Belfast’s May Street Presbyterian 
Church.  MacIntosh went to the United States as a delegate for the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance 
in 1880, where he received the call to the Second Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia.
63
 
Though these three men and many other members of the society had relatively recent 
direct personal connections to Ireland, the society itself hardly ever examined the Scotch-
Irish as an immigrant group after the time of Andrew Jackson.  They reinforced the idea of 
the Scotch-Irish as an old, mainly pre-revolutionary immigrant group.  This implied a distinct 
split between the Scotch-Irish and the Famine emigration of the Catholic Irish, as well as 
placing themselves on equal footing with the Puritans. 
 The Scotch-Irish underscored their differences with New England Puritans while 
emphasizing their roles as pioneers of civilization and guardians of American freedom.  The 
Puritans dominated the writing of American history, whereas the Scotch-Irish saw 
themselves as “doers” rather than writers and had neglected to record their own 
contributions.  They were adamant, nonetheless, about their unique role in the formation of 
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the American republic, and anxious to set themselves apart from the Puritans.  MacIntosh 
explained, “The world has in the Scotch-Irish a man as distinct from the Puritan as the 
Puritan is from all other men.”
64
  McDowell portrayed the Puritans and Scotch-Irish as 
having essentially different philosophies on the relationship between the individual and the 
state.  The Puritan ideal was to get the greatest aggregate good for the community, meaning 
that the individual and family were subordinate to the state.  In contrast, for the Scotch-Irish, 
“the state is made by and for the people.”
65
  This emphasis on the role of the individual led to 
the important contributions of the Scotch-Irish within American society, distinct from 
Puritan involvement. 
 In their rhetoric, the Scotch-Irish were much more interested in contrasting their 
historic role in the United States against that of older migrant groups such as the Puritans 
rather than creating a separate identity from the newer Catholic emigrants from Ireland.
66
  
They were never overtly anti-Catholic.  It is difficult to say how much they were actually 
motivated by the need to form a distinct identity from the Catholic Irish, especially 
considering that by claiming a Scotch-Irish identity they were asserting an overarching Irish 
character.  Because many Scotch-Irish families had been in America for generations, it was 
unlikely that any such individuals would be mistaken for more recent Catholic Irish 
immigrants. 
The society itself dealt with a persistent public perception of sectarianism despite 
frequent assertions that they were a nonsectarian body.  At one congress business meeting, a 
resolution was proposed stating, “That there may be no apprehension as to the purpose of 
this society, we hereby declare that we are not organized in antagonism to any class of the 
Irish or Scotch races, from whatever source they may derive their origin.”  Hall argued that 
such a resolution would put the society on the defensive, and he believed that they should try 
to appear as if they never considered the idea of being anti-Catholic.
67
  Bonner emphasized, 
“Whatever our respective opinions may be as to either religion or politics, or however 




 Notwithstanding its stated nonsectarian policy, the society was dominated by 
Presbyterians.  A church service conducted by a team of their many Presbyterian ministers 
became an annual feature of the congresses.  The role of the Scotch-Irish in building the 
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American Presbyterian Church was frequently celebrated, and at times the Scotch-Irish were 
contrasted with Catholic Irish immigrants.
69
  John Appel believes that some of the members 
did have anti-Catholic intentions in their participation in the society.  There were connections 
between some SISA members and the fiercely anti-Catholic American Protective 
Association.
70
  Even if creating a separate identity from the Catholic Irish was not an overt 
purpose of the society, there is no doubt that the Scotch-Irish were conscious throughout 
their congresses of tenuous links with the Catholic Irish and perceptions of sectarianism. 
 Some Irish-Americans objected to the formation of a Scotch-Irish society on the 
grounds that it propagated a myth.  Largely in reaction to the SISA and the growth of Scotch-
Irish ethnic celebrations, the American Irish Historical Society (AIHS) was established in 
Boston in January 1897.
71
  Appel claims that Boston newspaper debates over the existence of 




The journal of the AIHS and publications of its members accused the Scotch-Irish of 
falsifying history, attacked them as “defamers” of the Irish.  The AIHS denounced the term 
“Scotch-Irish” as a “delusion.”  John C. Linehan wrote that the prejudices of Scotch-Irish 
writers “blind their love of truth” as they created “a new race.”
73
  Michael J. O’Brien, the 
“historiographer” of the AIHS, challenged the idea that there were two traditions in Irish-
American history.  He contended that early Ulster Protestant immigrants to America were 
fully “Irish” in identity.  O’Brien also emphasized colonial Catholic migrations from Ireland.  
The position of the AIHS shows that the promotion of Scotch-Irish ethnicity was 
controversial.  No matter how often the society claimed to be nonsectarian, it was seen as 
inherently divisive by members of the Irish-American community. 
 From 1889 to 1896, the SISA met annually at congresses in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania; Louisville, Kentucky; Atlanta, Georgia; Springfield, Ohio; Des Moines, Iowa; 
Lexington, Virginia; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  The Pittsburgh congress in 1890 was 
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probably the most successful year, with President Benjamin Harrison in attendance.  Society 
Secretary A.C. Floyd wrote, 
In attendance was the president of the United States and members of his cabinet, 
governors of great states, judges of the highest tribunals, divines, editors, and 
congressmen, celebrated lawyers and physicians, noted bankers, merchants and 
manufacturers, substantial farmers, mechanics – every trade and profession 
represented by its best elements.
74
 
Floyd estimated that 12,000 people “eagerly sought attendance” to the congress.
75
  The 
society’s leaders believed that with this congress they achieved world-wide prestige and the 
notice of the world’s press.  The Belfast Chamber of Commerce even delegated one of its ex-
presidents, Francis D. Ward, as a representative to the congress, though he failed to attend, 
pleading exhaustion from his travels around the United States.
76
 
 The society was determined to gain further attention and create a global Scotch-Irish 
network through increased communications.  They received congratulatory cablegrams from 
the mayor and citizens of Belfast, U.S. Consul at Edinburgh Wallace Bruce, the mayor of 
Londonderry, and even Scotch-Irish citizens of Mexico and the Mexican president, Porfirio 
Díaz.
77
  MacIntosh, as the society’s vice-president general, reported that one of the duties he 
took up was wide-ranging correspondence with representatives of the Scotch-Irish ethnicity 
throughout the world.  He focused particularly on Ulster and the Scottish lowlands, he 
explained, “but it has reached farther than that, because there are leading men of our blood 
and kin in Britain, India, China, and Australia, who in various ways I have been striving to 
interest in our work.”
78
  MacIntosh was chiefly interested in collecting personal and inherited 
recollections, and genealogies written into family Bibles. 
The society sent out its annual volumes of congress proceedings to its members, as 
well as various libraries around the country.  Through the proliferation of these volumes, 
they believed they were making an impact on the field of American history.
79
  The national 
Scotch-Irish Society also spawned state affiliates in California, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, Kentucky, Georgia, and Iowa, as well as a Scotch-Irish 
Society in Atlanta. 
 Though a large portion of the congresses was dedicated to recounting the role of the 
Scotch-Irish in American history, speakers did not ignore the current conditions of Ireland.  
They revealed that they closely monitored relations between Britain, Ireland, and America.  
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Hall was by far the most outspoken society member on Irish matters.  He traveled back to his 
Ulster homeland every summer.  It was his regular duty to report on the state of Ireland at 
each congress.  Hall informed the attendees what life was like in Ulster, how the Ulster 
Scots’ educational and religious values connected them to their Scotch-Irish brethren, and the 
role of the Presbyterian Church in Ulster society.  He especially hoped to counter the 
American perception that all Irishmen were Catholic.
80
 
 Hall also emphasized the progression of Ireland’s condition over time.  Hall 
considered himself a pronounced Liberal, and according to his son was fascinated by 
parliamentary debates.
81
  Hall frequently stressed that Ulster’s political, economic, and social 
situation had greatly improved within his lifetime, particularly over the course of the 
previous decade.  This indicated support for Conservative policies of constructive unionism.  
Despite society restrictions on explicit statements of political views, Hall clearly advocated 
self-determination for Ulster, which implied maintenance of the Union.  “I have had the 
opportunity to know Ireland,” he explained, 
I was born there and brought up there, and I labored for years in Ulster as a 
minister.  I know the whole land, and I tell you, my brethren, that I am not speaking 
of American politics, but of something in another land – that what is wanted is not 
to carry out the policy that has been advanced by one great and distinguished man 
[Gladstone], but to educate her people, train them, inspire them with the thoughts, 
purposes, and convictions that have made these United States, in the face of 
difficulties and discouragements what, through the blessings of God Almighty, 
these United States are to-day.
82
 
In 1892, Hall spoke of the Ulster Protestants’ fear of Gladstone coming back into power, 
with the certain renewal of Home Rule policies.  He explained that various denominations of 
Protestants had leagued together to protest against Gladstone’s policies. 
My convictions are founded substantially upon that ground that they [Ulster 
Protestants] take, and, ladies and gentlemen, if you accept to be true those most 
eloquent statements that were made to us last night and which you applauded, 
regarding the prudence, the wisdom, the foresight, the sagacity, the integrity of my 
countrymen and the people of my race, the Scotch-Irish race – if you accept all 
those, then you must surely come to the conclusion that it is not without reason that 




The following year, Hall again called on his fellow Scotch-Irishmen to think of their Ulster 
brethren.  He hoped that Gladstone and the Liberal party would have their eyes opened to see 
clearly the situation in Ireland, “and when this is the case, the Protestants of Ireland, that are 
a unit upon this broad matter, will no longer be filled with apprehension as to perils that may 
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Not only did Hall state his support for unionism, his speeches also reflected the 
expectation that other members of the society closely followed British and Irish events.  Hall 
hoped that the identification of the Ulstermen with the qualities celebrated by the Scotch-
Irish would legitimize the cause of unionism for members of the SISA.  If the Ulstermen, 
like the Scotch-Irish, possessed all of these positive qualities, then they must be justified in 
their demands for the maintenance of the Union. 
 Others in the society also commented on Irish politics.  MacIntosh connected the 
Home Rule question with the Ulstermen’s traditional role as fighters for liberty, saying, 
The world is hearing a vast deal of the “Irish Question.”  That political porcupine, in 
its later form, came forth to light in Ulster; and it was selfish English statesmen and 
most despotic churchmen started it.  Though, at this hour, the Ulstermen, as a body, 
refuse to join with the Nationalists of to-day, Ulster and its wrongs and fierce revolt 
are the beginning of the later land and folk fights.  The Ulsterman was the brewer of 
the storm.  He became the “Volunteer” for freedom.
85
 
The mayor of Springfield, Ohio, James Johnson, urged the society to take a stand on the 
Home Rule issue, stating,  
It if shall be the wisdom of this congress to give expression to its sentiments on the 
momentous question now pending in which the fate of the mother country is 
involved, that expression shall display to the world that the Scotch-Irish of America 
have full confidence in the independence and ability of their race to maintain itself, 
whatever may be the issue of that question, and that fear, despair, and 
discouragement have no place in the breast of a genuine Scotch-Irishman. 
(Applause.)
86
   
Dr. William C. Gray, at the sixth congress in 1894, made probably the most extreme 
recorded statement of support for the Ulster unionists.  Gray went so far as praising the 
efforts of unionist militants.  “It is only a year or so ago that they turned out and organized 
military companies, and began to drill for the purpose of fighting the queen’s government for 
the privilege of remaining subjects of her government.  The like of that was never seen or 
heard of in the world before.”  Gray hoped that if Home Rule was passed, England would not 
interfere as the rest of Ireland tried to handle Ulster.  He was sure of the outcome: “The 
croppies would like down again.  The Scotch-Irish would be found, as soon as the smoke 
cleared away, where they are everywhere and always: on top.”  Gray believed that the 
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 Two of the society’s most illustrious speakers over the years also could not resist 
giving their opinions on Irish politics.  The future Democratic vice president under Grover 
Cleveland, Adlai E. Stevenson I, gave a speech in 1891 entitled “The Scotch-Irish of the 
Bench and Bar.”  Stevenson, whose grandfather was born in Scotland and migrated to Ulster 
and later the United States, stated that Ireland was in contrast with the United States, where 
the Scotch-Irish were enjoying liberty in the highest degree. 
Our thoughts on such an occasion turn to unfortunate Ireland, the ancestral home of 
our race.  Oppressed by merciless exactions, with cruel landlordism, the heritage of 
each succeeding generation yet struggling against odds for a larger measure of 
freedom, Ireland challenges at once our sympathy and our admiration.  May we not 
believe that the morning of a brighter day is soon to dawn upon that gallant people, 
and that the fruits of centuries of suffering, of oppression, and of toil will be to them 
as to us the principle in action of our race, “individual freedom and home rule.”
88
 
While Stevenson supported the Irish nationalist sentiments of his Democratic Party, William 
McKinley was only slightly less forthright in his opinions. 
McKinley was, at the time of his appearance at the Scotch-Irish congress in 1893, 
the Republican governor of Ohio.  His speech focused mainly on the Scotch-Irish role in 
America.  He stated, “The Scotch-Irish would not change either ancestry or birthplace if they 
could.  They are proud of both; but they are prouder yet of their new home they have helped 
to create under the stars and stripes, the best and freest under the sun.”  He then briefly 
touched on the situation in Ireland, saying, “To the Ulsterman across the ocean, to the Celt 
south of him, each with his virtues, and his faults, I cannot but say in the tender, pleasing 
language of the venerable Gladstone, the greatest living Englishman: ‘Let me entreat you – 
and if it were with my last breath I would entreat you – to let the dead bury its dead, to cast 
behind you every recollection of bygone evils, and cherish, to love, to sustain one another 
through all vicissitudes of human affairs in the times that are to come.’”
89
  Gladstone had 
said these words at the end of his speech introducing the second Home Rule Bill on 13 
February 1893, entreating his fellow MPs to support his Irish policy.
90
 
Macloskie explained Ulster unionist attitudes to Irish Home Rule at the eighth 
congress in 1896.  He compared contemporary Ulster with “the good old times,” explaining 
that conditions had greatly improved and the attitude of the British government toward 
Ireland had changed for the better.  According to Macloskie, Ulster unionists believed that, 
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any independent government which the majority of Irish voters would be able to 
establish would be a change greatly for the worse.  They have observed the methods 
of the Parnellites and anti-Parnellites under circumstances which should have elicited 
self-denial, caution, and true patriotism; they have observed the sort of statesmanship 
exhibited by some of our Irishmen in the great cities of America; after they have, by 
long and peaceful struggles, shaken off the tyranny of landlordism over their votes as 
well as their property, and the more galling tyranny of ecclesiasticism over their 
consciences, they are determined not to permit the reestablishment of a worse 
ascendancy by a majority who have shown no sympathy with the spirit or prosperity 
of the northern province.  Their intense loyalty to England’s crown and constitution, 
as now represented, is the strongest argument for this determined stand.
91
 
Macloskie’s sympathetic portrayal of the unionist cause was appended with a disclaimer that 
he personally did not take a side in the Home Rule argument, as he believed that it was his 
“duty as an American citizen not to intermeddle in the politics of other countries.”
92
 
Even with these forays into Irish politics, America was still foremost in the minds of 
the Scotch-Irish.  Benton McMillan, a United States Congressman from Tennessee, reflected 
on the society, stating, “The reason I rejoice that there is Scotch-Irish in my veins, is not 
simply because it is Scotch-Irish, but because it gives a little more grit and a little more 
resolution to see the right and to have the courage to do it, and be a better American citizen; 
for, after all, my greatest ambition is to be one of the best American citizens.”
93
  Members of 
the SISA were primarily driven by American circumstances, which influenced them to 
downplay concerns over contemporary Ireland because they wanted to prove their loyalty to 
the United States. 
The decline of the SISA was caused by several factors.  The society had faced 
diminished attendance after the wildly successful second congress, and since 1894 had dealt 
with decreasing membership and financial instability.
94
  After the eighth congress in 
Harrisburg, Detroit was chosen as the next host city.  Arrangements were in place for a ninth 
congress when the Detroit Local Committee reported that they believed a successful meeting 
could not be held in that city.  By that time it was too late to make other arrangements for 
1897.  The following year, the SISA planned a congress in Chicago.  That fell through when 
members of the Chicago Local Committee were called away due to the outbreak of the 
Spanish-American War.
95
  Attempts to organize congresses in the following years failed due 
to the Executive Committee’s disarray after the deaths of several key members.  Bonner, 
Hall, and vice president Reverend John H. Bryson all died within the space of a year.  
Secretary A.C. Floyd had already resigned his position after eight years of service, meaning 
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that there were few experienced leaders left in the Executive Committee.
96
  By the time the 
ninth congress was finally held in 1900 in Knoxville, Tennessee, the society was irreparably 
damaged.  After the Knoxville congress, the SISA managed one final congress in 1901 in 
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, before the organization disintegrated. 
 The only state society to survive the demise of the national organization was the 
Pennsylvania Scotch-Irish Society (PSIS), founded in October 1889.
97
  The PSIS flourished 
well into the twentieth century, eventually changing its name to the Scotch-Irish Society of 
the United States.  They formed the Scotch-Irish Foundation, which was charged with 
preserving the history of Ulster, Scotland, and the Scotch-Irish in America.  The PSIS’s main 
event each year was an annual dinner, which attracted such speakers as future Presidents 
Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Hoover, Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert, and British 
Ambassador James Bryce, a Liberal Home Ruler.
98
 
 The PSIS, much like its parent society, intended to promote the historical and literary 
side of Scotch-Irish identity.  In 1911, on the recommendation of Woodrow Wilson, the PSIS 
commissioned Professor Henry Jones Ford of Princeton University to write the history of the 
Scotch-Irish.
99
  Ford’s Scotch-Irish in America was published in 1915.  His book was one of 
a wave of new publications celebrating the role of the Scotch-Irish in America, including 
past president of the SISA, Oliver Perry Temple’s The Covenanter, the Cavalier, and the 
Puritan; Charles Hanna’s The Scotch-Irish; John Walker Dinsmore’s The Scotch-Irish in 
America; and Charles Knowles Bolton’s Scotch Irish Pioneers in Ulster and America.
100
 
 At the 19 February 1914 meeting of the council, the minutes reported that PSIS 
secretary Charles L. McKeehan presented a letter from a member “suggesting that a telegram 
of sympathy be sent from the Pennsylvania Scotch-Irish Society to the Scotch-Irishmen of 
Ulster.  After discussion it was moved, seconded and carried that it was unwise for the 
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Society to take part in the present controversy regarding Home Rule in Ireland.”
101
  The PSIS 
carried on the national organization’s tradition of official silence on Irish political questions.  
There are indications that society members, particularly McKeehan, were deeply interested 
in the events unfolding in Ireland.  The society elected a number of Ulstermen and their 
supporters as honorary members, ostensibly for their help in promoting Ford’s book in 
Ireland, as well as for manifesting “a very cordial and friendly interest in this Society.”  
These included Edward Carson; Reverend William Park, Presbyterian minister of Belfast’s 
Rosemary Street church; Reverend James Barkley Woodburn, author of The Ulster Scot: His 
History and Religion; Professor James Heron of the Assembly’s College, Belfast; Sir John 
Byers, Professor of Obstetric Medicine at Queen’s University who had an interest in Ulster 
dialect and folklore; J.W. Kernohan, secretary of the Presbyterian Historical Society of 
Ireland; and Samuel Cunningham, the editor of the Northern Whig.
102
 
 McKeehan carried on extensive correspondence with Cunningham, including the 
exchanging of books and other ephemera.  Cunningham sent McKeehan a copy of F.S. 
Oliver’s Alexander Hamilton, to which McKeehan replied, “I had read a couple of lives of 
Hamilton, and have also been quite familiar with his own writing.  Oliver’s treatment of the 
subject is most interesting and from a somewhat different point of view from the other lives I 
have read.  I thank you very much for sending it to me.”
103
  In a letter dated 5 April 1916, 
McKeehan wrote that he was enjoying Oliver’s Ordeal by Battle, also sent by Cunningham.  
“His chapters on ‘The Spirit of German Policy’ are very able, though I am looking forward 
with still more interest to his chapters on ‘The Spirit of British Policy.’  I have noticed 
several references to the book in newspapers and periodicals commenting on Mr. Oliver’s 
criticism of some aspects of British leadership during the war.”
104
 
 McKeehan credited Cunningham with initiating the “pleasant and interesting 
connections that our Society has made in Ulster.”
105
  McKeehan also corresponded with 
Kernohan at the Presbyterian Historical Society in Belfast, noting in 1916 that he sent 
Kernohan a copy of the PSIS annual report.  He also had connections with Park, the pastor of 
the Rosemary Street congregation in Belfast.  McKeehan wrote to Park in March 1916 that 
he was very glad to have him as a member of the PSIS, and heard that the meeting of the 
Pan-Presbyterian Alliance had been postponed due to the war.  He then commented, 
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The progress of the war is watched in this country with an interest second only to 
the interest felt in Europe.  There is nothing neutral about the feelings of this 
country, in spite of those who would have you believe otherwise.  I suppose there is 
no telling at all when the war will end, but it seems to be growing more and more 
clear, especially since the drive against Verdun, that Germany has passed the zenith 




In addition to McKeehan’s correspondence, other members of the PSIS such as Agnew T. 
Dice, the president of Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, also corresponded with 
Cunningham, Park, and Carson.
107
 
 After the Battle of the Somme, McKeehan encouraged PSIS members to raise funds 
to send to Ulster to help relieve distress.  McKeehan himself had already donated money to 
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) Hospital, which had been set up by the UVF Headquarters 
Council in connection with the War Office at the start of war.
108
  At the 23 December 1916 
meeting of council, McKeehan reminded the PSIS, 
That the Society had not done anything in a practical way to alleviate the distress in 
Ulster caused by the war, and after discussion, it was moved, seconded and carried, 
that Mr. Bayard Henry and the Secretary be appointed a committee to raise a fund 
of not less than $500 among the members of the Society, and present it to the Ulster 
Volunteer Force Hospital for Wounded Soldiers and Sailors, as a memorial of the 
Society to the late John McIlhenny.
109
 
The PSIS wished to memorialize John McIlhenny, an active member of the PSIS and former 
treasurer of the SISA born in Milford, County Armagh.  McIlhenny, a gas meter magnate, 
had died on 23 February 1916.
110
 
At the February meeting of the PSIS council, McKeehan reported that the PSIS had 
raised a total of $1000 to donate to the UVF Hospital.  The money was sent to Belfast 
through Cunningham, “from our Society for Ulster Volunteer Force Hospital in memory of 
John McIlhenny and in admiration of the splendid spirit of Ulster.”
111
  McKeehan also 
arranged for the PSIS to donate $100 to the Scotch-Irish section of the British-Irish Relief 
Society bazaar in 1917, which was organized in part by Philadelphia Orange lodges.
112
 
 In addition to concerns over the relief of Ulster during World War I, members of the 
PSIS took note of the influence of Irish-American nationalists and the United States 
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government on Irish policy. On 8 June 1917, McKeehan wrote to Cunningham, “I entirely 
agree with you as to America’s interfering on the Irish question.  On my return, I will send 
you something on this line for such use as you deem proper.”
113
  The appeal to counter 
American involvement in the Irish question was repeated throughout the years following the 
First World War.  In February 1921, for example, McKeehan wrote to the prospective 
speakers for the annual dinner that they should feel free to select whatever subject they 
wished, but if they cared “to include in what I am sure will be a delightfully witty speech a 
word of advice to the effect that Americans should stop interfering in the Irish question, it 
will be entirely in order, and will, I think, strike a responsive chord.”
114
  Though they did not 
directly take a stance on the Irish issue, the urging of the American government to stop 
interfering in the Irish question was a way to appear fully American while still expressing 
sympathy for the unionists in Ireland. 
 
Loyal Orange Institution of the United States of America 
 Irish immigrants founded the first American Orange lodges in New York in the 
1820s, affiliated with the Grand Orange Lodge in Ireland.  Lodges sprouted in east coast 
states such as New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, with the 
first Orange parade held in Boston in 1824.
115
  Throughout the nineteenth century, 
Orangeism in America faced the challenge of adapting to republicanism, since support for 
the British Empire and monarchy was a major tenet of Orangeism in Ireland and British 
Commonwealth countries.
116
  An 1880 newspaper announcement protested the impression 
that members were allied with Great Britain, describing the Order as “formed by persons 
desirous to the utmost of their power to support and defend the liberties (civil and religious) 
of the United States from the designs and intrigues of Popish mercenaries, as well as for the 
maintenance of the public peace and tranquility.”
117
  The Orangemen carefully constructed 
the rules of their organization so as to emphasize loyalties to the United States: only 
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naturalized American citizens and immigrants who were already Orangemen were allowed to 
become members of American lodges, which limited organizational growth.
118
 
After the Irish Orange Order was dissolved in 1836, Orange members in the United 
States turned to other organizations such as the American Protestant Association and the 
Know-Nothing party as alternatives to Orange lodges.  Later, the Orange Order was closely 
associated with the American Protective Association.
119
  The abundance of these nativist 
organizations in part explain the relative weakness of the Orange Order in the United States 
especially compared to the prolific Canadian Orange Order.
120
 
 By the 1850s, five states had Orange charters.  Application was made to the Grand 
Lodge of Ireland for National Grand Lodge status in the United States, approved in 1870.
121
  
While the numbers of Orangemen in the United States were never close to those achieved by 
their Canadian counterpart, Orange lodge members received similar benefits.  Donald 
MacRaild describes Orange lodges as encompassing a “social club, pseudo-religious sect, 
benefit society, and militant political movement” for the Ulster immigrants.
122
  As described 
in a newspaper announcement, part of the purpose of the Orange Order was to “afford 
assistance to distressed members of the order and otherwise promote such laudable and 
benevolent purposes as may tend to the due ordering of religious and Christian charity.”
123
  
Through such mutual benefits, membership in the Orange Order helped new immigrants find 
a place within American society. 
The core beliefs of Orangeism were preserved no matter where the lodge was 
located.  The Orange Order’s assertion of a Protestant libertarian vision was transferred from 
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Ireland to the United States, nurtured by transatlantic visits from such figures as William 
Johnston of Ballykilbeg.
124
  Ties to Ulster were emphasized through the names of lodges 
such as the American Sons of William, Apprentice Boys, Enniskillen True Blues, and Derry 
Walls.  Other lodges had wholly American names such as Abraham Lincoln, George 
Washington, and Daughters of John Adams, a Ladies’ Lodge.  At 12 July parades, 
Orangemen in the United States sang songs which would have been familiar to Ulster 
Orangemen, such as “Boyne Water,” “Croppies Lie Down,” and “Protestant Boys.”
125
  The 
political situation in Ireland and the influence of Irish nationalists in the United States 
remained important to the American Orangemen.  They combined their promotion of Irish 
unionism and traditional Orange values with advocacy of anti-Catholic policies in the United 
States. 
 With an increased presence in America, Orangemen came into frequent conflict with 
Irish Catholic immigrants, such as during the 1824 riots in Greenwich Village and the 1831 
riots in Philadelphia.
126
  The most significant clashes were the 1870 and 1871 Orange Riots 
in New York City.  Violence erupted on 12 July in both years, when Irish Catholic workers 
attempted to stop Orange parades.  In 1870, 2,500 members of the Orange lodges, the 
American Protestant Association, and their families gathered in Elm Park to listen to a 
speech by Grand Master John J. Bond.  The eruption of violence was sudden, as the 




In 1871, New York Governor John T. Hoffman called out the National Guard to 
protect the Orangemen during their parade.  Plans for an Orange parade were announced 
weeks before 12 July.  Rumors that Irish Catholics planned to attack the Orangemen 
circulated in city newspapers.  In the event, as Orangemen again clashed with Irish Catholic 
workers, the National Guardsmen panicked and opened fire on the crowd.  Over sixty people 
were killed and more than 100 injured.
128
  Collective memories of historical clashes between 
Protestant and Catholic groups in Ireland helped shape the riots.  The immigrant experience 
in America was also reflected, as the riots were underlined by religious animosity, tensions 
caused by ethnic and class divisions within the city, and frustration with the corrupt Tweed 
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Ring that controlled city government.
129
  MacRaild also asserts that the Orange Riots were 
partially caused by the immigrants wanting to emerge from “sectarian enclaves” to take a 
greater part in American society.
130
  The Orange Riots spurred wealthy New Yorkers and 
nativists to launch a crusade to topple the Tweed Ring, which was said to pander to the Irish 
Catholic masses in exchange for Democratic Party votes.  Ultimately, the Tweed Ring was 
forced from power by reformers who, according to Michael Gordon, sought to return 
respectability to city government by lessening Irish Catholic influence.
131
 
 After the riots, the Orange Order found itself increasingly popular.  Membership 
reportedly more than doubled in 1872, especially in New York.
132
  By 1875, the Orange 
Order claimed 120 lodges with 10,000 members.
133
  The records of the Pennsylvania Orange 
lodges show that they were deeply ingrained within the civic society.  Philadelphia 
Orangemen participated in the city’s Labor Day parades.  Orange delegates attended 
meetings of various other like-minded organizations within the city, such as the Patriotic 
League and the Protestant Federation Independent League.
134
  In November 1884, delegates 
from the Prince of Orange District Lodge met in the Philadelphia APA Hall to consider 
erecting a hall in connection with the Orange Order.  In December 1885, the delegates 
founded the Orange Hall and Literary Association of the City of Philadelphia.  The 
association’s constitution stated that its object was to erect “a Hall or other Suitable 
Buildings in the City of Philadelphia and the furnishing of the same for the Accommodation 
of the several lodges of the Orange Association of the City of Philadelphia now organized or 
that may be hereafter organized.”
135
  To finance the Orange Hall, stockholders purchased $5 
shares, with profits to be paid to the stockholders annually.  The new Orange Hall on 16
th
 
Street finally held its first meeting on 21 April 1894, a testament to the presence of the 
Orange Order in Philadelphia.
136
 
 Orangemen in the United States responded to the developing situation in Ireland.  
After the Phoenix Park murders of 6 May 1882, for example, the Grand Master of 
Massachusetts, D.H.M. McIntire, spoke for the whole American Orange Order.  He 
announced that “the Orangemen are ready and most willing to bury the hatchet which has for 
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so many years divided their ranks, and make common cause for the welfare of Ireland.  He 
denounced in strongest terms that the deed had been perpetrated by Irishmen or friends of 
Irishmen, and promised the utmost co-operation on the part of his order with the Land 
League to bring the murderers to justice.”
137
 
The American Orange Order’s response to the three Home Rule crises was much less 
conciliatory to nationalists.  The Grand Orange Lodge of the State of New York passed 
resolutions in 1886 censuring Gladstone, denouncing Parnell, and offering assistance to 
unionists.  State Grand Master William B. Kennedy sent a cable dispatch to William 
Johnston in Belfast, asking what the American Orangemen could do to give effective 
assistance to the Irish unionists.
138
  On 5 March 1886, the Washington Loyal Orange Lodge 
(LOL) of Philadelphia reported that an Orange brother asked the Lodge for money toward 
“helping the committee appointed by the three Districts to hold a publick demonstration to 
protest against home rule for Ireland and the saying of masses in the house of Correction.  It 
was moved and seconded that the report be received and an order drawn on the treasurer for 
that amount.”
139
  Combining protests against Home Rule with protests against the saying of 
masses in the Philadelphia jail kept the Orangemen connected back to Ireland while at the 
same time allowing them to be involved with American social and political issues. 
 The Home Rule crises also aided the growth of Orangeism in the United States.  The 
Chicago Tribune, in describing the unusually popular 12 July parades of 1886, stated, “The 
anti-home-rule agitation in the north of Ireland and alleged arming and drilling of the 
Orangemen there have raised a spirit of emulation among the Orangemen of this city, and 
strong efforts have been made to spread and strengthen the organization and put it on a firm 
financial footing.”
140
  However, at the same time, the Supreme Grand Orange Lodge of the 
United States voted against a resolution condemning Irish Home Rule because they did not 
want to be associated with foreign sentiments.  The Supreme Grand Master, George Herron, 
stated that he believed it was important for the American Orangemen to remain officially 
neutral when it came to Irish politics.  He did declare that he believed “the Unionists are just 
getting aroused to the fight and that they are able to defeat the present or any other home-rule 
movement.”
141
  The American Orangemen therefore were less Ireland-directed than the 
Catholic Irish-Americans during the first Home Rule crisis. 
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 The Orangemen’s response to the second Home Rule crisis in 1892-1893 showed 
less concern with the dangers of getting involved in a foreign issue.  At the 1892 meeting of 
the Grand Orange Lodge of the United States, held in Alleghany, Pennsylvania, the 
Orangemen passed a pro-Union resolution.  They tendered their support for 
their brethren in Ireland to their resistance of the projected scheme of home rule.  
This they state is a bold attempt to inaugurate an Irish Roman Catholic parliament.  
The order deems it a solemn obligation not to support a Roman Catholic who seeks 
political preferment.  If the American republic is to be maintained loyal American 
citizens should be on guard.
142
 
The Orangemen portrayed the Home Rule threat in Ireland as linked to the perceived threat 
of Catholic influence in the United States.  They believed that every American citizen should 
guard against Catholics seeking preferential political treatment.  Also in 1892, the Grand 
Orange Lodge of Massachusetts was one of several hundred organizations around the world 
to send messages of sympathy to be read by the Duke of Abercorn at the Great Ulster 
Convention on 17 June.
143
 
In 1893, the Pennsylvania State Grand Lodge, having heard the news of a Home 
Rule Bill “being imposed upon a Loyal industrious God fearing class of people whose 
principles are pure and whose allegiance to the government of their Queen never faltered,” 
resolved “that we pray every loyal Protestant of whatever denomination he belongs to not to 
sell his brothers into Slavery and Papist Bondage by the whims of an old Political 
Trickster.”
144
  The Pennsylvania Orangemen urged British Protestants not to betray loyal 
Irish Protestants by supporting Gladstone’s Home Rule policies. 
The Grand Master of the Illinois LOLs denied rumors of Ulster militancy.  B.P. 
Reynolds stated, “These reports and rumors circulated for the past month are absurd.  There 
is no arming, no collecting of money, at least on our side.  If there were, the Orangemen here 
would know of it.  I believe that these reports are circulated by the other side.  The men of 
Ulster are quiet and peaceable.”
145
  Though the American Orangemen supported the unionist 
cause, Ulster unionists had not called upon them for their tacit support of more militant 
actions in resisting the implementation of Home Rule. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, there were Orange lodges in twenty-one states, 
largely situated in major urban areas and attracting working-class membership.
146
  Lodge 
members met regularly to celebrate Orange history and Protestant values, try to counter Irish 
Catholic political influence and run campaigns to inform Americans about Papal influence, 
                                                 
142
 Duluth Daily News 16 Jun 1892. 
143
 Charlotte Observer 18 Jun 1892. 
144
 1893 Meeting, Minutes, Pennsylvania State Grand Lodge of the LOI, MSS 93, HSP. 
145
 Rocky Mountain News 24 Mar 1893. 
146
 Houston and Smyth, “Transferred Loyalties,” 204-206. 
110 
especially in public schools, and to provide support for fellow Orange members within their 
communities.
147
  They also spawned several related organizations, including the Ladies’ 
Loyal Orange Association founded in 1876, the Royal Black Institution of the Camp of 
Israel, Apprentice Boys of Derry Club, Loyal Orange Girls’ Lodge, and the Orange Home, 
an orphanage and retirement center in Pennsylvania founded in 1902.
148
 
Orange lodge records in Philadelphia show that members regularly received 
communications from Orange Institutions around the world, including Ireland and Canada.  
Orangemen in the United States also corresponded with the Irish Grand Secretary, Colonel 
R.A. Wallace.  At times, Irish and British Orangemen visiting the United States attended 
Orange meetings.
149
  Transfer certificates show that a significant number of new Orange 
emigrants from counties Tyrone, Londonderry, Cavan, Down, Antrim, and Fermanagh 
relocated and joined American lodges throughout the period 1880 to 1920. 
Connections back to Ireland were also solidified through triennial meetings of the 
Imperial Grand Orange Council of the World, founded in 1870.  The Triennial Council met 
in New York City in 1900, where David Graham of New York presided as Imperial Grand 
President.
150
  However, even at this time the American Orange Order was beset with 
factionalism and disaffection which, along with the difficulties associated with transferring a 
pro-British and monarchist order to the American republic, limited the organization’s ability 
to grow beyond a minority ethnic association.
151
 
Despite factionalism, the American Orangemen remained connected to Ireland 
throughout the third Home Rule crisis.  In 1912, the Pennsylvania State Grand Lodge issued 
an anti-Home Rule appeal to all lodges in its jurisdiction.  At the biennial meeting in 1913, 
the secretary reported “a very hearty response, which was very gratifying to your executive 
officers, and I am certain to each and every one of our membership.”  The State Grand Lodge 
issued a further statement that they “commend and approve the action and steps taken by the 
Grand Officers to raise funds to assist our brethren across the pond in their fight against 
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Home Rule, and we further recommend that the money now in the Grand Secretary’s hand 
be forwarded to Ireland.”  They initially sent about £150 to Wallace in Ireland, with a total 
contribution of over $750.
152
  New York Orange lodges also sent money to Edward Carson 
and the Carson Defence Fund, set up in 1913 to aid Ulster unionist action against the 
implementation of Home Rule.
153
  The State Grand Lodge of California also sent letters of 
support, wishing “Carson and his brave followers complete success in their efforts to prevent 
the passage of the Home Rule Bill.”
154
 
With Home Rule on hold for the duration of World War I, American Orangemen 
responded to heavy losses sustained by Ulster troops at the Battle of the Somme.  British-
American societies in the Philadelphia region joined together for “the purpose of raising 
funds for the relief of distressed & disabled British soldiers,” in which Orange lodges 
throughout the area took part.  Orange delegates were sent to the resultant Scotch-Irish Relief 
Association, which held meetings in the Philadelphia Orange Hall.  The Association 
organized a concert, dance, and bazaar to benefit British soldiers.  Orange delegates reported 
at a meeting of the Washington LOL on the bazaar plans: “Hon. John Wanamaker was to 
supply the stalls at 300 dollars & we supply the draping.  Orange and Blue to be the 
colors…. Next meeting night to be April 24
th
 [1917] in this [Orange] Hall – also decided to 
have a drawing for a gold watch – tickets to be 25¢ apiece.”  In the end, the Scotch-Irish 
Relief Association raised over $5000 to be donated to the British Red Cross.
155
 
Orange members continued to protest both Home Rule and the role of Irish 
nationalists in the United States.  They urged the American government to refrain from 
interfering in the Irish question.  In 1917, the Pennsylvania State Grand Lodge passed a 
resolution stating, 
As to the Irish Home Rule… [we believe] that no state or national government have a 
right to interfere with the domestic affairs of a foreign nation, we believe the same to 
be un-American and unpatriotic and that our executive officers be and are hereby 




Specifically targeting the Irish-American nationalist efforts, the Grand Secretary condemned 
the propaganda of the United Irish League and other similar organizations as “un-American 
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and unpatriotic.”  He warned “American Protestants are against being misled by these 
Roman Catholic societies.  Should Ireland desire a different form of government, let the Irish 
of Ireland decide for themselves.”  He welcomed the news of the 1917 Convention as 
evidence that Irishmen would be able to decide their own affairs without interference by 
Irish-Americans or the United States government.
157
  However, the convention caused 
dissension in the ranks of American Orangemen as others did not support the British 
government’s use of a convention to settle the Irish problem.
158
 
The State Grand Lodge of Massachusetts sent letters of support to Edward Carson, 
and sent messages to Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George propagating the unionist 
stance.  They protested to Lloyd George that “real” Americans wished he and the British 
public would “face the fact that any British Government which yields to the clamor of [Irish-
American] critique will merit and receive the detestations of Americans and of all others 
continuing to exalt truth and self-sacrifice above falsehood and treason.”
159
 
The New York State Grand Orange Lodge also circulated letters of protest to 
Wilson, Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, Edward Carson, and United States Senators and 
Representatives.  The letters argued against  
the exploitation of alleged American sentiment in favor of Home Rule, and the effort 
to commit the American Government to any policy or expression of opinion that 
could counsel or countenance any action by which the British Government would 
deprive the Protestant population of Ireland of the rights of small peoples, and reward 
Ulster’s glorious contribution to the victorious armies of our Allies by committing 
that part of Ireland that has rendered the last full measure of devotion to our common 
cause to the murderous passions of those who have openly defied all the claims of 
honor and humanity, and illustrated their Germanic Frightfulness in the perfidious 
assassinations of the Easter Rebellion.
160
 
They condemned Irish-American newspapers for supporting German war efforts, and 
declared that “sane, self-respecting, liberty-fostering Protestant America” would not stand 
for the separation of Ireland from the British Empire.  They urged Americans and Britons to 
understand that “Casements and Germanic co-operators abroad” do not “speak for America, 
that they do not serve the Common Cause by the Common Foe.”
161
 
After the end of the First World War, the Orangemen continued to condemn 
interference by Americans in the Irish situation.  At the 12 July 1919 parade in New York 
City, Orangemen extended their “sympathy and support to the Ulstermen and all who are in 
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sympathy with their cause throughout the world.”
162
  A few weeks later, the Supreme Grand 
Orange Lodge drew up resolutions to be sent to Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, as well as all members of the House and Senate, and to the 
press.  The Orangemen protested against the committee receiving representatives of Irish 
republicanism during their hearings on the Treaty of Versailles.  Their letter stated that “the 
American Senate has no business meddling with the unquestioned problems of the British 
Parliament.”  They accused Sinn Féiners of conspiring with Germany during the war, and 
denied that there were any grounds for separation from the United Kingdom.  The 
Orangemen also protested that a minority of the United Kingdom’s citizens in Ireland could 
place “the loyal population of that island in a false light before the world.”
163
  They believed 
that the Irish-American republicans who addressed the committee did not “represent 
American sentiment, nor the will of that Irish people who sent their sons with ours to win the 




At the Pennsylvania State Grand Lodge meeting of August 1919, two pro-unionist 
resolutions were passed.  They stated, 
that in view of the fact that the Irish Home Rule propaganda has been misleading and 
that the action of the Senate of the United States has caused the general public 
throughout the United States to form an opinion that all the Irish race desire home 
rule, whereas the truth of the matter is that the above is the desire only of the Irish 
race known as Sinn Feiners and be thus opposed to the Protestant religion as believed 
by the Ulsterites and their friends in Ireland; be it further Resolved, that we protest 
against any action by the United States House of Representatives and Senate in 
support of Home Rule and that we endorse the actions of Sir Edward Carson and his 
associates who agree with him in his attitude on the home rule question.
165
 
The State Grand Lodge sent copies of these resolutions affirming their support of the 
unionists to Carson and members of the United States House of Representatives and Senate. 
 Along with these attempts to persuade the United States government to refrain from 
interfering in the Irish situation, Orangemen also protested against the American visit of 
Éamon de Valera in 1919.  Delegates of the Washington LOL reported attending a meeting 
of the Independent Patriotic League of Philadelphia.  Attendees of the meeting protested 
“against Mayor [Thomas B.] Smith extending a welcome to de Valera” in his visit to 
Philadelphia.  On 2 December, the Washington LOL resolved to give the Independent 
League “all the help they can to give the view coming from the other side in protest against 
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what de Valera was spreading.”
166
  At the next meeting on 16 December, the delegates 
reported “that arrangements had been made to hold a mass meeting on Thurs. Jan. 8, 1920 in 
the Metropolitan Opera House, where the meeting will be addressed by Ulstermen who were 
here to speak & tell of conditions in Ireland.”  The Orangemen agreed to give that meeting as 
much publicity as possible.
167
 
The Ulstermen who came to Philadelphia to speak at the Metropolitan Opera House 
were the seven-member Protestant deputation led by William Coote.  They arrived in the 
United States in December to conduct a speaking tour to tell the Irish unionist point of 
view.
168
  In February, the Orange delegates were able to report a positive conclusion to the 
Ulster deputation’s visit.  They stated that the Patriotic League had a fine follow-up meeting, 
with principal business of setting up collecting cards for the Ulster mission.  The total 
amount collected for the Ulster Protestants by the Philadelphia Orangemen and Independent 
League was about $4300.
169
 
 The Orange Order in the United States was united in its support of Irish unionism 
and its condemnation of the influence of Irish-Americans and the American government in 
the Irish situation.  However, factionalism beset the organization when it came to functioning 
matters.  In 1920, the Triennial Council meeting at Belfast received word of a split in the 
American Orange Order, which had actually been troubled with factionalism since 1913.  
The split was rooted in two brethren, William J. Kirkland and George T. Lemmon, both 
claiming to be the Supreme Grand Secretary for the United States.  This led to the 
establishment of two separate Supreme Grand Orange Lodges.  There was confusion over 
who held the original charter establishing the Supreme Grand Orange Lodge, which the 
Triennial Council members agreed would indicate the authentic lodge.  The Triennial 
Council also agreed that this was a dispute to be settled by American Orangemen alone.
170
  
The Order was not reunited until 1930.  Such long-running factionalism significantly 
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Ulstermen and the Celebration of Scotch-Irish Heritage 
 Around the close of the nineteenth century, Irish unionists began to cultivate an 
“Ulsterman” identity.  This identity developed through the publication of several books on 
the history of Ulster and the Ulster Scots character.  Irish unionists attempted to assert claims 
of self-determination and validate arguments for remaining in the Union.  The Ulsterman 
“type” drew upon the concurrent revival of Scotch-Irish identity in America, and particularly 
flourished after the development of a separate Ulster Unionist Council in 1904 and during 
the third Home Rule crisis.
172
 
The growth of the Ulsterman “type” was informed by an Irish Protestant siege 
mentality in the north.  It developed in reaction to the increasing world-wide prominence of 
Irish nationalism and the changing roles of Catholics within Ulster society.  As Frank Wright 
describes, Protestants faced a decaying colonial structure and frontier conditions in which 
British and Irish identities went head-to-head.  Greater democratization and increased 
economic opportunities led to greater political and economic equality between Catholics and 
Protestants in the north.  Protestants became increasingly defensive, resulting in mistrust and 
suspicion by both groups.
173
  An Ulsterman identity was a way to minimize the importance 
of Catholics in the north of Ireland, while ideologically unifying Protestants.
174 
Under these evolving conditions and in the face of the Home Rule threat, Ulstermen 
worked to develop a united Protestant identity by emphasizing shared historical experiences, 
such as the 1641 rebellion, the United Irishmen uprising in 1798, and later the Battle of the 
Somme.
175
  The unionist sense of siege and desire to defend themselves against Catholic 
encroachment also acted as a unifying force.  Ulster identity was strengthened by a tradition 
of loyalty to the crown since 1689 and celebration of a shared British Protestant identity.
176
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The Orange Order, traditionally associated with Anglicanism, also helped to unify Ulster 
Protestants as it became increasingly associated with symbols of Presbyterianism such as the 
Ulster Covenant in 1912. 
Informed by the popular racial theories and social Darwinism of the time, the 
Ulstermen laid out the characteristics of their “type:” dour, shrewd, industrious, practical, 
independent, and naturally gifted with governing abilities.
177
  As Graham Walker 
emphasizes, the Ulsterman “type” was frequently linked to a Scottish heritage, in part as an 
attempt to draw support from Scotland for the unionist movement.
178
  Presbyterianism was 
also central to the Ulsterman identity.
179
  These Scottish ties, along with Ulster-American 
connections, were underscored through the celebration of Scotch-Irish achievements in the 
United States. 
 Scotch-Irish identity in America broadened over time to include all Irish Protestant 
immigrants regardless of denomination or region of origin.  In contrast, Ulstermen 
increasingly drew on Scottish and Presbyterian elements, to an extent excluding the Anglo-
Irish from their newly-formed sense of identity.  However, as Anglicans, Methodists, and 
Presbyterians alike were mobilized in huge numbers through the Ulster Covenant, the 
Ulsterman identity was able to create cultural hegemony amongst Protestant 
denominations.
180
  This artificially minimized differences to forge a seemingly-united Ulster 
Protestant opposition to Home Rule. 
 The ties between Scotland, Ulster, and the Scotch-Irish were celebrated in a speech 
on 1 November 1911 by the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Whitelaw Reid.  
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Speaking in Edinburgh on “The Scot in America and the Ulster Scot,” he enthused over the 
contributions of the Scotch-Irish to American history.  “During the whole period, from the 
Revolution to the Civil War,” Reid stated, 
the indomitable Ulster Scots, chiefly from Pennsylvania and the south, were pouring 
over the Alleghenies, carrying ever westward the frontiers of the country, forming the 
advance guard of civilization from the Lakes to the Gulf, fighting the Indians and the 
wild beasts, subduing and planting the wilderness, westward to the Mississippi.
181
 
Ulstermen in newspaper articles responded favorably to this well-publicized lecture as well 
as other by-products of the Scotch-Irish revival such as the annual reports of the Scotch-Irish 
congresses and books by Hanna, Bolton, Ford, and others. 
The roles of the Scotch-Irish in winning the American Revolution and taming the 
frontier were memorialized by Ulstermen.  Gillian McIntosh writes, “These ‘historical’ 
events were the beacon buoys for unionists, marking the rocks on which Ulster Protestants 
had almost foundered in the past but which they had overcome through their own 
tenacity.”
182
  The Scotch-Irish, through their tenacity, had overcome their immigrant status 
and frontier conditions to become leading members of American society.  A Witness editorial 
in 1912 mused, “The United States owe much of their being, and not a little of their well-
being, to the Ulster Scot, and the spirit of rugged and determined resistance of the obstacles 
of tyrannical government on the one hand or of nature on the other.”
183
  James Barkley 
Woodburn wrote in his The Ulster Scot, “They went hundreds of miles into the unoccupied 
interior, and made settlements on the slopes and in the valleys of the mountains that run 
parallel to the coast about two hundred miles inland.  Therefore they were sometimes called 
‘the mountainy men,’ or more commonly, the backwoodsmen.”
184
 
The Scotch-Irish backwoodsmen in America were determined to seek liberty to 
worship and to go beyond the reach of tyrannical civil authority, building new lives for their 
families.  According to Scotch-Irish mythology, they were first to call for independence from 
the British with the Mecklenburg Declaration of 20 May 1775.  As John Harrison wrote in 
The Scot in Ulster, they were also foremost in the fighting of the American Revolution: “The 
Presbyterian emigrants were among the stoutest soldiers who fought in the War of 
Independence, and many of the best citizens of the United States spring from the same 
stock.”
185
  Hugh Morrison, in Modern Ulster, also credited the Scotch-Irish backwoodsmen, 
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who had gained experience acting as “the frontier line against Indian aggression,” with 
turning the war in the colonists’ favor.
186
  Of all their contributions, Woodburn believed that 
the most important was “the leading part they took in the winning of the West – the lands 
between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi.”
187
  The Scotch-Irish had acted as a civilizing 
force for the American frontier. 
Ulstermen also celebrated the practical achievements of the Scotch-Irish in American 
government, religion, and industry.  Long lists of American presidents of “Ulster stock” were 
enumerated.  James Logan, in Ulster in the X-Rays, wrote, 
When he emigrates, the Ulsterman, like most Irishmen, ‘makes good,’ and he 
frequently rises to the highest positions.  Almost one half of the great line of 
Presidents of the United States came of Ulster stock, and McKinley’s old ancestral 
home may still be seen in the neighbourhood of Dervock, North Antrim.  This is a 
debt America owes to Ulster which is sometimes forgotten.
188
 
The Scotch-Irish achievements in the United States were also victories for Protestantism, 




The industrial achievements of the Scotch-Irish were lauded as well.  Harrison 
wrote, “It is, indeed, in the practical work of the world that those men of Ulster excel at 
home and abroad.  They have made but little mark in art or literature; but in commerce and 
manufactures and science, in war and diplomacy, they have done their own share of hard and 
successful labour.”
190
  Robert Fulton, inventor of steam technology, Samuel Morse, inventor 
of the telegraph, and Cyrus McCormick, inventor of the mechanical reaper, were upheld as 
examples, as well as A.T. Stewart, the entrepreneur who owned the most successful dry-
goods business in the world at that time.
191
 
These practical contributions to American society, through government, religion, and 
business, were mirrored with the achievements of the Ulster Scots in the north of Ireland.  
Through the use of Scotch-Irish examples, the Ulstermen were illustrating their value to 
Ireland.  They asserted their unique place in Irish society as the builders of industry.  Their 
success in industries such as shipbuilding and linen had benefited Protestant and Catholic 
alike.  Ulstermen emphasized dual identities which celebrated devotion to both Ulster and 
Ireland as a whole.  The Ulstermen feared the impact of Home Rule on the industrial north.  
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These American examples were used to illustrate the significance of the Ulstermen’s role in 
Ireland and the need to remain in the Union for continued industrial success. 
Emphasis on the American emigration was also used to foster unity amongst 
Ulstermen.  Morrison and W.F. Monypenny both wrote of the oppression of Ulster 
Presbyterians under the Test Act and the domination of landlords.  They fled Ulster for 
America to avoid oppression and cruel bondage, shun persecution and designed ruin, 
withdraw from the community of idolaters, and have the opportunity to worship God 
according to conscience.
192
  Woodburn wrote that through the Test Act and restrictions on 
woolen trade, 
Ulster was drained of the best of her sons.  They were driven out of the land which 
they had saved for England by their swords at Londonderry and Enniskillen, and they 
carried their enterprise and energy to another land beyond the seas, and played a great 
part – perhaps the greatest – in building up the largest Republic in the world.
193
 
Even those who had not emigrated from Ulster would be familiar with the perceived betrayal 
and oppression by England.  Ulstermen had shared experiences of the conditions that had 
driven so many to emigrate.  The significant impact of emigration itself on families and 
communities throughout Ulster was also a uniting factor. 
Even though those who had remained in Ulster had not directly contributed to the 
Scotch-Irish achievements in the United States, they still felt pride in the success of their 
“race.”  In 1912, the editors of the Witness wrote: 
The Ulster Scots are as proud as are the people of the United States of the part that 
the men of their race played of planting, pruning, and preserving the tree of liberty 
in the Western Continent.  They are proud of the part the men of their kith and kin 
have played in the upbuilding and upkeeping of the great Republic of the West.  
They are proud of the manliness and independence that characterized them.  Theirs 
was not to reason why, theirs but to do and die for the land of their adoption and for 
the maintenance of the liberties of that land that were threatened by a fatuous British 
king and a fatuous government.  They fought for what they believed to be the right; 
they suffered and sacrificed for it.  And it is just because the Ulster Scots now 
represent the same race and same spirit that we regard their attitude on the Home 
Rule question not as bluff, as their enemies would represent, but as sober, 
considered, well-regulated, and well-adviced determination.
194
 
It was this determination to uphold liberties and fight for what they believed to be right that 
united Ulstermen on both sides of the Atlantic.  The cultivation of the Ulsterman “type” 
justified shared claims over Scotch-Irish achievements.  As long as they all identified with 
the “type,” it did not matter if they had actually committed the acts themselves.  
Furthermore, as Morrison wrote, because of Anglo-American rapprochement and the shared 
                                                 
192
 Morrison, Modern Ulster, 18-20; W.F. Monypenny, The Two Irish Nations: An Essay on Home 
Rule (London: John Murray, 1913), 37. 
193
 Woodburn, Ulster Scot, 213-214, 228. 
194
 Witness 29 Mar 1912. 
120 
experience of the Great War, Ulstermen on both sides of the Atlantic had been reunited and 
would continue to fight together for the advancement of human liberty.
195
 
 The Ulstermen approached the era of colonial and revolutionary Scotch-Irish 
achievement as a “golden age” in their ethnic history.
196
  Celebration of this “golden age” 
helped to unify the Ulstermen in a time of threat and give them a sense of belonging when 
they were somewhat isolated from both British and Irish identities.  The Scotch-Irish “golden 
age” helped to explain the Ulster ethnic identity and symbolized its collective achievements, 
even for those who remained in Ireland.  Both the Scotch-Irish in America and the Ulstermen 
emphasized a vision of their ethnic history at a “flowering” stage, when the Scotch-Irish 
were at the peak of their pioneering and political powers.  Moreover, because of the high 
levels of emigration in the mid- to late-eighteenth century, this was a time when theoretically 
the Scotch-Irish were much more closely tied back to Ulster. 
Ulstermen’s celebration of the contributions of the Scotch-Irish to American society 
persisted to include contemporary events.  As the Witness editors wrote on the election of 
Woodrow Wilson as president, “An Ulster Scot, or the descendant of an Ulster Scot, is once 
again in the proud position of President of the great Republic of the West, with which Ulster 
interests are so bound up, and in the history and in the development of which Ulster Scots 
have played such a part.”
197
  Even though a century had passed since the peak of the Ulster 
Protestant emigration to America, the Ulstermen continued to feel close ties to the United 
States and believed that their futures would be determined in part by the continuing 
relationship with America. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Scotch-Irish in America were influenced by American political, social, and 
economic circumstances as well as their desire to remain connected to Ireland.  In late 
nineteenth-century America, pluralistic ethnic, class, occupational, and sectarian loyalties 
clashed against the promotion of nativism, social Darwinism, and Anglo-Saxonism.  These 
identities and viewpoints were often expressed through the popular associational and civic 
culture of the time.  The Scotch-Irish were in a unique position in that they were able to be 
on both sides of the ethnic-nativist divide simultaneously.  As immigrants with roots in Great 
Britain, many faded into American society as “invisible immigrants” who were difficult 
separate from the “native” population.  Others chose to celebrate their Anglo-Saxon ties 
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through joining British-American organizations.  The Scotch-Irish were also closely 
associated with nativist organizations.  In joining these anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant 
groups, they were likely expressing views informed by their past experiences in Ireland, even 
if they did not chose specifically to embrace a Scotch-Irish heritage.  At the same time, there 
were Irish Protestant immigrants who identified more with an Irish-American identity, which 
led them to declare nationalist sympathies despite its close associations with Catholicism.  
These differing identities reflected the diverse backgrounds and changing circumstances of 
immigrants who had come from Ireland over a period of two and a half centuries, and 
explain why Ulster unionism did not have a greater appeal in the United States. 
 Those who chose to celebrate a specifically Scotch-Irish identity were embracing 
their connections to Ireland while separating themselves from Catholic Irish immigrants.  
The increasing prominence of Scotch-Irish ethnicity in the late-nineteenth-century United 
States was in large part due to the formation of the SISA.  Despite the fact that many of their 
members were themselves natives of Ireland, the SISA almost entirely focused on 
immigration and life in America before the time of Andrew Jackson.  The rise of Jackson to 
the presidency marked the time when their ethnic group no longer had to fight their way in 
the wilderness but had risen to the top of American politics and society.  It was a success 
story that emphasized full assimilation into American culture, but was not in actuality an 
accurate picture of the Scotch-Irish as a whole at the time. 
 In their eagerness to emphasize their loyalties to the United States first and foremost, 
there was little mention of the contemporaneous situation in Ireland.  Membership of the 
SISA no doubt encompassed a wide range of views on the Irish problem, including those 
who were pro-Home Rule.  However, though they were not outspoken in their views, at 
times sympathy was expressed with the Ulster unionist position, especially through such 
prominent figures as Reverend John Hall.  Later, after the PSIS took over as the main 
promoter of the Scotch-Irish ethnicity in America, partiality for Ulster unionism became 
more pronounced.  Protesting against Irish-American influence and American government 
involvement in the Irish question was a way to support the unionist cause while still 
emphasizing loyalties to the United States.  There is also no doubt that both the national 
organization and the PSIS maintained close connections with Ulster through correspondence 
and visits back to the home country. 
 The LOI in the United States faced even greater problems with perceptions of 
foreign loyalties.  The Orange Order was challenged with difficulties in transplanting the 
organization outside of the British Empire, which limited the growth of Orangeism in 
America.  They also faced crippling factionalism throughout the late nineteenth and early 
122 
twentieth centuries, especially from 1913 to 1930.  Despite these setbacks, the Orange Order 
was vocal in its support for Irish unionism.  They combined a celebration of ties to Ulster 
with the promotion of anti-Catholicism in the United States.  Often anti-Home Rule protests 
also included protests against Catholic influence in American state or city governments and 
public schools.  Throughout all three Home Rule crises, but especially during 1912-1920, the 
Orangemen assured Ulstermen of their sympathy with the unionist cause, protested against 
Irish-American nationalist involvement, and attempted to influence American government 
policy.  It is clear that connections back to Ulster were an important element within the 
American Orange Order. 
 At the same time, Ulster itself was influenced and changed by the emigration to 
America and the Scotch-Irish heritage.  The formation of an “Ulsterman” identity, especially 
during the third Home Rule crisis, was informed by the concurrent celebration of Scotch-
Irish heritage in the United States.  It drew upon the reports of the SISA and books that were 
influenced by the society’s views.  The Ulstermen emphasized the role of the Scotch-Irish in 
civilizing the American frontier, as well as their governmental, religious, and industrial 
achievements.  The shared experience of emigration from Ulster helped to foster unity within 
unionism.  They claimed ownership of the actions of their “racial” brethren across the 
Atlantic.  The identity of Ulster was closely linked to an image of revolutionary and frontier 
America in which the Scotch-Irish fought to uphold liberties and were determined to stand 
up for what they believed was right.  Ulstermen during the Home Rule crises claimed the 
same determination and pioneering qualities for themselves.  Even to the modern day, Ulster 
unionists emphasize ties with the Scotch-Irish in America, such as through a 1965 pamphlet 
describing Northern Ireland as “the cradle of the Scotch-Irish, the pioneers and frontiersmen 
of early American life.”
198
  This is also reflected through the preservation of American 
presidential ancestral homesteads in Ulster, as well as the foundation of the Ulster-American 
Folk Park near Omagh. 
 The Scotch-Irish had long been part of a transatlantic community maintaining 
connections with Ulster, which persisted into the twentieth century despite declining 
immigration.
199
  The enduring appeal of the Scotch-Irish heritage in America was underlined 
by the existence of Ulster Scots heritage groups in Massachusetts, New York, California, 
Illinois, and Michigan in the mid-twentieth century, and the endurance, in smaller form, of 
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the Orange Order and the Scotch-Irish Society of the United States.
200
  More recently, James 
Webb’s prominent book Born Fighting has emphasized the lasting legacy of the Scotch-Irish 
in the southern United States.
201
  Factually accurate or not, many of the views now held 
about the Scotch-Irish were first propagated in the late-nineteenth century as Irish Protestant 
immigrants and their descendants attempted to find a place within American society while 
maintaining connections back to Ireland. 
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V. UNIONIST VISITS TO AMERICA: THREE CASE STUDIES 
 
 Over the course of the Home Rule era, Irish unionists continuously engaged with the 
United States.  They hoped to foster the development of a transatlantic unionist community, 
with resultant moral and financial support, as well as the diminishment of Irish-American 
nationalist credibility.  Transatlantic unionist visits are one particularly revealing aspect of 
the relationship with the United States, reflecting the approaches and inconsistencies of 
unionists in direct contact with American audiences.  This chapter will examine three 
unionist trips to America between 1886 and 1920.  The visits emphasized the unionists’ 
concern for the cultivation of Anglo-American friendship and Protestant unity, as well as 
their focus on countering Irish-American nationalist influence. 
 Irish nationalists frequently traveled to the United States to rally both moral and 
monetary support from the “greater Ireland” across the Atlantic.  A tradition of sending 
money from the United States to Ireland had been established through emigrant remittances.  
Remittances were substantial enough to make an impact on the Irish agricultural economy, 
social patterns, and family emigration patterns.
1
  By the 1840s, Irish-Americans commonly 
sent money in support of political movements in Ireland.  Daniel O’Connell and the Repeal 
Association collected donations sent by sympathizers in America.
2
  O’Connell’s insistence 
on constitutional methods meant that over time he gradually lost American support to the 
Young Irelanders.  Irish-American backing and funds played significant roles in the Young 
Ireland uprising of 1848, though leaders such as William Smith O’Brien were uncertain 
about the place of such support in the movement for Irish independence.
3
  The 1848 rising 
shifted the balance of external backing for Irish nationalism from Europe to America, drawn 
by the high numbers of Irish emigrants and political exiles in the United States.
4
 
 As the century wore on, the nationalistic fervor of Irish-America became an 
important consideration of Fenian proponents.  Fenian leader James Stephens arrived in the 
United States in May 1866, seeking armed aid and funding for a violent insurrection.  He 
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promised to lead an Irish revolutionary army against the British.  Stephens raised about 
$60,000 on his trip, which culminated in a final rally in New York on 28 October.
5
  Over the 
next decade, expectations of military support from Irish-American soldiers faded, but 
monetary and moral support became even more important.
6
  The successful tour of Charles 
Stewart Parnell through the United States in 1880 was so significant as to establish his place 
“as the greatest political leader of nationalist Ireland since O’Connell,” according to R.F. 
Foster.
7
  Parnell appealed to radicals through his platform rhetoric, including his reported 
“Last Link” speech in Cincinnati, while officially maintaining constitutional stances.  The 
United States was a significant source of funds for the Parnellite Irish Parliamentary Party 
(IPP), particularly as it became standard practice to pay IPP Members of Parliament.
8
  The 
importance of American funding was reflected in the regularity of visits by a wide array of 
Irish nationalists including Parnell, Michael Davitt, T.M. Healy, John Dillon, T.P. O’Connor, 
John Redmond, William O’Brien, and others.
9
 
 Like the Irish nationalists, the eyes of Ulster unionists also turned westward for 
moral and monetary support, though to a lesser extent.  One of the earliest transatlantic visits 
by an Irish politician was, in fact, made by Orangeman and MP William Johnston.  Years 
before the high-tide of Parnellite political tours, he traveled to the United States and Canada 
in 1872 speaking on the Protestant ideals of civil and religious liberty.
10
  Following the early 
visit by Johnston, subsequent political trips by Irish unionists were much rarer than those of 
Irish nationalists.  The cases examined in this chapter were in many ways exceptional. 
 This chapter will first look at the 1886 trip by Reverend Dr. Richard Rutledge Kane 
and barrister George Hill Smith, two representatives of the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal 
Union (ULAU).  They traveled to the United States and Canada following the defeat of the 
first Home Rule Bill.  They aimed to present the unionist case to a North American public 
that they perceived to be blinded by a pro-nationalist press.  Second, it will focus on the aged 
William Johnston’s visit to the Imperial Grand Orange Council of the World, held in New 
York City in 1900.  His visit to the United States exemplified attempts to create transatlantic 
connections through Orange and Protestant links.  Third, the chapter will examine the 1919-
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1920 Ulster Protestant delegation to America, led by the MP for South Tyrone, William 
Coote.  In an attempt to counter Éamon de Valera’s and Sinn Féin’s American influence, 
Coote and six Belfast clergymen traveled to the United States to speak at mass meetings and 
Protestant churches throughout the country. 
 These three cases, spread across a wide time period, reveal how the unionists 
marketed themselves while overseas, their approaches to the opposition of the nationalist 
influence in America, and their views of the United States.  The visits also show pitfalls in 
the unionists’ American tactics.  Each visit emphasized links between the United States and 
Ulster through their historic ties and Protestant values.  The delegates credited those links 
with helping to foster greater friendship between Britain and America.  Ultimately, these 
three visits reveal numerous facets of the unionists’ attempts to create their own transatlantic 
community in answer to that of the Irish nationalists. 
 
R.R. Kane and G.H. Smith, September-October 1886 
 “Our object,” declared the Reverend Dr. Richard Rutledge Kane before setting off 
from Londonderry on a two-month tour of North America, 
is first of all to assure the people of Canada and the United States of our continued 
friendship, though divided by thousands of miles of ocean, and to receive whatever 
tokens of their interest in us they may be disposed to make us bearers of, and 
especially to refute slanders so diligently circulated respecting this country by that 
bureau of slander, the National League.
11
 
Kane and his fellow delegate George Hill Smith, barrister-at-law, were sent to North 
America by the ULAU.  They hoped to enlighten “the people of the United States and 
Canada on the real state of the Irish question.”
12
  Their trip, coming soon after the defeat of 
the first Home Rule Bill, reflected the perceived importance of Irish-American influence in 
Irish and American politics.  It was a response to both the increasingly frequent Parnellite 
visits across the Atlantic and the anti-unionist propaganda in the United States. 
 The ULAU, founded in January 1886 as the Ulster Loyalist Campaign Committee 
with both Tory and Liberal membership, was to be one of the longest-standing unionist 
organizations by the time it disbanded in 1911.
13
  The focus of the ULAU was anti-Home 
Rule propaganda.  It acted as a central body for arranging speeches and demonstrations in 
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Ireland, England, and Scotland.
14
  The trip of Kane and Smith marked the ULAU’s first foray 
into North America, though members were earlier assigned to engage in letter writing 
campaigns to the United States and the Empire.  The trip was planned after a ULAU meeting 
on 23 July 1886 to determine whether the organization should remain in existence after the 
defeat of the Home Rule Bill.  The Belfast News-Letter reported that not only did members 
affirm the necessity of the organization’s work, but also resolved that a deputation be 
dispatched to North America to promote the cause of Irish loyalism.  A News-Letter editorial 
praised the plan as “an admirable idea, and we are sure that Canada especially – where there 
are many of our most loyal colonists – and in the United States also, the members of the 




 The two delegates dispatched to North America were prominent within the ULAU 
and Ulster society.  Smith was a barrister from Armagh educated at Queen’s College Belfast.  
He had worked on the North-East Circuit since 1878.  In addition to writing several books on 
law and ultimately his own reminiscences, he was a well-traveled speaker for the ULAU 
throughout England and Scotland.  Smith would continue this task for years to come with the 
Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union and Irish Unionist Alliance.
16
 
 Kane was a more notorious figure within Belfast society.  Born in Omagh in 1841, 
he was the rector at Belfast’s Christ Church from 1882 until his death in 1898, the Grand 
Master of the Belfast Orangemen, and heavily involved in the unionist politics of the city.  
As a member of the ULAU, he was on the platform during Lord Randolph Churchill’s 
infamous meeting at Ulster Hall on 22 February 1886.
17
  Along with Reverend Dr. Hugh 




 Throughout the time of the North American trip, Kane was a focus of the Belfast 
Riots Commission.  Hanna defended Kane and himself in a letter to the editor of the Times, 
writing, “One thing, however, can be easily established, that for the last forty years no 
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disturbance was originated in Belfast by the Protestant party.”
19
  In the House of Commons, 
the Nationalist MP for South Sligo, Tom Sexton, accused Kane of fleeing from the 
Commission by traveling overseas.
20
  The editors of the Belfast News-Letter championed 
Kane in response to Sexton’s speech.  They wrote, “Dr. Kane will return to Belfast in 
October, and is ready to come sooner if the Commissioners require him.  Perhaps when he 
does reach home, Mr. Sexton may have reason to think he has arrived too soon.”
21
 
 Within this context of defeat of the Home Rule Bill and accusations of inciting the 
Belfast riots, Kane and Smith departed for North America.  Their travels were closely 
tracked by the Belfast News-Letter, although there was a significant time delay on reports of 
their North American speeches.  Interviewed at Londonderry just before setting out, Kane 
took issue with the nationalist portrayal of Irish loyalists as “a bigoted set” who “don’t allow 
Roman Catholics to have the same liberty as themselves.”  He termed this portrayal, 
a gross slander and contrary to the whole history of Irish Protestants.  And we want 
to set everyone right as to the real object of these conspirators, to show that it is first 
to indulge themselves in luxuries which they could not otherwise enjoy; and 
secondly, to indulge their irrational hatred of empire, Crown, dominion, and 
influence of Protestant England.
22
 
Kane considered extreme nationalists unrepresentative of the Irish as a whole.  He stated, “I 
believe the moral sense of the vast multitudes of Irish Roman Catholics revolts at the 
domination of this immoral and atheistic conspiracy, and will hail with delight the dawn of 
Ireland’s emancipation, which I believe to be at hand.”
23
  Kane thought that the vast majority 
of Irish Catholics wished not for the corrupt control of the nationalists, but for substantive 
gains that could be achieved by working through the current British political system.  He 
perceptively portrayed the Fenians as anti-Catholic and atheistic, as many Fenians had 
abandoned Christianity.  Kane hoped to fight against nationalist propaganda in North 
America and to secure for the Irish loyalists “the sympathy and help of all who are interested 
in the greatness of the United Kingdom and the continued blessings of civil and religious 
liberty in this country.”
24
 
 Kane, Smith, and Smith’s wife arrived in Quebec City on 6 September 1886.  Kane 
later explained, “In one sense we wanted to pay our respects to Canada first and last.  I have 
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a strong opinion that no one has anything to say to the main question at issue in Ireland but a 
citizen of the British Empire.”
25
  Kane believed that strong imperial ties drew them to 
Canada, with greater assurances of a positive reception than in the United States.  Kane was 
considerably apprehensive about the potential negative response from nationalist-
indoctrinated Americans. 
 Montreal was the site of the delegates’ first meeting, followed by Toronto.  2,500 
people gathered there to hear them speak on “Home Rule from an Irish Loyalist Point of 
View” on 8 September.  Over the following month, they toured the eastern half of Canada, 
speaking at Hamilton, St. Catharines, London, Ottawa, Peterborough, Kingston, and 
Belleville, as well as smaller agricultural settlements.  Attendance was generally over a 
thousand and sometimes much higher.
26
 
 While speaking at an Orange meeting in Hamilton, Kane compared the “diabolical 
deeds” of Irish nationalists to those of “savage Indians.”  A First Nations man responded to 
his comments by stating, “It seemed as if their Irish visitors had but a very poor notion of 
what Indians really were.”  He challenged them both “to go with him to an Indian Reserve 
Settlement and address a meeting there,” which would certainly test Kane and Smith’s views 
of First Nations peoples as “wild, savage, or uncivilized.”
27
  A week later, the delegates 
found themselves on a First Nations reservation about twenty-five miles outside of London, 
Ontario.  First Nations representatives, through a translator, expressed their devotion to the 
Queen and Empire.   
Both Kane and Smith were taken with the events of the meeting.  Smith considered it 
one of the most extraordinary gatherings in his long speaking career.  He enthused, 
“Certainly we had traveled a long distance, and broken in on one of our off nights to hold 
this meeting, but we would not have missed it for all the tour.”
28
  Kane remarked, 
Even the loyal and educated Indians seemed anxious to surpass all others in 
extending to us assurances of their devotion to the glorious empire of which they 
were proud to call themselves citizens.  We had an opportunity of addressing a large 
meeting at an Indian reservation, at which a resolution was passed in their own 
language similar in terms to those passed at our other meetings; and I cannot soon 
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The expression of loyalty from the First Nations people was used as a symbol of the 
international appeal of the unionist cause.  Kane focused on the visit as symbolizing the 
strengths of the Empire in uniting a diverse range of people – an Empire to which the Irish 
unionists themselves were deeply committed. 
 Smith and Kane held a second meeting in Toronto on 2 October before turning their 
attention to the United States.  Invitations for further speaking engagements were already 
coming in.  Kane believed they could have spent their whole time in Canada.  However, he 
felt obligated to go on to the United States, knowing that “friends at home will be 
disappointed and United Ireland will say that we knew better than to venture into the great 
and free Republic with our preaching against justice to Ireland; so we turned our faces to 
Niagara.”
30
  As they traveled through the Niagara Falls area to the United States, the 
delegates faced their coming task with considerable trepidation because of the large 
nationalist influence.  Kane later remarked, “We had made up our minds that with Canada 
our smooth sailing as Loyalist delegates would be at an end, and we trimmed our sails for 
some stiff breezes.  We had yet to learn the true state of things in the United States.”
31
  Kane 
and Smith arrived in Philadelphia, the site of their first meeting in America, on 12 October. 
 The delegates spoke at the Philadelphia Academy of Music two days later.  
Philadelphia was one of the key cities of Scotch-Irish settlement and had a significant 
Orange presence.  Kane expressed amazement at the level of support they received starting 
with a procession to the meeting.  He wondered if the crowd was actually made up of Irish 
nationalist supporters of Parnell and Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa in disguise, stating, “A 
band and brilliant procession appeared outside the hotel to escort us to the place of meeting.  
Was this band and all this ovation intended by Rossaites and Parnellites and their American 
sympathizers as a trap to inspire us with false confidence?  (Laughter.)”
32
  Though Rossa’s 
influence was waning by 1886, Kane’s reference to him recalled the extremism and violence 




In Philadelphia, Kane and Smith were accompanied by 300 Orangemen and 
members of the American Protestant Association as they processed from the Continental 
Hotel to the Academy of Music.  At least 7,000 people crowded into the amphitheater, with 
hundreds turned away for lack of space.
34
  Smith noted that this was the largest crowd he 
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addressed over the span of his entire career.
35
  Kane went on to describe the Philadelphia 
gathering as “the most magnificent meeting of our tour,” though it was held in what he 
believed was “hostile territory.”  Subsequent newspaper reports from the Philadelphia Times 
were so popular that 10,000 additional copies of the issue were printed, and the entire 
meeting was later published in pamphlet form.
36
 
 The delegates next spoke on 18 October in Boston, which Kane considered to be 
“the headquarters of Fenianism.”  This was an interesting claim on the part of Kane, because 
Boston was generally considered to be more of a stronghold of constitutional support for 
Parnell.  For the first time, hostile elements formed a significant part of the audience – about 
800 “avowed” Fenians within a total crowd of 3,500.  Kane reported that the Fenians “hissed 
at the name of the Queen and any reference to the British Empire.”  Police had to remove a 
few noisy pro-nationalists.  Overall, however, Kane believed that the delegates had stood 
their ground against the Fenians: “We didn’t for a moment lower our flag of loyalty to the 
Queen and loyalty to the Union, but we held aloft, as in my opinion Irish Loyalists ought 
ever to hold aloft, our flag of loyalty to Ireland.”
37
  The final meetings of the trip, held in 
New York City and Brooklyn, were less hostile than the Boston gathering and left Kane 
encouraged by the delegation’s reception in the United States. 
 Kane and Smith addressed several themes in their speeches to North American 
audiences.  One of their main goals was to refute rampant nationalist propaganda, which they 
believed was spread because of nationalist control of the press.  The majority of Canadians 
and Americans had never been exposed to pro-Union arguments.  Kane recognized, “Our 
Nationalist opponents were not slow to appeal to people not only outside Ireland, but outside 
of the empire of the Queen for sympathy and support in their determined and deliberate 
efforts to dismember the United Kingdom.”
38
  He believed that unionists were hesitant to 
appeal to the United States because the bounds of the Empire would be broken, which 
contrasted with nationalist views of America as part of “greater Ireland.”  This hesitancy 
explains why Kane, Smith, and other unionists were much more confident in their appeals to 
Canada.  It also points to why actively soliciting funds was not made an explicit part of their 
agenda.  They had accused the nationalists of being foreign-run and unrepresentative of the 
Irish because so much of their monetary support came from America.  As the first unionist 
delegation to North America, Kane and Smith had expected hostile reactions and would not 
have wanted to embarrass themselves by failing to collect significant sums when the 
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nationalists had been so successful.  They did, however, accept donations from local 
organizations to fund the trip itself, which otherwise would have been paid for out-of-pocket 
by Kane, Smith, and the ULAU.
39
 
 Kane and Smith portrayed the unionists as loyal and proud Irishmen.  “I am an 
Irishman all over,” Kane told the Philadelphia audience, “and since the Flood none of my 
family have been born out of Ireland.  But it would take a Harvey and a microscope to 
discover a drop of Irish blood in Charles Parnell’s body.  The Union secures to my county its 
central state and her honour.”  Irish unionists were as concerned for Ireland’s honor and 
independence as any other part of the Irish population, especially when compared to 
Parnell’s perceived American loyalties.  Parnell had well-known American heritage and 
many family members living in the United States.
40
  The idea of Irish Protestants as proud 
Irish patriots, sharing a feeling of Irish nationality, was something Gladstone hoped to pick 
up on with the Home Rule project.  Irish Protestants were deeply invested in Ireland, but 
most, like Kane, determined that the best chance to secure a prosperous future lay with the 
Union.
41
  These ideas were underscored by the hundreds of thousands of loyal Irishmen who, 
as Kane described, “were prepared, if necessary, once more to draw their swords and prevent 
the dismemberment of the empire.”
42
 
 According to Kane, the unionists were prepared to oppose separation from the 
British Empire “to the bitter end.”  Any Home Rule policy leading to separation from the 
Empire would degrade the position of Ireland in the world.
43
  Kane and Smith especially 
emphasized imperial unity and power in their Canadian meetings.  Under the Union, the Irish 
like the Canadians were equal members of an Empire which they had helped to build.  Home 
Rule and separation would render Ireland “a poor nation cut adrift from the British 
Empire.”
44
  Home Rule would also lead to a degraded economic and political position for 
Ireland as compared to England and Scotland.  Ireland would have to pay taxes and 
contribute to the British armed forces without any representation at Westminster, destroying 
Irish equality with England and Scotland.
45
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In the United States, the delegates no longer appealed to imperial unity as they had in 
Canada.  Kane explained that they approached their American speeches as “advocates of 
Protestant truth and liberty,” ideals which would also be in “deadly peril” under Home 
Rule.
46
  Fear of Catholic domination of Protestants was an element in Kane’s speeches 
throughout North America.  Kane asserted that Protestants dreaded the rule of Catholic 
Archbishops Thomas Croke and William Walsh.  He declared that “Irish Protestants would 
never be slaves to political adventurers and religious domination.”
47
  However, Kane 
believed the problem lay in the Catholic hierarchy rather than the majority of Irish Catholic 
people.  He felt that the Irish on the whole were satisfied with the full equality, freedom, and 
prosperity they had gained through the Union.
48
 
The main focus of Kane’s and Smith’s speeches was attacking Parnellism.  Kane 
accused Parnellites of inconsistency in their preaching of Home Rule or separation 
depending on their location.  In Canada, Kane emphasized that Parnellism meant separation, 
“that the last link that bound her to England would be broken” and the control of Ireland 
would be in the hands of the criminals who had orchestrated such outrages as the Phoenix 
Park murders.
49
  These Canadian speeches accused Parnell of advocating total separation 
from Britain and the Empire. 
In contrast, when faced with hostile Fenian elements in the United States, Kane 
emphasized that Parnell was lying to America’s Fenians to gain monetary support.  Parnell 
would never follow through with demands for full separation.  Kane played on the suspicions 
that purist American Fenians felt toward Parnellite constitutionalism.
50
  Indeed, according to 
Kane, Fenians and Orangemen had much more in common than either of them with the 
Parnellites.  Kane explained, 
Both the Fenians and the Orangemen desire that Ireland should be a nation, not a 
province paying tribute to a foreign country, but a nation.  The Fenians wanted 
Ireland to be a separate nation from England and a republic.  The Orangemen were 
content that Ireland should be as much a nation as England and the same nation.
51
 
Separation in itself was not the problem, although Orangemen would rather remain within 
the Union.  The problem was with a Home Rule policy that would degrade Ireland to the 
status of a colony paying tribute to the mother country.  This idea of unionists preferring full 
separation to Home Rule was not unique: at times a unionist strand of thought emerged 
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which argued that the unionist minority would be better able to defend its interests in an 
independent Ireland rather than under a Home Rule system.
52
  In this argument, unionist 
loyalties were not to the Empire in itself, but rather to the protections the Empire was able to 
offer them as a minority group within Ireland. 
 Kane and Smith also attacked Parnell’s role as the leader of the IPP.  Smith accused 
Parnell of being a megalomaniac with absolute control over IPP members to the extent that 
they were only able to represent Parnell rather than their constituents.
53
  Parnellites, as 
described by Kane, were “the most contemptible set of hirelings that have ever appeared in 
Irish history.”  None was worse than Parnell himself.
54
  To gain monetary support, 
Parnellites portrayed Ireland as a “down-trodden country” when in reality, according to 
Smith, “there was no class of tenantry in the world that enjoyed greater privileges either 
under the land purchase or eviction bills.”  Irishmen were in every way equal to the other 
citizens of the British Empire, meaning that the land agitation was based on a sham.
55
  
Parnell himself was a landlord who enforced payment of rents by the same process of writs 
that he condemned when leading the land agitation movement.  He was no better than any 
other landlord.  The only Irishmen benefiting from money donated by Americans and 
Canadians to the nationalist cause were the Parnellites themselves.  They would say anything 
about the state of the Irish people or their own separatist intentions to gain funds “from dupes 
in America and Canada.”
56
  According to Smith, this money had been spent lifting Parnell 
out of poverty and supporting others “in luxury.”  Smith concluded that “the American 
people had better keep their money in their pockets, as of the last $40,000 which they sent to 
Parnell $25,000 of it went into his pockets.”
57
 
 The reception of Kane and Smith was mostly positive over the course of their tour.  
They faced hostility from Fenians and others in Boston.  At their meeting in Kingston a 
nationalist proposed a pro-home rule resolution which garnered controversy but gained little 
support.
58
  Otherwise, following Kane and Smith’s speeches, a leading member of each 
community proposed pro-unionist resolutions assuring the delegates of their sympathy.  
Reflecting the Orange character of the meeting, the audience at Philadelphia also resolved to 
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“support those struggling to resist the usurpation of Popery and conspiracy of the Church of 
Rome against Ireland’s rights and liberties.”
59
 
In the wake of such support, Kane was left wishing the delegates had more time to 
spread the unionist message in the United States.  He reported back to a Belfast audience that 
their short stay was enough to convince him “that the Irish Loyalist and Protestant loses 
nothing of his attachment to his principles and to his religion by being transplanted to 
American soil.”  Kane hoped that future unionist delegations would continue the work they 
had begun, which would eventually cause the dominance of Irish-American nationalism to 
melt away.  Without this element, the United States and United Kingdom would naturally 
gravitate toward each other because of their similar political, social, and moral values.  Kane 
believed that in the future the two countries would “be found shoulder to shoulder, joint and 
unconquerable guardians of constitutional liberty, political reform, and Scriptural truth.”
60
 
 Kane and Smith arrived back in Queenstown on 30 October, where they were 
interviewed by the Belfast News-Letter before traveling on to Belfast.  Kane reported that 
there had been marked change on the Irish question in North America even over the short 
two months of their tour.  “We shall disappoint our friends on the other side of the Atlantic 
immensely,” he stated, “if we do not continue that interchange of sympathy and sentiment 
and principle, which was begun – so far as organized change is concerned – so auspiciously 
in the mission.”
61
  The Belfast News-Letter responded to the support shown for the unionist 
delegation in North America by observing in an editorial, “Those who are perpetually 
boasting about the greater Ireland beyond the sea ought to bear in mind that there are two 




William Johnston, July-August 1900 
 By the time of William Johnston’s visit to the United States in 1900, he was a 
seasoned traveler across the Atlantic.  On each of his four trips to North America, he was 
treated like Orange royalty.  Prior to his first visit in 1872, Johnston had gained notoriety for 
defying the Party Processions Act, for which he spent time in jail.  He was well-known 
internationally as an Orange leader.  During his North American visits, he promoted stronger 
ties between Britain and the United States by drawing on Orange principles and international 
connections. 
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 Johnston was born in Downpatrick in 1829, gaining low-church values from his 
Episcopalian parents.  He became a member of the Ballydonnell Orange Lodge in May 1848.  
Early on, he had a tumultuous relationship with the Orange Order, centered on his promotion 
of the Grand Black Chapter and controversy surrounding old higher degrees within the 
Order.
63
  Johnston also disagreed with the Grand Orange Lodge’s policy of cooperating with 
the provisions of the Party Processions Act of 1850 and Party Emblems Act of 1860.  He was 
determined to influence both the Orange leadership and ordinary brethren who accepted the 
ban on processions.  He toured local Orange halls making speeches attacking the 
government.  He staged an illegal Orange parade on 12 July 1867 in Newtownards, for which 
he was arrested.
64
  His subsequent stint in prison made Johnston an Orange martyr.  He was 
quickly returned as an Independent and Orange MP for South Belfast.  In Parliament, he 
acted to repeal the anti-parading acts in 1870.
65
 
 Johnston was heavily involved in the formation of the Imperial Grand Orange 
Council of the World.  This Triennial Council originated from a desire within the Grand 
Orange Lodge of Ireland to spark closer cooperation between lodges in the United Kingdom 
and the Empire.  Supporting the idea, Johnston proposed a resolution at the December 1865 
meeting of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland.  The resolution provided for regular 
gatherings of Orange representatives to “take into consideration the state of Orangeism and 
Protestantism, with a view of devising means for the furtherance of the cause of Truth, and 
the extension of the Orange Society.”
66
  The subsequent Grand Orange Conference was held 
in the College Street Orange Hall in Belfast on 18 July 1866, with representatives present 
from Ireland, England, Scotland, and Canada.  This conference organized the Imperial Grand 
Orange Council of the World, which met for the first time on 17 July 1867 at Radley’s Hotel 
in London.  American Orange brethren first attended the Triennial Council three years later 
at the July 1870 meeting in Toronto.
67
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 Before his 1900 trip to the United States, Johnston made three visits to North 
America, two of which were to attend meetings of the Triennial Council in Canada.
68
  
Newspaper reports from Canadian cities stated Johnston was treated like royalty on his visits.  
Processions with thousands of people greeted him on his arrival.
69
  In 1872, after spending 
most of his trip in Canada, he visited New York and addressed an Orange audience at the 
Cooper Institute.  With the visit coming only a year after the deadly New York City Orange 
Riot of 12 July 1871, police presence at Johnston’s meeting was considerable.  
Superintendent James J. Kelso detailed 275 patrolmen to occupy the hall, with 250 patrolmen 
held in reserve at the Fifteenth Precinct and 200 in reserve at the Seventeenth.
70
 
 The meeting passed with no instances of conflict.  Representatives of the New York 
Orange Lodges occupied the platform, celebrating Johnston as a “champion of civil and 
religious liberty.”
71
  The New York Herald reported, “Mr. Johnston has acquired considerable 
notoriety in Ireland, in consequence of his determined adherence to Orangeism, and also 
because he had taken high rank in the Order, notwithstanding opposition of some aristocratic 
persons who are identified with the Orange association.”
72
  Johnston was renowned for his 
principled stances and as an “everyman,” as opposed to the higher ranking brethren who he 
fought against to repeal the Party Processions Act. 
When it came time for him to address the meeting, Johnston spoke on some of the 
problems which were inherent with the transfer of Orangeism to the United States.  Though 
American Orangemen lived in a republic rather than a monarchy, he said, they still held the 
same principles celebrated by the Orange Order worldwide: 
They felt that they were one with those in the British Isles, and their firm and 
resolute determination to uphold the cause which was victorious at the Reformation 
and triumphant at the Boyne gave civil and religious liberty not only to England, 
Scotland, and Ireland, but also to this great Republic – as much to New York and 
Boston as to Belfast and Londonderry.  (Cheers.)
73
 
American Orangemen had been seen as a British faction in the middle of the United States, 
where Anglophobia was common since the days of the American Revolution.  Johnston 
stated that if American Orangemen were actually supporting Britain, he would not have 
visited them.  He could never support a group which went against its home country’s 
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constitution.  Johnston concluded his speech by thanking “the audience for the superb 
welcome they had given him, which he accepted, not as an individual, but as the member of 
a society bound to spread civil liberty and evangelical truth throughout the world.  And 
above all he begged them never to be separated, in word nor in thought from their Protestant 




The relationship between the United States and Great Britain had changed drastically 
by the time of Johnston’s visit to America in 1900.  The British response to the Spanish-
American War in 1898 was seen as a welcome sign of friendship to the United States.  With 
the settlement of the Venezuela boundary dispute by arbitration in 1899, a rapprochement 
began between the two countries.  This was further solidified by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 
of 1901 on control of the Panama Canal, and the settlement of the Alaska-Canada boundary 
dispute in 1903.
75
  The rapprochement was marked by the rise of Anglo-Saxonist sentiment, 
heralding the English-speaking nations as superior to every other civilization on earth due to 
their exceptional racial characteristics.
76
  The Anglo-American alliance in politics and 
sentiment was celebrated by Johnston during his visit. 
By the time of his trip to New York in 1900, Johnston was an elder statesman within 
the Orange Order, the only surviving member of the original Triennial Council in 1867.  
Though his wife was ill at the time, Johnston took the opportunity to attend the twelfth 
meeting of the Triennial Council, held in New York.  He also planned to speak at gatherings 
in Philadelphia and Boston.
77
  He left home on 12 July 1900 to attend the Orange procession 
in Belfast, at which he presided.  Johnston noted in his diary, “A magnificent demonstration, 
and a cordial greeting for me.”
78
  In his speech to the Orange crowd, Johnston reported his 
plans for his transatlantic journey, stating that “it was a pleasing thing for him (the chairman) 
to be able to stand there on the last day that he expected to spend in Ireland for at least a 
couple of months, for on the morrow he sailed, please God, from the Maiden City to attend 
the triennial council of Orangemen in New York.”
79
  He planned to tell Americans of “the 
loyal Ulstermen – (hear, hear) – and how they rejoiced to know that the Orangemen of the 
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United States were one with the Orangemen of Her Majesty’s dominions in upholding the 
Protestant and Orange cause of Derry’s watchword, ‘No Surrender.’  (Cheers).”
80
 
The Belfast News-Letter reported on Johnston’s speech and the rest of the Twelfth 
celebrations.  The reporter mused on the international reach of the Orange organization, 
stating, “It is gratifying to remember that the Orange Institution is a world-wide 
organization.”  Though the Orange Order was centered in Belfast, its reach went throughout 
the world with North America in particular playing an important role.  “It is a power in the 
United States and in Canada – a power which does much to make firmer ties uniting the 
different branches of the Anglo-Saxon race.  Wherever Orangemen are found they are 




Johnston left the next morning for Londonderry, and from there boarded the 
Furnessia to New York.  He reported in his diary that the ship arrived in New York on 22 
July.  He was greeted on the pier by David Graham of New York, the Grand Master of the 
Supreme Grand Lodge of the United States, and other representatives.  Graham was a leader 
during the New York City Orange Riot in 1871.
82
  The next day, Johnston visited meetings 
of the State Grand Lodge of New York and the Grand Black Chapter of the United States.  
He was later able to attend a session of the Supreme Grand Lodge of the United States, also 
held in New York City.
83
  A mass meeting was held in the Lyric Hall to welcome Johnston 
along with the other Council delegates.
84
 
The Triennial Council began on 26 July in the auditorium of the Grand Opera House.  
While there were many Orange members from the United States and Canada, Johnston was 
the only delegate from Ireland or Great Britain, indicating that the Triennial Council was 
perhaps more important to Johnston personally than it was to the Grand Orange Lodge of 
Ireland as a whole.  He wrote in his diary, “We had a grand attendance from Canada and the 
states.  I was the only representative from HOME.”  Along with Johnston, the Grand Orange 
Lodge of Ireland had contacted four Canadian brethren to represent their views at the 
Triennial Council.
85
  The unwillingness of Irish and British Orangemen to undertake the 
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transatlantic journey indicates that the Triennial Council did not have a significant impact on 
the conduct of the Orange lodges in the United Kingdom. 
The Triennial Council in 1900 dealt with practical issues, such as the implementation 
of a universal ritual of induction.  The council secretary reported, “The New York brethren 
gave the members and delegates a right royal reception, spending thousands of dollars on the 
same.  There were many and successful public meetings, receptions, and an enjoyable 
excursion to New York harbour, and a parade which included 3000 Orangemen with colours 
on.”
86
  The Orange celebration at New York Harbor took place on 27 July, ending the 
Triennial Council with Johnston giving a speech.
87
 
The next day, three or four thousand Orangemen paraded through New York City, 
their first Orange parade since 1871.  Extra police were detailed to line the parade route 
because of fears that trouble could break out.  An Irish-American group, the Sons of 
Limerick, had applied for a parade permit over the same route and was refused.  They 
threatened to march without a permit.
88
  A newspaper report described, “For two hours this 
afternoon Fifth Avenue, save for the tall buildings and splendid mansions, might have been 
taken for one of the principal streets of Belfast.”
89
  The parade passed with only a few 
incidents of shouting and waving of green flags from onlookers. 
A letter from James Magowan of New York reporting the events of the day appeared 
in the Belfast News-Letter.  He stated that the New York Orangemen refrained from parading 
on the twelfth in preparation of the parade of Triennial Council members.  Magowan wrote, 
“Of course, you have no idea how hard it is in New York to be loyal, as many people 
imagine we are against the U.S., but that is a silly idea of the opposite party.  We do not 
molest them, and they dare not lay a finger on us as a body, because we have the same 
freedom and privileges as they have on the 17
th
 of March.  We have a noble cause to fight 
for; they have none, although, I am sorry to say, they are away in the majority by a long 
lead.”
90
  Magowan said that city officials had protected their right to process and to wave 
orange flags and ribbons. 
Johnston noted in his diary, “A brilliant day.  At 2, carriages with delegates left the 
Ashland House for the Parade of Orangemen.  Black Knights, in full regalia, headed it.  
David Graham acted efficiently as Grand Marshall.  ‘Three Cheers for Johnston of 
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Ballykilbeg’ was constantly repeated.  All went off well.”
91
  These New York proceedings so 
impressed Johnston that he reported back to the Belfast Orangemen that he believed, 




For the rest of his time in New York, Johnston visited old friends, toured the 
Museum of Art, and saw Central Park.  He left for Philadelphia in the company of Orange 
brethren on 2 August.  The American Orangemen escorted Johnston from place to place, and 
showed him the sights of each city.  Johnston wrote in his diary entry for the next day, “Very 
fine.  Brother Abernethy took me to see the old house where Betsy Ross made the first 
American flag for Washington.  I laid my hands on Franklin’s tomb; and stood beside the 
place where Penn, in 1682, signed treaty with Indians.”  He also saw Independence Hall and 
other Philadelphia sights. 
On the afternoon of 4 August, he attended an “enthusiastic Orange demonstration” at 
Washington Park, where, he noted, “hundreds of old friends shook hands.  The welcome was 
touching.”
93
  The Philadelphia Inquirer reported between two and three thousand 
Orangemen present at the demonstration.  The article described Johnston as “the hero of the 
crowd, which pressed upon him and almost fought for a chance to grasp his hand.  Many of 
those in the audience had voted for him when he first went to Parliament in 1868, after 
having been imprisoned for parading on Orangemen’s Day, July 12.”
94
 
Johnston believed that the American Orangemen were united by the principles 
fought for at the Battle of the Boyne, just as America and Great Britain were now united by 
Anglo-Saxon principles.  “I came here profoundly impressed that God had given the control 
of the destinies of the world to the Anglo-Saxon race,” he told the crowd. 
In Great Britain, under God, we think we can take care of ourselves and guess you 
Americans think the same of yourselves.  But I am earnestly glad to see the good 
understanding between these two nations and I hope it may continue to the judgment 
day.  You know when European potentates wanted to intervene between your 
government and Spain during the war our statesmen told them Great Britain would 
not permit any such interference.  And we watched your armies in Cuba and in the 
Philippines and have felt you were fighting for the emancipation of mankind.  I 
believe upon the American armies has rested the blessing of Almighty God.
95
 
For Johnston, the Anglo-Saxon race had united together against the European Catholic 
powers to bring Protestant freedom to the world through imperialism.  This Anglo-American 
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alliance, exemplified by the unity of the Orange Order across the Atlantic, stood in sharp 
contrast to the other transatlantic Irish connection between nationalists. 
 Johnston was also given a banquet on the night of 6 August.  He was excited to note 
that almost 130 were in attendance.
96
  However, the triumphant tone of his visit took a 
radical shift when he received a letter on 8 August announcing the death of his wife, 
Georgiana.  He wrote in his diary, “I deeply regret not being at home.  Arranged with W. 
Abernethy to leave at 11 am tomorrow for New York.”
97
  All of his other plans were 
canceled and with the help of Orange brothers Abernethy and Graham, Johnston made 
arrangements to travel to Belfast as quickly as possible.  He left New York on 14 August, 
and arrived back in Belfast eleven days later.
98
 
 Johnston’s message of Anglo-American unity and the spread of Protestant freedom 
through imperialism chimed well with the mood of the nation.  Following the Spanish-
American War, jingoistic nationalism swept the United States.  At the turn of the century, 
Americans embraced a “positive” Anglo-Saxonism, believing that the superior Anglo-Saxon 
race could uplift inferior races in conquered territories.  Though racism did not decline, there 
was a decline in fears that immigration would threaten the nation.
99
  The energetic anti-
Catholicism which characterized the early 1890s had faded away.  The American Protective 
Association, an organization with strong Orange connections which had briefly flourished 
from 1893 to 1894, now denied its Orange associations.
100
  This left the American Orange 
Order in a state of transition.  Johnston’s message helped point the way to a path upon which 
they might find greater success in the United States, at least temporarily.  However, the 
American Orange Order also continued to promote anti-Catholicism and ties to Ireland as 
they struggled to find a place in American society. 
 
Ulster Protestant Deputation to America, December 1919-February 1920 
 On 24 November 1919, a seven-member deputation sponsored by the Ulster 
Unionist Council (UUC) left from Liverpool for a three-month tour of the United States.
101
  
As representatives of Irish Protestant churches, the delegates aimed to defend their own pro-
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Union stance.  They intended to refute “the gross charges” made against the British 
government as part of the long-running propaganda efforts of Irish-American nationalists 
and, more recently, Éamon de Valera and his fellow Sinn Féiners.  In a pamphlet written 
after their return, the delegates outlined the objectives of their trip.  They hoped to counter 
the “misrepresentation and falsehood” of nationalist reports on the Irish situation; lay before 
the American people the privileges and liberties that Ireland had gained from the Union; 
emphasize the historic ties between the north of Ireland and America along with Anglo-
Saxon characteristics that helped “bind the American and British races in mutual hope;” and 
entreat Americans to refrain from interfering in the Irish question.
102
 
 William Coote, MP for South Tyrone, led the deputation.  An Orangeman and 
Presbyterian, Coote worked as a businessman in the provisions, stock, and woolen yarn 
trades in Tyrone.  He held his parliamentary seat from 1916 to 1922.
103
  Accompanying him 
were six ministers from different Protestant churches.  Alexander Wylie Blue was a Scottish 
Presbyterian, born in Argyll and educated at Glasgow University and the United Presbyterian 
Theological College in Edinburgh.
104
  After years preaching in Glasgow and Sunderland, he 
was invited to be the new minister at Belfast’s May Street Presbyterian Church.  His first 
sermon there was on 26 May 1916 in the midst of uproar following the Easter Rising.  He 
quickly integrated himself into the Belfast Protestant community, genuinely believing in the 
strength of “Ulster’s cause.”
105
  Like Blue, fellow Presbyterian delegate William Corkey was 
known as a great platform speaker on the subject of Ulster unionism.  As the minister at 
Belfast’s Townsend Street Presbyterian Church, Corkey had already written pamphlets on 
education and the influence of the Catholic Church.  He would subsequently gain 
prominence by lobbying for greater Protestant influence on the Northern Irish constitution 
and educational system.  In later writings he used his participation in the deputation to prove 
the strength of his loyalty to Ulster.
106
 
 Three Methodists were selected as part of the delegation due to the strength of 
Methodism in the United States.  Frederick E. Harte grew up as the son of a Methodist 
itinerant minister in the south of Ireland.  In 1892 he was accepted as a candidate for the 
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ministry at Belfast’s Methodist College.  Working at the Donegall Square Methodist Church 
in Belfast since June 1917, he had long wished to visit America.  He later wrote that he never 
would have imagined the way in which this dream was fulfilled, going to the United States 
“to tell the truth about Ireland.”
107
  Edward Hazelton, also the son of a Methodist minister, 
was born in Arklow in 1852.  At the time of the deputation he was a supernumerary minister 
at Belfast’s Falls Road Methodist Church in the Agnes Street Circuit.  C. Wesley Maguire, 
the secretary of the delegation, was born in Lurgan in 1890, educated at Belfast’s Methodist 
College, and was then serving as minister at the Donegall Square Church.  In 1921 he 
resigned from the Methodist Church to join the Church of Ireland ministry.  The final 
member of the deputation was Louis Crooks.  He had been educated at Belfast’s Methodist 
College, Queen’s College Cork, and Trinity College Dublin, and was then rector at 
Knockbreda Episcopal Church.  He was also Grand Chaplain of the Grand Orange Lodge of 
Ireland and Imperial Grand Chaplain of the Grand Orange Council of the World.
108
 
 At the time of the deputation’s visit to the United States, David Lloyd George’s 
government had set up a committee on Ireland.  Led by former Ulster unionist leader Walter 
Long, the committee recommended the creation of two separate Home Rule governments, 
one each in northern and southern Ireland.  The committee’s recommendations were 
incorporated into the Government of Ireland Bill, introduced on 22 December 1919.
109
  
Discussions on the bill in Parliament were ongoing throughout the time of the deputation’s 
visit.
110
  Unlike the two previous cases discussed in this chapter, the delegates in 1919 had to 
deal with the fact that Home Rule had already been conceded.  The primary target of the 
unionist delegates in this case was not the Home Rule party, but more extreme Irish 
republicans.  The early stages of the Anglo-Irish War had already commenced, and Ireland 
was on the cusp of independence.  This context contributed to feelings of frustration and 
desperation amongst the delegates. 
In the United States, the deputation came up against the presence of Éamon de 
Valera, president of Dáil Éireann.  De Valera had traveled in secret to America in June 1919, 
intending to conduct a brief tour of the country in pursuance of two goals: the establishment 
of an American loan for the new Irish republican government through a “bond-certificate” 
program, and official recognition of the Irish republic which would be vital in the 
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  He made his first public appearance with a press conference 
at New York’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel on 23 June.  Through publicity and propaganda he 
continued to garner attention for the cause of the Irish republic for the entire eighteen months 
of his trip.
112
  De Valera faced divisions within Irish-American nationalism and engaged in a 
power struggle over who would ultimately direct the nationalist movement in the United 
States.  At the same time, he was confronted with the presence of the Ulster Protestant 
deputation, which arrived in America in early December. 
 Upon landing in New York, the delegates issued a press statement asserting that they 
were not on a financial or political campaign, and that their purpose was nonsectarian, raising 
“no religious issue.”  Rather, they were there to counter the “radical and destructive” Sinn 
Féin agenda, which used Bolshevik methods: “We resent their untruthful propaganda; we are 
here to help your citizens, who know the falsity of the Sinn Féin appeal, to inform the 
American public on the real situation.”
113
  The deputation had arrived at the height of the 
post-war red scare in the United States.  They highlighted fears of Bolshevik propaganda, 
radicals, and anarchists in their speeches against Irish nationalism.
114
 
Now that they were in the United States, however, the deputation floundered because 
of organizational failures.  Harte later lamented, “Looking back on this mission, after many 
years, I see what a mistake it was to send us out to this vast country without having our 
itinerary previously arranged.”
115
  They were stuck in New York for weeks because they had 
not scheduled meetings in advance.  Meanwhile, they remained in the public eye because of 
clashes with de Valera through the press. 
 When he heard of their arrival, de Valera challenged the delegates to a debate on 
Irish freedom.  The London Times reported de Valera’s delight at the delegates’ arrival, “for 
it is hardly possible in the present state of the Irish problem that this mission to ‘protest 
against a pernicious propaganda’ can have much effect.  The Ulstermen have come ‘in the 
interests of law and order, truth, honesty, and fair play.’  Mr. de Valera replies that he stands 
for the same principles.”
116
  Coote refused to debate with de Valera, stating that he “could 
see no benefit to the case by indulging in an argument with him.”
117
  The delegates also 
rejected de Valera’s invitation to join him in setting up an American commission of 
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investigation to examine the two sides of Irish opinion.  He advocated a five-person panel 
with two members selected by each side and a chairman agreed by all.
118
 
 Though they refused to directly engage with de Valera, the delegates still believed 
that their very presence in America was creating positive headway against Sinn Féin 
influence.  Harte was amazed by the reception he received at his first speaking engagement 
on 7 December at St. Paul’s Church: “To my astonishment it was followed by a round of 
clapping led by the minister.  We had a great reception when the service ended.  Irish folk 
came up in the dozens to shake hands and wish us well.”
119
  Other delegates found the 
American public eager to hear the Ulster side of the Irish situation.  They began to learn how 
to shape their message to appeal to an American audience.  Blue wrote that the most 
important thing in relating to an American audience was to satisfy their somewhat naïve 
desire for “the facts.”
120
 
Despite their efforts, the delegates’ reception was not entirely positive.  They 
received threatening letters and a bomb threat in New York.
121
  They also had to deal with 
hostile elements in audiences at their meetings.  The delegates often refused to engage with 
dissenters.  Harte recalled that at the end of one of his speeches, the chairman spurned an 
Irish Catholic audience member by stating, “This is not a debating society.  You have stated 
your side for years, and this is the first time we have ever heard the other side.”
122
  The 
delegates believed they deserved the chance to tell their side of the story after years of 
nationalist domination in America.  They could not prevent Sinn Féiners from attending their 
meetings, however, leading to probably the most notorious event of their American trip. 
 Harte was scheduled to preach on the last Sunday of the year, 29 December, at Grace 
Methodist Episcopal Church.  Due to a confrontation with Catholics at an earlier service, he 
asked Coote to attend with him.  At the church they found a large crowd and about a dozen 
policemen.  Harte reported that he was determined to preach “the plain gospel on the last 
Sunday of the old year,” and he was able to speak without any disturbances.  Then Coote 
started to talk on “the truth about Ireland.”  Harte recalled, “The M.P. had scarcely opened 
his lips when… shouting and free fights with the [police] seemed to break out everywhere.  
At one time there was a scene of indescribable confusion and disorder.”
123
  The Sinn Féiners 
in the audience shouted, “Down with England,” “Hurrah for de Valera,” and “To Hell with 
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lying ministers!”  After a struggle with the police, they were ejected and Coote was able to 
continue with his speech.  “This is the very thing we have tried to stop in Ireland,” he said.  
“That is the beast that is trying to ruin our civilization and yours.”  As the congregation 
began to exit the church, they were “hooted” by about fifty Sinn Féiners standing outside, 
which led to further disturbances that took the police half an hour to quell.
124
  De Valera 
responded the next day by condemning the disrupters as unrepresentative of Sinn Féin while 
simultaneously minimizing the impact of the Ulster delegates.  He stated, “We stand for 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press everywhere.  We welcome the advent of these 
men from the north-east corner of Ulster.”
125
 
 By the end of 1919, the Ulster Protestant deputation still had not left the New York 
City region.  Harte reported that he and his companions were anxious to spread their message 
to a wider audience.  He wrote, “This settling down in one place for so long a time jarred 
upon us.”
126
  On 3 January the deputation finally left New York for Philadelphia.  They were 
welcomed, as Harte described, by “thousands of people at the railway depot who raised 
cheers when they saw us.”
127
  The deputation spoke at a wide variety of meetings in 
Philadelphia, including the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Scotch-Irish Society.  Their 
time in Philadelphia was capped by a meeting at the Opera House, organized by the Patriotic 
League and local Orange lodges.
128
  Harte reported, “When we all marched in the band 
struck up ‘The Protestant Boys,’ and there was a scene of indescribable enthusiasm.”  The 
delegates’ speeches were designed to appeal to an American audience and counter Sinn Féin 
propaganda.  Hazelton spoke on “Why I Cannot be a Republican,” Crooks on “Is Ireland a 
Nation?” and Harte discussed, “Is Ireland an Oppressed Country?”
129
  Though they were not 
specifically there to raise funds, the meeting was such a success that almost $4,300 was 
collected for the Ulster mission.
130
 
 Next the deputation made a day-long visit to Washington, DC where they met with 
Vice President Thomas Marshall.  The delegates reported that he responded to them privately 
by saying, “So far as I am concerned there is no Irish Republic!”
131
  His remarks had added 
weight because Marshall was one of the few voices of authority from the Executive branch 
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after President Wilson suffered a stroke the previous October.  Some members of the 
deputation later returned to Washington for a mass meeting at the New York Avenue 
Presbyterian Church.  The meeting was so popular that an overflow session was held in the 
hall below.  The deputation also went to Pittsburgh, where they addressed a meeting at the 
Syria Mosque with a similar program to their Philadelphia meeting, and collected $2,300.
132
 
 After Pittsburgh, the delegation divided so as to cover as much of the country as 
possible, as well as make stops in Canada.  Harte, Hazelton, and Blue went on to Columbus 
and Dayton, Ohio.  The full deputation met again in Chicago on 17 January as guests of the 
Moody Bible Institute.  They held a mass meeting at the Medinah Temple on 19 January 
where they were forced to hold two overflow meetings.
133
  After Chicago, the deputation 
once again divided, with Harte and Coote initially visiting Kansas City, where Harte was 
taken ill.  Coote went on to Colorado, California, and Vancouver, while Harte eventually 
traveled to St. Paul, Minnesota.
134
  Delegates also addressed meetings in Boston, where they 
had the support of the Loyal Coalition, a group formed in response to the Ulster mission.  
The Loyal Coalition’s aim was to preserve the links between the United States and United 
Kingdom which were under threat because of the prominence of the Irish question.
135
 
 At the beginning of February, the whole deputation met in St. Paul and traveled to 
Toronto.  Harte reported that arriving in Toronto was almost like coming home, as within the 
Empire they no longer felt like foreigners.  They were given a civic reception and held a 
mass meeting at Massey Hall, “where there was very great enthusiasm, especially since there 
were so many Ulster people in Toronto.”
136
  The mass meetings held in Toronto were marked 
by intense displays of sympathy for the Ulster unionists.
137
  Afterwards, they addressed 
meetings in Ottawa and Montreal before going back to New York.  Their final mass meeting 
was at the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church.  The next day they had their farewell dinner at 
the Society for British and American Friendship. 
 Though the delegates claimed to espouse nonsectarian views, religion played a large 
role in both their speeches and the pamphlet which they published for their American 
audience, entitled “Facts about Ireland.”
138
  A focus on the Protestant community was 
                                                 
132
 Harte, Road I Have Travelled, 135-136. 
133
 Chicago Tribune 17, 18, 20 Jan 1920. 
134
 Harte, Road I Have Travelled, 139. 
135
 “America and the Irish Question.” 
136
 Harte, Road I Have Travelled, 141. 
137
 Times 16 Feb 1920.  Also described in the Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Imperial Grand 




 of July, 1920, Papers of the 
Wallace Family, Downpatrick D1889/6/5C, PRONI. 
138
 “Facts about Ireland for the Consideration of American Citizens by the Delegates of the Protestant 
Churches of Ireland” (Philadelphia: Protestant Federation, 1920). 
149 
perhaps inevitable given the composition of the delegation.  As well as addressing mass 
meetings for the public, the ministers preached in Protestant churches every Sunday, 
sometimes several services each.
139
  The delegates believed that the thing Ireland needed 
most, in the words of Harte, was “the gospel of the Lord.”
140
  With Christian teaching, 
dissension and strife in Ireland could be remedied.  These calls for increased gospel teaching 
contrasted with newspaper reports of appeals made from Catholic pulpits to give support to 
de Valera’s Irish bond drive.
141
  The Ulster delegates targeted the Irish Catholic hierarchy as 
a cause of Ireland’s problems.  They described in the “Facts about Ireland” pamphlet: 
“Acting sometimes in accordance with the will of the state and at other times opposing that 
will, the Hierarchy evidences its consistent claim to be the dominating factor in civil as well 
as religious affairs in Ireland.”
142
  The Irish priesthood was accused of impeding trade and 
industry in the south through advocating boycotting.  They were accused of opposing civil 
rather than religious control of education.  Archbishop of Dublin William Walsh and other 




 At the same time, the delegates asserted that most Catholic Irish did not want a 
republic.
144
  Sinn Féin misrepresented the wishes and condition of the Irish public by 
claiming that Ireland was oppressed by the British.  The delegates maintained in their 
speeches and through “Facts about Ireland” that the nation was in actuality overrepresented 
in Parliament, was not overtaxed as de Valera had claimed, and had a generous land 
arrangement.
145
  Ireland had its own local self-government, and received substantial grants 
from the British Parliament for education and agricultural development.
146
  Sinn Féin did not 
need American money to help Ireland, only to help themselves.  De Valera himself, who 
claimed to be the president of the Irish republic, preferred to be “put up at the Waldorf-
Astoria on American money now” than go to Ireland to aid his countrymen.
147
  In the eyes of 
the delegates, Sinn Féin was content to fill their coffers with American dollars rather than 
fight for freedom in Ireland. 
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 Sinn Féin’s greed and deception were contrasted with the Ulstermen, who did not 
ask for American money though they were willing to accept funds donated at their meetings.  
The delegates called upon Ulster’s history of defending liberty throughout the world, not 
only in the Great War but also as part of Washington’s army in the American Revolution.  
Coote reminded a Chicago audience that the Catholic Irish did not start arriving in large 
numbers until they were driven to America by the Famine.  “Ulster has sent more men to… 
defend the liberties of the world than all the rest of Ireland together.”
148
 
Anglo-American friendship, which had been aided by the historic connections 
between Ulster and the United States, was under attack by Sinn Féin.  The delegates asserted 
that de Valera was attempting “to sow discord between Great Britain and the United States.”  
Harte worried that “Ireland may yet be the great obstacle between English-speaking 
peoples.”
149
  The delegates hoped that their efforts to present the truth about Ireland to the 
American people would allow the Anglo-American alliance to prosper.  They urged the 
United States government to refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of a friendly 
power.  They also appealed to the American public, now presented with the facts about Sinn 
Féin, to halt their monetary support of Irish republicanism.
150
 
 After traveling back to Liverpool on the Lapland, the deputation was welcomed in 
Belfast with a celebration in the Donegall Square Methodist Church.  They were also given a 
“splendid reception” by the UUC on 9 March in the Wellington Hall, attended by Edward 
Carson and James Craig.
151
  The delegates claimed to have reached a wide swathe of the 
American public, presenting “a story much of which America did not know, and which it 
was good that she should hear.  She, too, knows what national integrity means, and she can 
understand why the oneness of these our British lands should be and must be forever 
maintained.”  Drawing on their own Civil War experiences, Americans were able to 
appreciate the unionist cause at the same time as they were growing tired of the Irish 
nationalists’ “perpetual disloyal and disruptive scheme.”
152
  However, the effectiveness of 
the deputation was under debate.  The London Times condemned the deputation for 
prolonging the settlement process for Ireland.
153
  Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery, a 
prominent Liberal Unionist landlord, after consulting with his correspondents, revealed a 
mixed view of the deputation’s work. 
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 Montgomery’s correspondent John E. Gunn, Catholic Archbishop of Natchez and 
Montgomery’s former tenant, reported that the deputation was doing more harm than good 
by emphasizing the sectarian nature of the Irish question.  Gunn accused them of avoiding 
“public debate, [speaking] only behind closed doors and… [flooding] the country with 
propaganda matter, mostly published in Belfast.  You can imagine how this irritated the 
American public.”
154
  Gunn sent Montgomery a clipping from a Chicago newspaper, Brann’s 
Iconoclast, blasting the Ulster delegates as “Irish traitors” after their meeting at the Medinah 
Temple.  “They came to this country on a mission of hatred for the British government,” the 
newspaper stated, “and mean to invade all the principal cities of America.”
155
 
Montgomery wrote to another correspondent that he worried about “the growing 
strength of the Sinn Féin view of matters there.”
156
  Nevertheless, he took heart from Gunn’s 
reports because he believed they showed that Sinn Féin saw the Ulster delegates as a serious 
threat.  Montgomery hoped that further delegations might be arranged.  UUC secretary 
Richard Dawson Bates wrote to Montgomery that he believed that “undoubtedly our last 
Deputation did an enormous amount of good.”  However, he also outlined some of the 
pitfalls of sending delegates to America.  Many people in Belfast would rather have their 
money spent on “home purposes.”  Many believed that the question of promoting harmony 
between America and Great Britain should be a focus of the British government rather than 
the responsibility of Ulster unionists.
157
  Montgomery, still optimistic about making a 
favorable impression on the American public, replied, “If Coote’s deputation did much good, 
it appears to show that a further deputation of the same sort should go, consisting, if possible, 




 Coote reported to the Orange Triennial Council that their delegation had discovered 
that the British government had nothing to fear from the American people.  He alleged that 
“they were sick of the Irish question.”  The opinion of the United States therefore should not 
be used to influence an Irish settlement.  Coote hoped “that the United States and Great 
Britain would be bound together as one, and that both would hand down to future 
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generations the same principles of civil and religious liberty for which they stood in the 
Orange Institution.”
159
  Coote’s claims revealed inconsistencies in the Ulster unionist 
approach to America.  If the United States was indeed sick of the Irish question, the 
delegates would not feel the need to continue to appeal for American support. 
Instead, the delegates aimed to maintain relationships with contacts they made on 
their trip.  They sent out an annual letter to friends in the United States and Canada.  Their 
letter of 1922 called upon North Americans to remember their historic ties to Ulster.  The 
letter urged them to speak out on Ulster’s behalf “so that British politicians shall hear” as 
they formulated further Irish policy and determined a settlement with the new Irish Free 
State.
160
  Additionally, September 1922 found Coote back in the United States, speaking 
against Sinn Féin atrocities in Ireland.  Coote accused Sinn Féin of murdering and plundering 
thousands of Protestants in the south of Ireland.  He implored audiences to donate funds for 
the relief of Protestant refugees.
161
 
Coote’s second visit to the United States showed the depth of his anti-Catholic 
animosity.  In a meeting at Chicago’s Western Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church, Coote 
stated, “The whole question of this strife in Ireland is religious.  I’m an Orangeman and 
proud of it.  And the only trouble is that Catholics are fighting against Protestant England.”
162
  
A near-riot was sparked in response to his speech, with Sinn Féiners thrown out by ushers 
and bricks hurtling through the windows of the church.
163
  A Chicago Tribune editorial 
defended Coote’s right to free speech but criticized his methods.  “He does what Americans 
generally believe is useless and mischievous.  He attacks a religion.”
164
  Coote’s blatant 
framing of the Irish question in religious terms during his second visit reflected some of the 
problems that the original deputation had during their visit to the United States.  Despite their 
nonsectarian claims, the composition of the delegation and their methods showed that their 
approach to the Irish question was transparently anti-Catholic in a way which many 
Americans found unappealing. 
 
Conclusion 
 The trips to the United States made by Kane, Smith, Johnston, and the Coote 
deputation are a central element to consider in the Ulster unionist relationship with America.  
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These visits acted as an important counterpart to the frequent Irish nationalist tours overseas.  
They were part of the unionists’ efforts to foster the development of their own transatlantic 
community.  Indeed, all three case studies reveal that Anglo-American friendship and 
Protestant unity were cultivated by the unionists.  Kane and Smith recognized the ties of 
political, social, and moral values which drew Great Britain and the United States together as 
“guardians of constitutional liberty, political reform, and Scriptural truth.”
165
  They appealed 
to the American public to protect “Protestant truth and liberty” in Ireland, which would be 
under attack with the passage of Home Rule.  As the Anglo-American relationship evolved at 
the turn of the century, Johnston also drew upon Anglo-Saxonist ideals in his appeal to 
American Orangemen.  He urged the English-speaking powers to unite against European 
potentates to spread Protestant freedom throughout the world in the age of imperialism.  
Finally, the Coote deputation, emphasizing the need for the spread of gospel truth in Ireland 
against the harmful authority of the Catholic hierarchy, urged Americans to preserve Anglo-
American friendship by opposing the influence of Sinn Féin. 
 Kane, Smith, and the Coote delegation all went to the United States with the express 
purpose of countering the long-running propaganda of Irish and Irish-American nationalists.  
Kane’s determination to “refute slanders” of the Parnellites was mirrored by the Coote 
delegation’s desire to spread “the truth about Ireland” against Sinn Féin falsifications.  The 
context of the two trips, however, was different.  Traveling just after the defeat of the first 
Home Rule Bill, Kane and Smith focused their attention on appealing to Orangemen and 
Fenians alike through anti-Parnellism.  They accused Parnellites of inconsistencies in their 
message, at times espousing extremist separatism while at others adhering to constitutional 
Home Rule.  Kane and Smith also charged Parnellites with advocating crime and outrage, an 
accusation that later would be echoed during the Parnell Commission trial.  As Home Rule 
had already been defeated, Kane and Smith had a more distant dialogue with their nationalist 
opponents than the Coote delegation. 
Coote and the six clergymen who accompanied him came into direct confrontation 
with Sinn Féin in general and de Valera in particular, as he was in America at the time.  The 
Ulster delegation floundered through lack of organization which left them stuck in New York 
City for over a month.  Their greatest blunder, however, may have been not taking advantage 
of de Valera’s offers to open up debate between the two sides.  Engaging in debate with de 
Valera would have gained them greater publicity throughout the country.  Instead, they gave 
the impression they were intimidated by the Sinn Féiners.  Like the Coote delegation, Kane 
and Smith approached their trip to the United States with marked hesitation to confront the 
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nationalist presence.  They relied on emphasizing imperial connections while in Canada, and 
viewed the United States with trepidation because it was out of the bounds of Empire.  They 
appealed to ancestral connections with Ulstermen in Canada, but did not take full advantage 
of similar connections in the United States. 
In contrast, Johnston was very much concerned with the international ties of 
Ulstermen through the worldwide Orange organization.  He was particularly anxious about 
the challenges that Orangeism faced as it was transplanted to the United States, because so 
much of Orangeism revolved around the British monarchy and Empire.  Not only did 
Orangemen have to adapt the movement to America’s republican system, but they also faced 
criticism within the United States because they were perceived as being loyal to Britain.  
This may have been one of the problems inherent with American support of Ulster unionism 
overall – reconciling its implied links with Britain as a world power with life in the United 
States, as opposed to support for Ireland in its small-nation quest for self-determination.  The 
strength of Johnston’s personal popularity in the United States nevertheless showed that 
transplanted Ulstermen did retain connections and celebrate the values of their homeland. 
In all three of the case studies in this chapter, unionists were able to claim success by 
attracting sizable crowds and publicity for an Ulster Protestant message.  Each, however, was 
constrained in various ways: Kane and Smith by their hesitation to leave the familiarity of 
the British Empire and face Fenian opposition in the United States, Johnston because of his 
limitation to the Orange organization, and the Coote delegation through organizational 
blunders and unwillingness to rise to challenges from their opponents.  If these unionists 
were aware that there were, as the Belfast News-Letter described, “two Irelands beyond the 
sea,” the question remains as to why the Irish unionists on these visits and on the whole 





VI. TRANSATLANTIC RELIGIOUS CONNECTIONS 
 
 In 1857 and 1858, Protestants in Ulster received reports of significant religious 
revival in the United States.  Eager to spark their own revival, the Irish Presbyterian General 
Assembly sent two representatives to America to report on the proceedings.  Their reports 
contributed to the beginnings of Ulster’s great revival of 1859, which brought American and 
British influences together with Ulster Scots evangelical religious culture.  American 
revivalists came to Ulster to lead services and prayer meetings, renewing the traditional 
religious links that had been maintained throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 In their Evangelical Protestantism, David Hempton and Myrtle Hill stress the impact 
of American connections on the Ulster Protestant community.  They write, “With close links 
established by successive waves of emigrants, the Ulster Scots community was particularly 
susceptible to the transmission of religious excitement generated by the American frontier 
experience.”
1
  At the same time the American religious establishment itself was influenced 
by Ulster religion.  From the colonial period onward, American religion received 
considerable contributions from Scotch-Irish immigrants as well as other Irish Protestants. 
 Ulster and America forged connections through centuries of shared religious 
experiences.  A transatlantic Presbyterian tradition was formed by the reciprocal flows of 
clergymen from Ulster to America on the one hand, and on the other, of revivalists and 
Princeton-educated ministers from America to Ulster.  Religious connections between Ulster 
and the United States increased throughout the nineteenth century with improvements in 
communications technology, greater ease of travel for revivalists and missionaries, and the 
formation of international religious organizations such as the Evangelical Alliance and Pan-
Presbyterian Alliance. 
 By the Home Rule period, religion and politics were intertwined as essential 
components of Ulster’s relationship with the United States.  This chapter aims to illustrate 
the ways in which evangelical religion was utilized to help build a transatlantic unionist 
community.  Scotch-Irish and Ulster Scots connections were born out of religious 
associations.  Ulster Protestants were inspired by the American Protestant religious example 
and critical of the roles of Catholics in American society.  Irish Protestant churches of a 
variety of denominations called upon their American counterparts to support anti-Home Rule 
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stances.  Shared religious heritage was a defining feature of the Ulster unionist view of 
America throughout the Home Rule era. 
 
Transatlantic Evangelicalism and the 1859 Ulster Revival 
 By the mid-nineteenth century, Ulster and America had developed transatlantic 
religious connections sustained by visits from evangelical missionaries, continuing 
emigration, and common impact of evangelicalism on religion, politics, and society.  In both 
places, evangelicalism drew upon societal changes and helped to shape political and social 
outcomes.  Evangelical groups played leading roles in the democratization of politics and 
culture, promoting ideas of volunteerism and individual freedom to act independently from 
traditional social hierarchical patterns.
2
  In Ireland, evangelicalism in general had the effect 
of narrowing the gaps between Presbyterians, Methodists, and the Church of Ireland, and 
widening those between Protestants and Catholics.
3
  For Presbyterians in particular, 
evangelical ideas of individualism helped certain factions to express progressive political 
ideas in the mid- and late-eighteenth century.  However, the Irish Presbyterian Church 
gradually became associated with conservative forces in Irish politics.
4
 
 Evangelical links between Ulster and America grew with the emergence of a revival 
movement in New York in 1857, which soon spread to New England, Texas, New Orleans, 
the Ohio River Valley, and Canada.
5
  Upon hearing news of revival in North America, the 
Presbyterian General Assembly decided to dispatch representatives to report on its 
development and conditions.  Under this direction, William Gibson, professor of Christian 
Ethics at the Assembly’s College, visited the United States with Reverend William McClure 
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  Gibson was elected moderator of the General Assembly in 1859.  In the following 
year, at the urging of a Boston publishing company, he wrote The Year of Grace: A History 
of the Ulster Revival of 1859.  His book related the experiences of the deputation in the 
United States and the impact of the American “awakening” on Ulster.  Gibson reported, 
In the spring and summer of 1858, the news of the American revival reached us, and 
for some time excited an interest among the people; and when our Assembly met in 
July of that year in Derry, and engaged in conference on the subject, and it was 
reported that God had also begun a gracious work in Connor, the intelligence was 
communicated to our people, and helped to rekindle in the hearts of God’s children a 
desire for a similar awakening.
7
 
Gibson directly linked the revival in Ulster with the events in America.  After his return, 
Gibson toured around the north of Ireland to report on his experiences.  Emigrant letters and 
pulpit readings of accounts of the American revival also had an impact.
8
 
 Signs of revival emerged in Connor under the direction of Reverend J.H. Moore.  
Prayer services and camp meetings were held throughout the north of Ireland.  James 
McConnell reported, 
Soon the whole district was resounding ‘with prayers and supplications, with strong 
crying and tears unto Him that was able to save.’  The movement spread gradually 
over the whole of Ulster, and even extended to Dublin and parts of the South.  The 
universal eagerness with regard to religion was intense, and the most extraordinary 
agitations of mind and body together were witnessed.
9
 
As McConnell noted, the 1859 revival in Ulster was known for the pathological phenomena 
displayed at services such as fainting, falling into trances, and seeing apparitions, which were 
generally associated with American frontier religion. 
 Gibson remarked that when he visited America, he was surprised by the revival’s 
“noiseless character and its entire freedom from those tumultuous agitations which have 
sometimes signalized the progress of kindred movements in that land.”
10
  He cited two 
Princeton professors, Dr. Archibald Alexander and Dr. Charles Hodge, of whom he said, 
“America can boast no greater master in Israel,” as supporting the view that physical 
manifestations were not necessary for a revival to be effective.
11
  He also quoted a letter sent 
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from the Episcopal Bishop of Ohio, Charles McIlvaine, to the Bishop of Down, Connor and 
Dromore, Robert Knox.  In the letter, McIlvaine recognized the physical phenomena of the 
Ulster revival as similar to those experienced by Scotch-Irish settlers in Kentucky at the turn 
of the century.  McIlvaine described the Scotch-Irish as “an intelligent, hardy, industrious, 
brave, and quiet set of people.” He explained that, 
the character of the people was precisely that from which you would least expect mere 
excitement.  They were the very ones to suspect and resist all attempts to produce 
excitement.  But among those Scotch-Irish strangely appeared precisely such cases of 




These traditional American frontier behaviors were looked down upon by “respectable” 
Belfast classes.
13
  Gibson went to some lengths to show that these manifestations were not 
necessary to experience religious revitalization.  However, he also attempted to legitimize 
such experiences through his references to McIlvaine’s letter and links to the Scotch-Irish 
tradition in America. 
 The excitement of the revival in Ulster triggered visits from the international 
evangelical revivalist community.  These visits were a continuation of a tradition of 
American revivalists touring the United Kingdom since the Second Great Awakening, such 
as Charles Grandison Finney, William Taylor, Absalom B. Earle, Edward Payson Hammond, 
and Maggie Van Colt.
14
  At the height of the Ulster revival in 1859, American Methodists 
Walter and Phoebe Palmer visited to conduct services out of the Donegall Square Methodist 
Church in Belfast.  Phoebe Palmer was known for drawing converts to the front of the crowd 
as an expression of commitment and evidence of conversion.
15
  The Palmers continued to 
hold services throughout Ireland, England, and Scotland through 1860.
16
  Other preachers 
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from North America, such as Michael Bosner, John Cooke, Theodore Cuyler, John Graves, 
and Edward Payson Hammond, also visited Ulster during the revival.
17
 
 The revival took place during a time of industrial and agricultural transition in 
Ulster.  Ulster Protestants responded to these changes as well as religious influences from 
America and Britain.
18
  In response to the revival, Wesleyan Methodists in Ireland had a one-
year membership increase of over 15 percent, and the Primitive Methodist membership rose 
almost 54 percent.
19
  These increases were short-lived as membership quickly dropped in the 
years after the excitement of 1859 dissipated.  The revival also had a significant impact on 
Presbyterians.  Gibson noted that the revival had made great inroads among Orangemen as 
well.
20
  The revival influenced the changing composition of the Orange Order, which was 
transitioning from a mainly rural, Anglican organization, to including increasingly urban, 
Presbyterian membership.  Church leaders who promoted Conservative politics as well as 
conservative religion, such as Reverend Dr. Hugh Hanna, emerged in Ulster after the great 
revival, leading to the development of a fundamentalist element similar to that emerging in 
the southern United States.
21
 
 The revival had the effect of increasing the religious connections between Ulster and 
America that had already been facilitated by shared evangelicalism.  Ministers from Ireland, 
such as John Edgar, made trips to America to report on the religious happenings in Ulster.  
Edgar was a member of the Secessionist church who had started the temperance movement 
in Ulster, founding the Ulster Temperance Society in 1829.
22
  He was the Professor of 
Theology at the Assembly’s College from 1852 to 1866.  Edgar’s visit to America was 
covered in Belfast newspapers, which reported a warm reception as he relayed news of the 
great revival.
23
  After the mid-nineteenth century, visits by evangelicals to America, Britain, 
and Ireland became increasingly scheduled and routine, which helped to eliminate the 
spontaneous physical phenomena that previously marked the American frontier experience 
and the Ulster revival.  The visits of Dwight L. Moody and Ira D. Sankey in the 1870s, 
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Revivalism, Princeton, and Pan-Presbyterianism 
 By the 1860s, attention turned to the Liberal objective of disestablishing the Church 
of Ireland.  The Irish Church Act was passed in 1869.  Many in the Anglo-Irish community 
believed this act was a breach of the Act of Union which had nominally brought together the 
Churches of Ireland and England.  Therefore, disestablishment was seen by some members 
of those churches as endangering the constitution and threatening the integrity of the 
empire.
25
  While antidisestablishmentarianism was prevalent amongst church members, the 
Church of Ireland did see some benefits from disestablishment such as greater lay 
participation in directing the church.  The church was now governed by a bicameral General 




 Primitive Methodists were also significantly affected by disestablishment.  The 
Primitive Methodists had maintained their distinction from the Wesleyan Methodists through 
their continued connection to the Church of Ireland, working as an evangelical group within 
the established church.  After disestablishment, they received an invitation from the 
Wesleyan Conference to reunite.  The two groups came together as the Methodist Church in 
Ireland in 1878.
27
  The Irish Church Act also withdrew the regium donum from the 
Presbyterian Church, and the Maynooth Grant.  In the Presbyterian General Assembly of 
1868, an intense, three-day debate resulted in a series of resolutions adopted against the 




Disestablishment brought new life into the unionist cause through pan-Protestantism.  
A significant source of division between Presbyterians and Anglicans was taken away, 
enabling the creation of a more united Irish Protestant identity.
29
  Evangelicalism had helped 
to diminish boundaries between different Protestant denominations in Ireland, and had also 
drawn Irish Protestants closer to those in Britain, including through attempts to convert Irish 
Catholics.
30
  Historians such as Linda Colley have drawn attention to the central place of the 
Protestant religion in the formation of national identity in Britain.  The importance of 
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Protestantism in identity formation certainly extended to Protestants in Ireland as well as 
helping to form national identities in America and Europe.
31
  Protestantism provided one of 
the most important bonds between Ulster unionists and Britain;
32
 it was also a vital 
component of the relationship between Ulster unionists and America. 
Protestants on both sides of the Atlantic continued to be affected by evangelical 
visits.  Dwight L. Moody emerged as the next great evangelical leader in the nineteenth 
century.  Born in Massachusetts, Moody started his evangelical career in antebellum Chicago 
where he met his partner, gospel singer Ira D. Sankey.  Moody and Sankey left Chicago for 
Britain in the spring of 1873, landing at Liverpool.  They had been invited by three friends, 
but by the time they arrived two of them had died.  No one else had an interest in them 
coming to Britain.  Starting off slow, their revival mission gained some success in the north 
of England, especially Newcastle.  As they became increasingly in demand they went to 
Edinburgh in November 1873, followed by a tour of Scotland.
33
 
 Moody and Sankey’s first Belfast meetings were held on 6 September 1874.  
Reverend Edgar J. Goodspeed, a Baptist minister from Chicago who traveled with the pair, 
reported crowded meetings in churches and Ulster Hall, with people coming long distances 
to experience the revival.  Their final Belfast meeting was held in the Botanic Gardens on 8 
October, and they made a stop in Londonderry before going on to Dublin.  Goodspeed 
quoted a Dublin Protestant as reporting, 
It was not found necessary to preach those sermons which are generally used as a 
preparation for revival.  The revival commenced immediately.  Dublin had been 
waiting to hear the Gospel preached; and its people, by crowds, when they heard it, 
eagerly pressed into the kingdom of Christ…. We have never before seen such sights 
in Dublin as we have seen this last week, night after night, in the Exhibition Palace.  It 




Goodspeed also noted that Moody was careful to stay away from any divisive reference to 
Catholicism, thus gaining favorable attention from Dublin’s Catholic community.
35
  At the 
meeting of the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance in 1884, Reverend Hamilton Magee of Dublin 
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hoped that the Catholic response toward Moody and Sankey indicated the possibility of 
conversion among Catholics in the south of Ireland.  He stated, 
The Irish are a religious people.  They hold some of the foundation truths of our 
common Christianity with a firm grasp.  Agnosticism and Infidelity have, so far, made 
comparatively little progress among them.  Their recent demeanor towards the mission 
of Mr. Moody and Mr. Sankey in the south of Ireland, and their attitude of mind 




Magee believed that Protestants must reach out to Catholics, not merely to pad conversion 
statistics, but to project Gospel truth into Roman Catholicism. 
 After traveling back to England to tour for another nine months, Moody and Sankey 
returned to the United States in the second half of 1875.  Goodspeed wrote that “great 
expectations had been raised by their success abroad, and eager multitudes awaited their 
coming.”
37
  Back in the United States, Moody and Sankey held services in Philadelphia, 
Princeton, and New York in 1875 and 1876 before traveling to the south and west.  Moody 
made several return trips to the United Kingdom, his last visit in 1892, maintaining the 
tradition of a transatlantic network of evangelical preachers.  Frederick Harte, newly arrived 
to begin as a student at Belfast’s Methodist College, attended the last night of Moody’s 
mission in 1892.  He described the gathering, held at the pavilion built for the Great Unionist 
Convention in the Botanic Gardens: 
There was an enormous gathering, and there came upon me a feeling of intense 
loneliness, since I did not know a single face in that vast multitude.  Moody was just 
like the photographs of him, which appeared in the papers.  He did not strike me as 
being a great preacher, but somehow he gripped the crowd and one felt that the power 
of God was with him.  The meeting I attended was the last of the series conducted by 
Moody.  So if I had not gone that night I should never have heard him at all.  I 
remember having a feeling of consternation when it was announced that the mission 
would be continued by a man called the Rev. John McNeill.  How could anyone hold 
the crowd after Moody?  But the new preacher did hold the crowd, and held forth night 
after night with tremendous eloquence and power.
38
 
Harte’s account illustrated how preachers from both sides of the Atlantic worked together to 
conduct revival missions.  The preacher who had continued Moody’s mission, McNeill, was 
an Ulster Scottish Presbyterian minister just beginning his career as a traveling evangelical 
preacher.  He later preached all over the world, including at the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian 
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 Ulster Protestants throughout the Home Rule period were interested in and affected 
by the work of American evangelical preachers.  The Witness reported on the activities of 
Moody and Sankey in the United States and abroad.
40
  The paper also monitored the 
emergence of new evangelical revivalists coming to prominence in America, such as 
Reverend Samuel Porter Jones who gained notoriety at the end of the nineteenth century.
41
  
American Congregationalist Reuben Torrey came to preach in Belfast in 1904.  Torrey’s 
work as the Dean of the Bible Institute in Los Angeles linked him to another Ulster 
evangelical, W.P. Nicholson.  Nicholson held successful revivals in Ulster, the United States, 
and throughout the English-speaking world after his appointment to the Bible Institute in 
1918.  Newspaper reports and minutes of church assemblies and synods record numerous 
visits between Ulster and America by a wide variety of ministers and delegates throughout 
this period. 
This transatlantic network was exemplified in the person of James McCosh, the 
president of Princeton.  McCosh had participated in both the great revival of 1859 in Ulster 
and in Moody and Sankey’s revival services in 1876 in America.  He spent much of his life 
attempting to forge greater connections between transatlantic Protestant groups.  McCosh 
was born in southern Ayrshire and educated at Glasgow and Edinburgh’s New College, 
where he was a student of Thomas Chalmers.  As a minister in Scotland, he was caught up in 
the anti-patronage campaign and ended up separating from the Church of Scotland to join the 
Free Church in 1843.  He wrote, “This disruption was a great event in the history of 
Scotland.  I certainly regard it as the greatest event in my life.”
42
 
In 1850, McCosh was called to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at Queen’s 
College, Belfast.  An article in the Princeton Theological Review of 1903 described 
McCosh’s contributions to Irish society while he was at Queen’s: 
We find him in the midst of this activity taking an active part in organizing the 
ministerial support fund for the Irish Presbyterian Church, advocating with cogent 
arguments for the disestablishment of the Irish Church, and taking a leading part in the 
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organization of the Evangelical Alliance, which held its first meeting in London…. He 
lived a threefold life of philosophical thinker, educator, and man of affairs.
43
 
McCosh was also dedicated to Irish primary and intermediate education reform.  A strong 
supporter of the Union during the American Civil War, he traveled to the United States for 
the first time in 1866 to visit major universities and theological seminaries.  William Sloane, 
his biographer, wrote that it was during this trip that McCosh had the idea for the Pan-
Presbyterian Alliance. 
During the extended tour he made through America in 1866, he had been much feted, 
and had made many influential acquaintances in all parts of the United States.  
Although it was ostensibly a holiday journey, yet he was ever revolving many 
important schemes in his mind, and among these was a plan for the alliance of 
Presbyterian churches throughout the world, concerning which he spoke and 
conversed much with the leading men of all the various Presbyterian denominations.
44
 
McCosh became friends with Dr. Samuel Irenaeus Prime, the long-time editor of the New 
York Observer, who suggested him to Princeton’s trustees as a potential president.  McCosh 
accepted the appointment as president in 1868.
45
 
 Princeton had long been a major point of connection between Ulster and America.  
The university had Presbyterian founders in 1746.  It was closely linked to the Princeton 
Theological Seminary, founded in 1816.  For generations, Irish ministerial students crossed 
the Atlantic, making Irish the most prominent nationality of international students studying at 
the Theological Seminary.
46
  Both Princeton University and Princeton Theological Seminary 
also maintained close intellectual ties to the Assembly’s College in Belfast, particularly 
through faculty members at each institution.  Robert Watts, for example, held the Chair of 
Theology at the Assembly’s College starting in 1866. He was born in County Down, studied 
at the Princeton Theological Seminary, worked at Philadelphia’s Westminster Church for ten 
years, and then became the minister at Gloucester Street Church in Dublin.
47
  He was 
moderator of the Irish Presbyterian General Assembly from 1879-1880, and also served as a 
delegate to the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance.  Watts was a staunch unionist, reflected in letters 
he wrote during the Home Rule crises.
48
  Watts hoped to shape the Assembly’s College after 
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the model of Princeton.  He encouraged the Assembly’s College to forge greater links with 
the American university rather than focus on Edinburgh’s New College.
49
 
 McCosh had urged Moody and Sankey to visit Princeton in 1875 after students 
showed signs of revival impulses.  Goodspeed reported that the students themselves 
“initiated a movement which has had its fruit in an almost unprecedented interest in spiritual 
things, heightened and spreading day by day, and yet on the increase.”
50
  McCosh described 
the revival by stating, “Every student, indeed every member of the college, felt awed and 
subdued.  It was estimated that upwards of one hundred were converted.”
51
  Around the same 
time, McCosh was laboring to create a Pan-Presbyterian Alliance, which would unite 
Presbyterians on a federal basis inspired by the United States government model.
52
 
 The formation of the Young Men’s Christian Association in 1844, the Evangelical 
Alliance in 1846, and the Lambeth Conference of Anglican Bishops in 1867 all influenced 
the creation of the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance.  The alliance was organized by an initial 
conference held in London in 1875, with McCosh as president and the Reverends Professor 
William Garden Blaikie of Edinburgh’s New College and George D. Mathews of New York 
as clerks of the body.  The first general council was held in 1877 in Edinburgh, and met 
every three or four years thereafter.  Reverend Robert S. Duff, a Presbyterian representative 
from Tasmania, described the main subjects dealt with by the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance as 
modern theological thought, Christian life and worship, roles of ruling elders, distinctive 
principles of Presbyterianism, religion in relation to philosophy and science, Sabbath 
schools, temperance, and most importantly, cooperation on foreign missions.
53
  The Pan-
Presbyterian Alliance was part of a trend toward transnational religious organization.  The 
last quarter of the nineteenth century also saw the creation of other international church 
bodies, notably the International Congregational Council and the World Methodist Council, 
both of which were founded in London in 1881. 
 Several future members of the Scotch-Irish Society of America (SISA) were part of 
the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance, including George Macloskie, John S. MacIntosh, and John 
Hall.  Indeed, it was likely during the third general council in Belfast in 1884 that the initial 
meeting in which McCosh suggested the formation of a Scotch-Irish society took place, as 
                                                 
49
 Ibid; David N. Livingstone, “Darwinism and Calvinism: The Belfast-Princeton Connection,” Isis 
83, No. 3 (Sep 1992), 412. 
50
 Goodspeed, Full History, 408. 
51
 Sloane, Life of James McCosh, 229; Livingstone and Wells, Ulster-American Religion, 12. 
52
 Sloane, Life of James McCosh, 250. 
53
 Robert S. Duff, Notes of a Visit to America During the Pan-Presbyterian Council, 1880 





  Macloskie had studied in Belfast under McCosh, and arrived in 
Princeton at McCosh’s invitation in 1875 to take the Chair of Natural History.  He was 
ordained in the Irish Presbyterian Church and had served in Ballygoney from 1861-1873.  
Macloskie maintained connections with Watts in Belfast, especially as they took part in the 
transatlantic debate over the role of evolution in the religious sphere.
55
  McCosh himself 
became known for reconciling evolution with Protestantism.
56
 
 John S. MacIntosh, who represented Ireland at the Philadelphia meeting of the Pan-
Presbyterian Alliance in 1880, was another future member of the SISA.  MacIntosh, who was 
born in America but grew up in Europe, was at the time the minister at May Street 
Presbyterian Church in Belfast.  In 1881, the Second Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia 
invited him to take over their ministry.  He resigned his post in Belfast on 5 April 1881.
57
  
MacIntosh later became one of the most prominent members of the Pennsylvania Scotch-
Irish Society, the only Scotch-Irish state society to survive the demise of the national society 
in 1901. 
 The Ulster that MacIntosh left in 1881 was a society in which Presbyterians and 
Catholics were still able to unite in their support of Liberal political issues such as that year’s 
Land Act.  Presbyterians were traditional supporters of such Liberal issues as tenant rights, 
franchise reform, and disestablishment.
58
  However, as the movement for Home Rule drew 
together Irish nationalism and Catholicism, religious cooperation became increasingly 
unlikely in the political sphere.
59
  James J. Shaw, a unionist pamphleteer, urged Irish 
Presbyterians not to be blindly attached to their traditional liberalism. 
You are not, nor am I, ashamed of the fact that our ancestors were United Irishmen.  
We do not fear to speak of ’98.... But, at the same time, we were taught that every 
object which our forefathers fought for had been attained.  Our forefathers took up 
arms against an Irish Parliament which represented only a small, and interested 
faction; against an Irish executive which was dominated by the narrow, prejudiced, 
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Though the Presbyterians had fought for civil and religious liberties with the United 
Irishmen, the Union granted them sufficient space to achieve their goals within Irish society.  
Now during this new battle over Union, marked by the introduction of the first Home Rule 
Bill in 1886, Irish society and politics were becoming more and more popularly sectarian. 
 
Identity, Anti-Catholicism, and Indebtedness 
Celebration of civil and religious liberty was at the heart of British and Irish 
Presbyterian use of the American religious example, which was utilized to help solidify a 
Presbyterian identity.  Presbyterians of the nineteenth century saw the seventeenth century as 
a model of religious purity and political principle, which linked with their celebrations of the 
foundations of American Presbyterianism.
61
  At the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance meeting of 
1884, Reverend Professor William Garden Blaikie of Edinburgh’s New College emphasized 
that the resistance of Scottish Presbyterians to attempts of the government to control the 
religious establishment led to the advancement of liberty in the British Empire and the 
United States.  He stated, 
I venture to say that but for their resistance to the Royal claims on Church and State, 
the civil liberties of the country, as well as the liberty of the Church would not have 
been established on the firm basis where they now stand.  I venture to say that Britain 
would not have been the country she is; I am sure that Ulster would not have been the 
province she is; I do not think the United States would have been so great in their 
independence and in their freedom; and I do not think that our Colonies would have 
been rising or advancing by strides so rapidly into Empires that bid far to rival one day 
the islands from which they sprang.
62
 
Blaikie linked Presbyterian identity with liberty, as exemplified by the traditions of the 
United States and British Empire. 
Reverend R.J. Lynd, of Belfast’s May Street Presbyterian Church and Moderator of 
the Irish Presbyterian General Assembly, drew on the history of American Presbyterianism 
to illuminate the international importance of Ulster’s Presbyterians in an 1888 speech to the 
Pan-Presbyterian Alliance. 
He [Lynd], as an Ulster Presbyterian, was there to assert that the first American 
Presbytery owed its very existence to an Ulster Presbyterian; and if Ireland could show 
nothing else but American Presbyterians as the fruit of its own Presbyterians, he 
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thought the Presbyterianism of Ireland need not be afraid to lift its face in the presence 
of the other Presbyterian Churches of the world.
63
 
As Lynd highlighted, Ulster Scots emigrants in America had dramatically impacted upon 
early religious organization.  Prominent ministers such as Francis Makemie and the Tennent 
family helped to establish Presbyterianism in the colonies.
64
  Presbyterianism was the most 




 John Hall, an Irish minister who had immigrated to America to serve at New York 
City’s Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church and prominent member of the SISA, also linked the 
Presbyterian tradition back to liberty.  He stated, 
Church history is to a great degree ignored in many places.  Yet we, as Presbyterians, 
have the deepest interest in making the history of the Church known, since it 
constitutes so powerful an argument for the substantial elementary principles of the 
Presbyterian system.  Some of our best American historians say that liberty in Great 
Britain owes its existence to the teachings of John Calvin.
66
 
The history of Scottish, Ulster, and American Presbyterians was linked to help forge a 
transatlantic Presbyterian identity based around the concepts of civil and religious liberty. 
 At the same time, transatlantic Protestants were also tied through attitudes toward 
Catholicism.  Anti-Catholicism was part of the evangelical movements on both sides of the 
Atlantic in the mid-nineteenth century.  According to John Wolfe, anti-Catholicism helped to 
define evangelical identity.
67
  Britain, Ireland, and the United States all saw significant 
agitation against Catholicism.  In Ireland, both Presbyterians and Anglicans evangelized to 
the Catholic community.  Protestant missionaries preached throughout the country, 
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distributed Bibles and tracts, and challenged Catholic clergy to religious debates.
68
  
Evangelical voluntary societies were particularly active in attempts to convert Irish 
Catholics.
69
  While evangelical campaigns ultimately failed in their goal of the mass 
conversion of Catholics, they did aid in the creation of greater evangelical identity among 




 In contrast to the zealous members of evangelical societies, the hierarchies of the 
Protestant churches were more cautious in their approach to converting Irish Catholics.  
Church leaders retained an awareness of their responsibility to refrain from religious or 
political conflict, but as the nineteenth century wore on churches were increasingly drawn 
into religious and political controversy.
71
  After Catholic Emancipation, there was particular 
concern over education policies, specifically seen in the hostility to the increased state grant 
for Maynooth College in 1845.  Greater links were being forged between evangelical religion 
and political conservatism.  Just as Daniel O’Connell and the Catholic Association helped to 
create a distinctly Catholic Irish nationalism, evangelicalism aided lower class Protestants in 




 In the United States, the Catholic Church grew due to the influx of Irish and German 
immigrants, causing resentment of nativist Americans and concerns over assimilation.  
Nativists and evangelicals saw the Catholic immigrants as threatening to American national 
identity.
73
  Catholicism was said to threaten the republican system of the United States, 
acting as a hostile force to civil liberties, religious toleration, and the separation of church 
and state.
74
  While there was relatively little overlap in the membership of evangelical 
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 By the time of the Home Rule period, Ulster Protestants showed concern with 
American Catholicism.  Some unionists portrayed the fight against Home Rule as part of an 
international battle against the influences of Catholicism.
76
  The Presbyterian Witness 
reported on “Roman Catholic Demands in America.”
77
  The Pan-Presbyterian Alliance had 
reports on “Romanism in the United States.”
78
  English historian James Anthony Froude, 
who had wide firsthand experience of Ireland, wrote a two-part series of articles on 
“Romanism and the Irish Race in the United States,” which appeared in the North American 
Review in 1879.  He praised America as a “land of wonders,” but feared the influence of Irish 
Catholics who had failed to assimilate into American society.  He portrayed Catholicism as a 
direct menace to the American republic because it did not support the idea of freedom of the 
individual. 
The growth of the Irish element has, for some time, disturbed the minds of the 
Americans.  They have absorbed a substance which they have been unable to 
assimilate, and it interferes with their digestion.  A religion, to which the Irish vote has 




Froude asserted that as Irish Catholics were able to influence politics in the United States, 
they had similar power in the United Kingdom.  If Home Rule was granted to Ireland, 
Catholics would take over the Dublin parliament, establish Catholicism as the state church, 
and destroy individual freedom.  Froude warned that on both sides of the Atlantic, “the 
principles of constitutional government have permitted the growth of a party at once 
religious and national, which is the natural enemy of religious and political liberty; which 
demands toleration, yet will concede no toleration; which aspires to undo the work of the 
Reformation, and turn back the tide of human things.”
80
  Therefore, according to Froude, 
Irish Catholicism was a threat to both the American and British governments, and citizens in 
both countries should fight against its influence. 
At the second general council of the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance held in 1880, 
Reverend Robert Knox of Belfast’s Linenhall Street Church also linked concerns with 
Catholics in America to Irish Catholicism.  Knox addressed the council on “The 
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Evangelization of Ireland.”  Knox had worked as a missionary in the south of Ireland in the 
1840s, and received a doctorate of divinity from New York’s Union College.  He stated,  
If you look at Ireland on a map, it is a mere speck in the great Atlantic; and yet that 
little island has wielded for ages, and continues to wield, a mighty influence on Britain 
and all the dependencies of Britain, and on this great continent of America.  Hence it 
becomes a matter of supreme importance to bring the Irish people under the power of 
the gospel, not only for their own sake, but for the sake of those countries whose 
character and destinies they influence.
81
 
Knox explained that William Gladstone’s policy of religious equality had given new life to 
the Catholic cause, exciting “the most extravagant hopes.  From a condition of sullen 
inactivity Rome has started up ‘as a giant refreshed with wine.’  The watchwords now are, 
‘Ireland for the Irish!’ – ‘Ireland for Rome;’ ‘Protestantism must be conquered or 
expelled.’”
82
  Knox saw the hierarchy of the Catholic Church as intensely ultramontane, so 
that every line – even in Irish politics – converged on Rome.  He was especially concerned 
over the issue of education, and the influence of Rome as Catholics tried to grasp civic and 
political power in Ireland. 
 Knox asserted that the only option for Presbyterians, as a group that had no quarrels 
with Irish Catholics in the past, was to attempt to convert the Catholics.  Because of the large 
influx of Catholic immigrants in Britain and the United States, these nations should also have 
a deep interest in this work.
83
  Protestants in Ireland, Britain, and the United States all had to 
fear the influence of Rome in their political and social lives, and therefore ought to be united 
in their efforts to combat Catholicism.  Knox went on to argue that it was not enough for 
each country to do this individually; Catholicism must be fought at its source in Ireland. 
Knox concluded that the American Presbyterians had special reason to aid the 
conversion of Catholics in Ireland: 
It was an Irish Presbyterian, from the centre of Donegal, who laid the foundation of the 
American church; and from the days of Francis McKemie [sic] till this hour, America 
has been thinning our ranks and draining our resources.  Thousands of what you call 
the Scotch-Irish are landed every year on your shores.  This process, so exhausting to 
us, has been going on for a century and a half.  Not a few of these have become your 
statesmen and your warriors, you orators, merchants, and ministers of religion.  Others 
have helped to clear your forests and build your great cities, and yourselves would be 
the first to acknowledge that, in many cases, they form the bone and sinew of your 
churches.  Thus you have become numerous and rich by making us poor.
84
 
The contributions of the Scotch-Irish to American history and development meant that the 
Ulster Presbyterians were now unashamed to put a claim upon them.  Knox implored, 
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For your own sakes, and in memory of all you owe Ulster, ‘come to the help of the 
Lord against the mighty.’  If we succeed, as by the help of heaven we expect we shall, 
the richest benefit will be yours, for then you would be receiving, year by year, an 
influx of free, enlightened, law-abiding Churchmen and women.
85
 
The Scotch-Irish essentially owed the Irish Presbyterians their aid in converting the Catholics 
because of the great success they had achieved in America at the expense of the Ulster 
population.  Interestingly, the arguments by Knox were made a full nine years before the 
SISA was founded with the very purpose of promoting the ideas of Scotch-Irish excellence 
within American society. 
 At the meeting of the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance in 1884, Dr. T.Y. Killen was 
concerned that efforts to convert Catholics in Ireland would not aid in increasing the 
Protestant population of the country.  He stated, 
It may be said that we cannot show much fruit of our Roman Catholic mission, and so 
far as Ireland was concerned, that was true, but what was the reason?  Because those 
who were converted to Protestantism were very often exposed to persecution on the 
part of their own countrymen, and were obliged to flee to America, and so the 
[American] brethren in that way got the benefit of the work done in Ireland.
86
 
Presbyterians viewed the American church as receiving the benefits of their missionary work 
amongst Irish Catholics.  New converts were said to have a high rate of emigration from 
Ireland, which benefited the United States rather than the Irish Protestants. 
Similar concerns over Protestant population draining were expressed at the Irish 
Presbyterian General Assembly in 1885.  Reverend William Park of Belfast’s Rosemary 
Street congregation asserted, 
For some years past the number of our families and communicants seemed to be 
growing less, partly from emigration, partly also, perhaps, from a more accurate 
scrutiny of communion and stipend rolls.  This year, rather strangely, there seems to be 
an advance…. Perhaps the tide of emigration has begun to ebb a little, for times are not 
so prosperous in America as they were some years ago.  There is no doubt that, if we 
would find a large number of those who have disappeared from our communion and 
stipend rolls, we would search for them in America.  In 1883 and 1884, the total 
membership of the Presbyterian Church in the Northern States was 687,000, and it had 
grown by almost 24,000 in one year.  A large proportion of the 24,000 were Irishmen.
87
 
Presbyterians in Ireland viewed the large numbers of emigrants leaving Ireland for America 
as advancing Protestantism in the United States, while in Ireland their numbers suffered.  As 
Reverend Charles L. Morrell explained at the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance, this placed an 
obligation on the United States Presbyterians to come to the aid of their brethren in Ireland. 
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To our American cousins we can appeal with equal confidence.  You owe us 
something.  We have been sending you for years our sons and brothers.  They have 
filled your virgin soil; they have digged from the bowels of your land the iron and the 
gold; they have filled your Churches and occupied your pulpits; they have been among 
your honored Senators and illustrious Presidents.  In all your wondrous material 
prospects and spiritual growth, the Ulster Scot has been an important factor.  We want 
your prayers, fathers and brethren, for the Evangelization of Ireland; the prayers of you 
that stand on the watch-towers of Zion; the prayers of you that make mention of the 
Lord [i.e. all your prayers].
88
 
According to Morrell, the high levels of emigration from Ulster and the success that the 
Scotch-Irish achieved in the United States meant that they were indebted to the Ulster 
Presbyterians, owing them prayers and support in their efforts to convert the Irish Catholics. 
 The idea that American Protestants were beholden to Ulster Protestants was not an 
attitude that was prevalent only among Presbyterians.  In 1886, Irish Methodists sent a 
delegation to the United States and Canada to raise money for the newly-founded Clarke 
Memorial Church in Portrush.  The reporter for the Irish Times commented, “The Clarke 
Memorial Church, Portrush, has strong claims on American Methodists.”
89
 
Forty years later, Reverend Frederick Harte of Belfast’s Donegall Square Methodist 
Church participated in a mission to America in 1925 to raise funds for building work.  He 
wrote, “The capital sum required was to be raised in the land flowing with dollars, and the 
building was to be a memorial to the pioneers of American Methodism who went out from 
Ireland, notably Philip Embry, Barbara Heck, and Robert Strawbridge, and became the 
founders of the great Methodist Episcopal Church of America.”
90
  Harte explained the 
reasoning behind their approach to the American Methodists, stating, 
I think I may confidently state that we had a really good case to put before the 
Methodists of America.  It was the Irish Methodists who founded American 
Methodism, and for years Irish Methodism has sent out its best sons and daughters to 
America.  It would be a gracious act if the great Methodist Episcopal Church would 
make some tangible and worthy expression of an indebtedness which surely exists.
91
 
American Protestants were indebted to Ireland for providing the founders of its religious 
institutions and for drawing the nation’s “best sons and daughters” as immigrants.  These 
attitudes toward emigration and American obligation provided an important context for the 
Ulster unionist approach to the United States. 
By the 1880s, Ulster Protestants closely followed developments within American 
religion.  The Witness printed articles on American churches and religious life, essays by 
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McCosh, and regular articles and sermons by Hall and other American ministers.
92
  The Pan-
Presbyterian Alliance heard accounts of the progress of Presbyterianism in America.
93
  With 
all of their historic connections, in many ways it was natural for Irish Protestant churches to 
turn toward the United States when confronted by the threat of Home Rule. 
 
Religion and Politics in the First Home Rule Crisis 
Early Home Rule-era Irish unionism incorporated the influences of conservative 
politics, Orangeism, and the Church of Ireland.
94
  These three factors were combined in the 
work of one man, Reverend Dr. Richard Rutledge Kane, the minister at Christ Church in 
Belfast and Grand Master of the Belfast Orangemen.  John Frederick MacNeice, a Church of 
Ireland Bishop and father of poet Louis MacNeice, described Kane as extraordinary in his 
attention to the church, Orange Order, and Irish politics.  MacNeice wrote in 1931, 
Much has happened since 1898, and it may well be that no clergyman could again be a 
foremost political leader as Dr. Kane was.  For more than ten years he was, perhaps, 
the most dominant personality in the public life of Belfast.  There will be general 
agreement now that the minister of religion should not be too intimately associated 
with politics of a partizan character.  The Church invariably suffers when clergy give 
up to party what was meant for mankind!  But as a public man there was something 
very attractive about Dr. Kane.
95
 
MacNeice’s view of Kane reflected the changing position of clergy during the Home Rule 
era.  During this time, clergymen such as Kane took opinionated stances on political issues, 
because of the substantial ramifications of Home Rule for the role of religious organizations 
in Ireland. 
 As well as working at Christ Church and with the Belfast Orange Order, Kane was 
an active member of the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union (ULAU).  Kane traveled to the 
United States and Canada in 1886 with barrister George Hill Smith on behalf of the ULAU 
to promote and defend Ulster unionism.
96
  He was also concerned with American 
Catholicism, which he targeted in his sermons.  In a sermon of January 1885, he preached 
that, 
It was impossible that the Roman Catholic should be loyal to the State unless the 
Church – that was, the priest – be supreme.  The State must be satisfied with a divided 
                                                 
92
 See, for example, Witness 19 Jun 1885, 26 Jun 1885, 1 Jan 1886, 22 Jan 1886, 26 Mar 1886, 23 Apr 
1886, among others. 
93
 Alliance of the Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian System. The Fourth General Council, 
London, 1888, 96. 
94
 Jackson, “Irish Unionism, 1870-1922,” 116; John Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party, 1882-
1973: Its Development and Organisation (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1973), 8. 
95
 John Frederick MacNeice, The Church of Ireland in Belfast: Its Growth, Condition, Needs (Belfast: 
William Mullan & Sons, 1931), 17. 
96
 See Chapter Five for more on the Kane/Smith trip. 
175 
 
allegiance or receive no allegiance at all.  Here was the reason of the chronic 
disaffection which they met with amongst Popish populations all over the world.  At 
the present time it was beginning in America, and unless the schools and the elections 
and the civil government in America be subjected to the control of the Church – that 
was, the priest – America would soon have in her Popish population as disaffected and 




According to Kane, unless the Pope and priests were able to dictate political policy, 
disaffection and rebellion would spread amongst Catholics who could only be partially loyal 
to the state.  Now that the Church of Ireland had been disestablished it was easier to claim 
similarities with the United States, separate in its churches and states. 
The role of Kane within Belfast society reflected the solidification of the sectarian 
nature of the unionist cause, spurred by the emergence of a combined Orange-Church of 
Ireland element within unionism.  By the late nineteenth century, the Orange Order 
increasingly attracted Presbyterian membership, though it was traditionally associated with 
Anglicans.  This meant that unionism was able to appeal to Protestants across a spectrum of 
denominations, while barring Catholics from full participation.
98
  By 1886, political and 
religious events transpired to unite almost all Irish Protestants against Home Rule.  They 
believed that Gladstone’s Home Rule scheme would isolate them from Protestant Britain, 
leaving them at the mercy of an oppressive Catholic majority in Ireland who were sure to 
deprive them of civil and religious liberties.
99
 
Protestant churches in Ireland became heavily involved in Irish political affairs as 
they attempted to maintain the Union.  Reverend James McConnell reported that after 
Gladstone introduced the first Home Rule Bill, 
The members of the General Assembly and nearly all Irish Presbyterians became 
seriously agitated.  They feared that if this Bill were to pass their civil and religious 
liberties would be seriously imperilled.  Many of them who had hitherto been Mr. 




The Presbyterian General Assembly called a special meeting to consider the serious state of 
the country, and unanimously resolved against Home Rule.
101
  Presbyterians were anxious to 
resist the forces of ultramontane Catholicism at home and worldwide. They also wished to 
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proclaim support for civil and religious equality and fair settlement of the land question, 
ideals which remained consistent with their traditional support of Liberal policies.
102
 
 The Presbyterian General Assembly also prepared an anti-Home Rule statement for 
publication in the United States, calling on historic linkages and connections they had made 
through the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance. 
The Presbyterian Churches in America being connected by many ties to their brethren 
in Ireland holding the same creed and maintaining the same church order, and having 
two years ago cemented their kinship at the meeting of the Pan-Presbyterian Council in 
Belfast, are naturally deeply interested in the Constitutional changes proposed to be 
carried out by Mr. Gladstone’s Government of Ireland Bill, and are especially desirous 




The assembly believed that the historic and religious ties between the two nations would 
compel American Presbyterians to look to their co-religionists in Ireland to formulate views 
on Home Rule. 
 In their address to the United States, the assembly focused on explaining the actions 
of Irish Presbyterians regarding Home Rule.  They described the dangers inherent in the 
Home Rule settlement: 
And if the Constitution foreshadowed in the present bill be imposed on us, which, 
instead of conferring upon Ireland anything resembling State rights, reduces her to a 
position in the empire lower than that of a third-class colony, the birth of the new 
system will be but synchronous with the inauguration of fresh agitation, whose object 
will be not merely to shake off the disabilities attached to the Constitution, but to 




The Presbyterian General Assembly asserted that far from gaining the status of an American 
state, Ireland would sink to the level of the lowest colony.  This relegation would ensure that 
Home Rule would lead to further rebellion, extremism, and demands for total separation. 
 An editorial in the Witness commented that the assembly’s statement would “very 
effectually meet the objects for which it was primarily prepared.  Our friends across the 
Atlantic will have their minds disabused by it of any false impressions which may have been 
left upon them by the utterances of men who spoke about us with some appearance of 
authority.”
105
  The paper referred regretfully to the stance of McCosh, who had come out in 
favor of Home Rule.  McCosh believed that the passage of Home Rule was inevitable, so 
Irish Presbyterians would be better off if they accepted it and worked toward the unification 
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  The Witness worried that McCosh’s statements would mislead Americans on 
Irish Presbyterian views of Home Rule. 
All the deep respect which is felt for [McCosh] here has not prevented very many from 
feeling the deepest sorrow, not unmixed with surprise, at the attitude which he has 
assumed.  Men who were only partially acquainted with all the circumstances of the 
case might possibly imagine that he spoke with some authority on the subject, and that 
some American journals which followed in his wake were the true exponents of Irish 
Presbyterian opinion.  We are glad, therefore, that the Assembly’s Committee has put 
the real state of the case before the American public, and we trust that public will take 
their views of the question not from any individual or journal… but from this 
deliberate statement agreed upon by the Assembly’s Committee.  We ought, it may be 
supposed, to know our own affairs and our own position best.
107
 
The Witness’s concern with the views of McCosh reflected the importance of American 
opinion on the Home Rule question.  They hoped that the assembly’s message would 
convince the American public that the true interests of Irish Presbyterians were with the 
maintenance of Union. 
 The Presbyterian preoccupation with American opinion was reflected in the paper’s 
articles monitoring opinions across the United States.
108
  One article related the contents of a 
telegram from New York: 
The declaration of the Ulster Presbyterians just published here does not meet with the 
approval of the leading American clergy.  Commenting upon it, they take substantially 
the same view as Dr. M’Cosh sent recently.  Dr. Howard Crosby says – “I do not agree 
at all with the Irish Church.  It takes a selfish, not a broad and liberal, view of Mr. 
Gladstone’s Bill.”  The only eminent Presbyterian clergyman agreeing with the Ulster 
declaration is Dr. John Hall, an Irishman.
109
 
One letter to the editor insisted that there was far less backing for Gladstone’s bill from 
America than was apparent from press reports.  The writer, Thomas West, sent in a copy of 
the Presbyterian Journal of Philadelphia, which revealed that the Presbyterians of that city 
were in sympathy with Ulster.
110
 
 The Presbyterian Journal had devoted an entire page to analysis of the Assembly’s 
American statement.  The Witness reprinted an article from the Journal which stated that the 
Home Rule cause had little support in Philadelphia. 
However it may be elsewhere, that is strictly true of this neighbourhood.  Especially we 
may say that Presbyterians of Irish descent, or connection, have almost wholly held 
aloof from it.  We think we can say with confidence that the Presbyterians who have 
had anything to do with the movement, from its inception to its completion… can be 
counted on one round of the fingers, and we suspect that not three hundred dollars all 
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told of the money raised came from them.  We say this that the Presbyterians in Ireland 
may know that their kindred here have not been faithless to them.
111
 
The Presbyterian Journal confirmed Irish Presbyterian hopes that their kinsmen in America 
were not supportive of the Home Rule movement, at least in the Scotch-Irish hub of 
Philadelphia.  However, there was a wide gap between opposing Irish-American efforts to 
raise money for Home Rule, and actively supporting the preservation of the Union. 
 The Anglo-Irish used the Church of Ireland General Synod to express total 
opposition to the policy of Home Rule in 1886.  The Church of Ireland focused on all-Irish 
unionism, emphasizing common ties with other Irish Protestants.
112
  At the special meeting 
of the Synod on 23 March 1886, America frequently appeared in the attendees’ speeches.  
Lord Plunket, the Archbishop of Dublin, asserted that Home Rule was not the final goal of 
the Irish nationalists.  “Is it not plain to everyone who is not blind to what is taking place at 
the present moment, and who is not deaf to what is being said, that there are ulterior aims on 
the part of those, in this country and in America, who exercise a chief influence among the 
advocates of this policy?”
113
  Plunket claimed that the true demands which lurked behind 
Home Rule were complete separation and advanced socialism, as illustrated by the land war 
and dynamite campaign.  The Bishop of Down, Robert Knox, expressed similar sentiments 
through quotation of Charles Stewart Parnell’s alleged “Last Link” speech.
114
 
 Others also emphasized the American extremism which lurked behind the Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP)’s constitutional exterior. The Bishop of Cork, Right Reverend 
Robert S. Gregg, stated, 
I will not judge men unfairly: I will judge them by their acts and words.  Their acts 
you know too well; as for their words, they have but one voice – a very gentle voice – 
in the British Parliament, a voice of villainous import in Ireland, and in America 
absolutely ferocious.  The foremost men in the movement have there spoken of the 
crime which disgusted Europe, when two blameless and highminded men were 




Very Reverend James Byrne, the Dean of Clonfert, stated that a deep-seated hatred of 
England was at the heart of motivation for the Irish race, particularly in America.  He 
explained, “That hatred, indeed, cannot quite be overlooked.  It is proclaimed in the Irish 
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 Reverend George Salmon, Professor of Divinity at Trinity College, asserted that 
Home Rule went against the worldwide trend toward greater union, as exemplified by the 
American example during the Civil War.
117
  Sir Frederick Heygate, the former MP for 
County Londonderry, emphasized that the idea of Ireland separating from Great Britain was 
looked upon with astonishment by the rest of the world. 
The world looks on from the outside with astonishment; the people of every civilized 
land rub their eyes with surprise that a small country like Ireland, without much 
capital, should desire to separate from a country like England.  The Americans look on 
and sneer and laugh at the infatuation of the people, and regard the situation as a good 
safety-valve for the discontent of their own people.
118
 
Heygate asserted that Americans, given their own history of movement toward union, were 
not supportive of the principle of Home Rule.  However, the American government had its 
own motivations for indulging Irish-Americans, in that Home Rule kept Ireland as the focus 
of the Irish-Americans’ dissent rather than the United States. 
 Gilbert Mahaffy, the curate of Monkstown, published an 1886 pamphlet on “The 
Attitude of Irish Churchmen in the Present Political Crisis.”  He outlined the main reasons 
that the Church of Ireland was opposed to the imposition of Home Rule: 
One reason is that the Home Rule movement has been, from first to last, a movement 
hostile to British rule.  And fostered as it has been on American soil, and supported by 
American dollars, it is essentially republican.  Such being the case, can it be expected 
by anyone that a Home Rule Parliament would be friendly to England or loyal to the 
British Crown?  The certain result of setting up such a Parliament would be to make 
Ireland more than ever a source of weakness to England – a perpetual thorn in her side 
– a cause of trouble to be reckoned with in every complication with foreign nations.
119
 
Like others at the special meeting of the Church of Ireland General Synod, Mahaffy 
propounded anti-American views which contrasted with the generally pro-American views 
of Presbyterians during the Home Rule crisis.  However, criticism of Irish-American 
extremism was common across all Protestant denominations in Ireland.
120
 
 The Methodist Church, though hesitant to enter into the political realm, took a stand 
against Home Rule based in part on reactions to the influence of Irish-American extremism.  
The Methodist Recorder asserted, “We care nothing for politics or political party.  We care 
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not how radical the scheme that can give weary Ireland peace once more.  But we protest in 
the name of Methodism against a scheme which would hand over our Methodist brethren to 
the tender mercies of Archbishop Walsh and the dynamiters of New York.”
121
  Methodists 
had maintained a record of loyalty to the Union and opposition to Catholic causes such as 
Catholic Emancipation, the Repeal Campaign, and the Maynooth grant.  For the minority of 
Methodists who supported Home Rule, generally those whose livelihood depended on the 
goodwill of Catholic neighbors, they also refused to support any extremism in connection 
with the cause.
122
  The majority of Methodists, however, were firmly against Home Rule. 
 At the Irish Methodist Annual Conference in 1887, Irish Methodists responded to a 
message from the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United 
States.  The message expressed sympathy with the unionist cause, stating “that the future of 
Ireland, in respect of peace and growth, depends largely upon the security of the Protestant 
element in her population.”
123
  The Irish Methodist address in reply asserted that they were in 
favor of removing every political or religious grievance from all classes of the population, 
but that they did not believe there was “a single remaining grievance of which Roman 
Catholics as such have to complain.”  The address concluded, “As with you during your 
recent civil war we are heartily with the Union as being, in our judgment, of vital importance 
in relation to the safety and growth of Protestantism, of which you speak, and earnestly hope 
that under the wise and firm administration of Government the reign of lawlessness and 
disorder will speedily come to an end.”
124
 
 The role of the Catholic Church was a common concern amongst Irish Protestants.  
An editorial in the Witness cautioned that Catholic attitudes as revealed by the American 
priesthood were an indication of the future for Ireland under Home Rule.  American priests 
had indicated that the Catholic Church would not tolerate heretics if Catholics became a 
majority in the United States.  The paper warned, “Just as the Irish [Parliamentary] party 
have been obliged to accept the doctrines of the Romish hierarchy in regard to their 
denominational education, whatever their own private opinions may be, as soon as Romish 
ascendency is again established in Ireland, they will be constrained to swallow Rome’s 
teaching in regard to toleration.”
125
 
Another editorial portrayed the American example as indicative of the future for a 
self-governing Ireland. 
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We only have to look across at the state of things in New York to learn what is a very 
real and probable danger.  There the dominant Irish party, by wire-pulling and 
corruption of various kinds, have allocated public funds from time to time to distinctly 
Roman Catholic projects.  The Protestant Press has complained bitterly, denounced 
and exposed these knavish tricks, but with as yet little or no result.  If in Ireland the 
command of public funds was in the hands of a political party which in turn was 
manipulated by the priesthood, who can doubt that a growing endowment of Roman 
Catholic institutions would take place to the detriment of all other parties and the 
shame of public justice?  It is American-Irish ideas that are ruling at present in Ireland.  
It is American-Irish institutions that would most likely be imported here.
126
 
The Witness feared the influence of Catholicism on a potential Dublin parliament, as 
illustrated by Irish Catholics in America. 
 Thomas Witherow, prominent Presbyterian minister and Professor of Church History 
at Magee College in Londonderry, used a hypothetical American example to illustrate the 
dire situation that Irish Protestants would be faced with under Home Rule. 
If the State of New York were a Roman Catholic State in the proportion of four to 
one; and if a proposition were made to withdraw New York from the jurisdiction of 
Congress, and give it a Congress of its own, practically independent; and if this State 
Legislature were clothed with legislative and administrative power, so as it have 
under its control the lives, property, religion and liberty of the Protestant minority; 
and if the Protestant minority had before them the certainty of being governed in 
perpetuity by such men as the popular vote now casts to the surface in Ireland – we 
here wonder how all this would be regarded by the Protestant minority in the State of 
New York?  All who understand this will understand perfectly why it is that the idea 




Published in the Presbyterian Review, Witherow’s analogy was part of an appeal to an 
international audience of Presbyterians to understand the Irish unionist cause. 
 At times, Irish Protestants took a different tactic regarding Catholicism and Home 
Rule.  Like the editors of the Witness, Mahaffy believed that Home Rule would result in the 
complete ascendancy of the Catholic Church.  The only way that this would not happen, he 
asserted, was “if the revolt against priestly power, of which there are many signs here and 
there – a revolt stimulated by the frequency of intercourse with America – should reach its 
culmination, there would be a separation between the clerical party and the communistic 
party.”
128
  Irish-American nationalists were sometimes portrayed as extreme anti-Catholic 
and irreligious socialists or communists.  In a pamphlet entitled “Religion and Unbelief in 
Ireland,” Leopold Agar-Ellis warned that the result of an Irish parliament, dominated by 
American Fenians, would be an attack on all religion, starting with Protestants and ending 
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with the Catholic Church itself.  They would persecute the Catholic priesthood and obliterate 
the Protestants.  He asked, “Is anyone simple enough to suppose that the teaching of the 
decalogue would be tolerated by an Irish-American government?”
129
  Irish-America was 
portrayed as an irreligious threat to all religious groups in Ireland, which accorded with their 
extremist image. 
 The defeat of the Home Rule Bill at its second reading on 8 June 1886 led to 
protracted and violent rioting in Belfast, with Kane and Hanna accused of fomenting the 
disturbance.
130
  Hanna was the Presbyterian minister at Belfast’s St. Enoch’s Church.  He 
was ordained in 1852, and an American university had conferred upon him an honorary 
doctorate.
131
  Known for promoting extremely conservative political views from the pulpit, 
he was a remarkably popular preacher who, like Kane, combined his role as clergyman with 
participation in the Orange Order and the ULAU.
132
  Hanna and Kane’s roles as leading 




Opposition to Home Rule and Self-Government, 1890-1920 
 At the Jubilee Assembly of the Irish Presbyterian Church in 1890, Reverend R.J. 
Lynd asserted that the great traditions of Ulster Presbyterians were evidenced by their 
outreach to the world. 
We have, through the mysterious workings of Providence, sent out men who have 
planted their faith in foreign lands, and it has grown so bravely that it has far 
outstripped the Church’s growth at home.  Who does not known Francis M’Kemie 
[sic], who founded American Presbyterianism, was a native of County Donegal? and 
Dr. [John] Hall will tell you, as he alone can, something of what that Imperial 
Republic owes to the Ulster Scot.  All our colonies have a similar experience.
134
 
Irish Presbyterian identity was linked to a history of emigration and planting of faith in 
foreign frontiers.  The Scotch-Irish heritage and success in America was called upon to 
develop a sense of distinctiveness among Ulster’s Presbyterians, which helped to contribute 
to a separate Ulster identity within the unionist movement. 
 Hall, who frequently visited his native Ulster, was present at the Jubilee Assembly.  
He reported the influence of Ulster on the United States, stating, “In point of fact there is no 
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doubt about this, that Ulster has sent into these United States a body of people that have 
exercised the strongest formative influence upon the institutions and the character of this 
great nation.”
135
  He said that this opinion had been confirmed by the recent formation of the 
SISA, whose president, Robert Bonner, was from the same place as Francis Makemie, 
Ramelton in County Donegal. 
 Hall was also the subject of an Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union pamphlet in 1888, 
“The Testimony of a Presbyterian Devine.”  It described Hall as an Irish minister who was 
now in charge of one of the most influential Presbyterian churches in America, New York’s 
Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, raising the largest church offering in the world.  In the 
pamphlet, Hall was quoted explaining the view of Americans toward Ireland as being 
influenced by Irish-American Catholics.  He asserted that the Republican and Democratic 
parties were swayed by their desire to court the Catholic vote, which explained politicians’ 
utterances in favor of Home Rule.  Hall said, “In other cases, American citizens naturally 
wish to see approximation in other lands to the ways of their own; and they do not always 
know enough of the circumstances to discriminate.”
136
  Thus the American public only 
seemed to be supporting Home Rule because they had not been properly presented with the 
other side of the argument. 
 The Special Commission on Parnellism and Crime influenced views about the role 
of America in the Home Rule question.  Antrim-born Methodist missionary and principal of 
Belfast’s Methodist College, William Arthur, wrote that the Parnellites had been 
beneficiaries of 
the preachers of the lowest forms of crime which have ever been, in a civilized nation, 
commended in print, as the beneficiary of men like Patrick Ford, a wretch at whose 
name every honest man ought to shudder, whom Mr. [Michael] Davitt regards – and 
told the judges so – as an admirable example of the Christian and philanthropist[.]  
How, I repeat, could those who, with all this proved, would set up Parnell in the chief 
place of power in Ireland be acquitted of partaking of his sins?
137
 
Arthur was astonished that anyone could support a party so linked with conspiracy, crime, 
intimidation, and murder. 
After the second Home Rule Bill was introduced in 1893, the Witness similarly 
condemned the influence of Irish-America.  An editorial stated, “Only one class would be 
benefitted by the Home Rule legislation.  This is the class of greedy vultures who in the 
name of patriotism, have fattened upon political agitation.  Gentlemen of the Healy, O’Brien, 
and Dillon type and the cadaverous Fenian Yankee beyond the sea would swoop down upon 
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Ireland, and prey upon her vitals.”
138
  The analogy is with the fate of the fire-bringer 
Prometheus, tied by Zeus’s command to a rock where a vulture daily devoured his intestines.  
The IPP was incriminated by association with Irish-American extremists and funded by those 
who would prey upon Ireland if Home Rule was granted. 
 A special meeting of the Irish Presbyterian General Assembly was called on 15 
March 1893, which resolved to “strenuously oppose” the enactment of the Home Rule 
Bill.
139
  Nevertheless, Gladstone was able to gain support from a minority of ministers such 
as the Reverends J.B. Armour and J.L.B. Dougherty.
140
  The Irish Methodists and the Church 
of Ireland also expressed strong opposition to the second Home Rule Bill.
141
  The Parnell 
split had left the IPP divided, but Protestants remained threatened by what they saw as the 
Catholic Church openly identifying themselves with the Home Rulers.  The condemnation of 
Home Rule as Rome Rule became increasingly prominent.
142
  The Witness used American 
examples to illustrate the corruption of the Catholic Church.  The newspaper quoted Froude 
as saying that what happened in America was bound to happen in Ireland as Catholics were 
the same throughout the world.  The newspaper implored, “Let Mr. Gladstone and his 
colleagues ponder these words of the far-seeing Froude, and there will be no Home Rule 




 After the defeat of the second Home Rule Bill in the House of Lords, the issue of 
Catholic Church involvement in Irish politics and society continued to form an important 
part of the arguments against Home Rule.  This was particularly the case after the papal ne 
temere decree of 1908.  The decree, requiring all children of marriages between Catholics 
and non-Catholics to be raised as Catholics, was a rallying point for Protestants illustrating 
how the Pope was attempting to dominate the lives of the Irish.  The McCann case of 1910, 
in which a Catholic man left his non-Catholic wife and disappeared with their two children, 
especially captured the attention of Irish Protestants.  The Ulster Unionist Council resolved 
that the Church’s sanction of such events deserved the reprobation of the entire community.  
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They considered the McCann case to be a confirmation of the threat to civil and religious 
liberties embodied in a potential Home Rule settlement.
144
 
 The Presbyterian General Assembly in 1911, with Reverend Dr. John Macmillan as 
moderator, turned its attention to Anglo-American relations.  The Assembly passed a 
resolution expressing its “intense gratification” for President William Howard Taft’s 
proposal for an arbitration treaty between the two countries, which they called “the two great 
sections of the English speaking race.”  The Assembly stated that they “sincerely hope[d] 
that nothing may prevent the conclusion of this treaty, and that it will be but the first among 
many such treaties between the great nations of the world, so that the day may be hastened 
for which we all earnestly pray when peace shall reign over all the earth and men shall learn 
war no more.”
145
  Macmillan, who was the minister of Belfast’s Cooke Centenary Church 
and an 1878 graduate of Princeton, went to the United States in 1912 to speak at the 
Princeton Theological Seminary centenary.  He also represented the Irish Presbyterians at the 




 At the Princeton Theological Seminary centenary, Macmillan gave an address on 
“Irish and American Presbyterianism.”  He described the plantation of Ulster and the 
foundations of the Irish Presbyterian Church.  According to him, the early Ulster Scots 
regarded the Bible as their statute book and library, emphasized the value of education, and 
lived a humble life, always retaining close ties with Scotland.
147
  He regarded Ireland as the 
original homeland of the Ulster Scots, which was the “Scotia major of the ancient world.”  
The Ulster Scots struggled for toleration, and through those struggles became 
uncompromisingly Presbyterian.  According to Macmillan, Presbyterianism, “with its 
franchise and freedom of the Kingdom of God enjoyed by women as well as men – is the 




Macmillan went on to describe the emigration of Ulster Scots to America, leaving a 
land of bondage to settle in the Lord’s land, maintaining the focus on religion, education, and 
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humility.  He spoke of the roles of Francis Makemie and William Tennent, and those Ulster-
Americans who had a direct impact on his own life.  He stated, 
Webster, writing in the middle of the last century, declares that Ulster has continued 
for one hundred and fifty years to be ‘the great nursery’ of the American Presbyterian 
Church.  When I think of John Glendy, who was the minister of the church of my 
boyhood, who fled from Ireland in the tragic days of 1798, who became successively 
chaplain of the U.S. Congress and of the U.S. Senate, and a minister of great eloquence 
and power; of the incomparable John Hall, who came to New York in 1867 and 
exercised a unique influence over the American Continent, of which every great Irish 
Presbyterian was so justly proud; and of the men who in Princeton greeted me as a 
fellow-countryman and who are rendering such splendid service in this vast and high 
field, I am convinced that the ministerial succession is still being well maintained.
149
 
Macmillan made clear that it was not just religious connections between Ulster and America 
that were celebrated, but that Ulster Scots had been inspired by the American political 
example: “The Declaration of Independence gave hope to those who struggled for justice in 
Ireland, and the struggle at length was crowned with victory.  We now have religious 
equality.”
150
  Macmillan expressed the close connection felt by the Ulster Scots to America.  
He concluded, “Although year by year, we suffer from emigration, by which we are deprived 
of the enthusiasm and enterprise of our youngest and strongest, we do not grudge our youth 
to our colonies nor to this Republic, which our people regard as almost a second home.”
151
 
 Macmillan’s visit to the United States was part of a larger web of transatlantic visits 
which continued to be made by ministers and evangelists.  At the meeting of the General 
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, the Committee on 
Christian Life and Work reported that Dr. John Wilbur Chapman, a prominent member of the 
evangelistic circuit who had worked with Moody, spent several months in Britain as a 
representative-at-large of the committee.  He conducted several “successful evangelistic 
campaigns in Belfast and other points.”
152
  Dr. William H. Roberts also visited Europe on 
behalf of the committee in 1911, meeting with church leaders in Edinburgh, London, 
Geneva, and Belfast.  The committee recounted,  
Dr. Roberts reports a conference of unusual interest with the Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland, in which 250 ministers and elders were present to meet him at the call of the 
Moderator, Rev. Dr. McMillan [sic].  Dr. Roberts also reports a deep interest in the 
subject of Evangelism as presented by him and the general expression of opinion that a 
world-wide revival of spiritual religion would be the best monument to the great 
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Presbyterians in the United States and Ireland remained dedicated to an international 
evangelical effort supporting revivalism and collaboration of churches around the world. 
 Meanwhile, by the time of the third Home Rule Bill in 1912, the unionist movement 
became increasingly narrowed on Ulster rather than all-Ireland unionism.
154
  McConnell 
wrote,  
The veto of the House of Lords had since [1911] been destroyed, and an attempt is 
again being made to pass a Home Rule Bill for Ireland, which the Irish Presbyterians 
are preparing to resist with all their might.  What the result will be may be inferred 
from the following pronouncement by Lord Rosebery, when presiding at a lecture by 
the American Ambassador (Mr. Whitelaw Reid) in Edinburgh a short time ago: – “I 
love Highlanders and I love Lowlanders, but when I come to the branch of our race 
which has been grafted on the Ulster stem, I take off my hat with veneration and awe.  
They are, I believe, without exception, the toughest, most dominant, the most 
irresistible race that exists in the universe at this moment.”
155
 
In the face of increasing Ulsterization, Protestant churches continued to lend their support to 
the unionist cause, including staging anti-Home Rule rallies.  The Irish Presbyterian 
Convention was held on 1 February 1912.  They received messages of sympathy from the 
Church of Ireland, Irish Baptists, and Methodists.
156
  The Methodists organized their own 
Belfast demonstrations against the third Home Rule Bill in 1912, with simultaneous meetings 
held in Ulster Hall, the Exhibition Hall, and the People’s Hall.
157
 
 The signing of the Ulster Covenant on Ulster Day, 28 September 1912, was the 
ultimate expression of the distinctive Ulster blend of religion with politics.  The text of the 
Covenant, reflecting the historic Scottish covenants signed by the Ulster Scots’ ancestors, 
was mainly written by a Presbyterian elder, Thomas Sinclair.
158
  The moderator of the 
Presbyterian General Assembly and the Bishop of Down signed the Covenant immediately 
after Edward Carson and Lord Londonderry at the ceremony in Belfast City Hall.  The 
Covenant gained the signatures of all the northern Irish bishops in the Church of Ireland.  
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Preachers throughout the country insisted that the signing of the Covenant was a religious 
rather than political occasion.
159
 
 The menace of Irish-America remained part of the discourse against the Home Rule 
Bill.  The Bishop of Kilmore, Reverend Dr. Alfred George Elliott, warned that “Ireland a 
Nation” was the motto of the American supporters of the nationalist party.
160
  The threat of 
Catholicism was also prominent, especially amongst members of the Orange Order.  The 
Imperial Grand President, Colonel Robert H. Wallace, addressed delegates from all parts of 
the British Empire and the United States at the meeting of the Triennial Council in 1912.  
Wallace stated that they hoped to shut the gates of the Empire against Roman Catholic 
aggression.  He called on the worldwide body of Orangemen to fight against Irish Home 
Rule, because, he stated, “in our corner of Ulster we are fighting the battle not only of the 
other Protestants in Ireland, but of the Protestantism of the world.”
161
 
 Presbyterians also called upon positive links with America, including the traditional 
Presbyterian association with fighting for civil and religious liberty.  An editorial in the 
Witness about the signing of the Covenant stated,  
Presbyterianism has flourished, and flourishes still, by resistance to tyranny, and it 
would be a red day for Presbyterianism and for civil and religious liberty all over the 
world when Presbyterians would be content to submit to tyranny in any form, 
ecclesiastical or political.  Presbyterianism has ever been in the van of liberty, and it is 
to Presbyterianism and the Scottish blood that it represents that the United States of 




The traditional Presbyterian defiance of tyranny and celebration of liberty, as embodied in 
the Scotch-Irish experience in America, was called upon to legitimize the unionists’ stance 
against Home Rule.  This also helped to draw Presbyterians into a more unified “Ulsterman” 
identity, aiding in the Ulsterization of the unionist movement.
163
 
 The Witness also called upon the American example as they expressed a feeling of 
betrayal by the British which led to unionist threats of militancy.  The editors wrote, 
The Southern States of America demanded in practical effort what the Irish are 
demanding – separation from Great Britain.  The North went to war rather than submit 
to it.  The British Government in regard to Ireland represents the Northern States of 
that day.  But they do not fight; they surrender; and with their surrender sacrifice all the 
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interests, all the traditions of their loyal friends in Ireland.  It is asking too much of 
these men to submit to the rod and lash.
164
 
This was likening Catholicism to American slave-owners, to whom the British were 
willingly submitting the loyal Ulstermen.  Presbyterian traditions in Ulster, Scotland, and 
America were invoked to portray the Ulster Scots as liberty-loving and loyal, but prepared to 
stand up for their ideals against tyranny and coercion.  Presbyterians believed that their 
traditions were responsible for inspiring the constitutions of the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  This made the sense of betrayal all the greater when, as they saw it, the 
British government attempted to force Home Rule upon them. 
 Even after the passage of the Home Rule Bill and the conclusion of World War I, 
Ulster Protestants continued to call on Scotch-Irish and evangelical religious connections in 
the United States.  They attempted to gain unionist political support in America and counter 
the influence of Éamon de Valera as he toured the country.  The MP for South Tyrone, 
William Coote, led a delegation of six clergymen in November 1919 on a tour of the United 
States.  The delegates were composed of members of the Church of Ireland, the Methodist 
Church, and the Presbyterian Church, illustrating cross-denominational support for unionists 
to make appeals to the United States.  The delegates spoke out against the dangers of Irish 





 The religious and political links called upon by Coote and the Ulster clergymen had 
continued from the days of the earliest emigration from Ulster to America, and the 
foundations of American Presbyterianism.  Within the larger context of the worldwide 
growth of evangelicalism, Ulster and America forged a web of connections between 
individuals and organizations based on shared religious heritage.  From the time of Francis 
Makemie, there was an unlimited flow of Ulster clergy to America. In return, revivalists and 
Princeton-educated ministers came to Ulster from the United States.  Through the 
connections of individual ministers, voluntary societies, and transatlantic religious 
organizations, Ulster and America each developed similar evangelical, and in some cases 
fundamentalist, religious traditions. 
 The interconnection between Ulster and American religion was epitomized by the 
1859 Ulster revival, which was inspired by revivals in the United States and Canada in 
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preceding years.  The 1859 revival triggered visits from the international evangelical 
revivalist community.  Preachers from both sides of the Atlantic worked together to conduct 
revival missions.  Ulster received visits from prominent American revivalists throughout the 
second half of the nineteenth century, including Moody and Sankey. 
 Princeton was a major point of connection between Ulster and the United States, 
particularly under the presidency of McCosh.  At Princeton Theological Seminary, Irish 
students were the most numerous international group.  Transnational religious organizations 
also drew together the United States, Britain, and Ireland.  The Pan-Presbyterian Alliance in 
particular served as a forum for informing other countries of developments in national 
churches and coordinating missions, including attempts to convert Catholics in Ireland.  
Through such meetings, Irish Presbyterians emphasized the impact of emigration on Ulster, 
developing a theme of American indebtedness.  The United States “owed” Ulster because of 
the success of the Scotch-Irish in America at the expense of Irish Protestants. 
 Though the connections between Ulster and American religion did not always 
directly result in support for the unionist cause, they still formed an important context vital to 
understanding Ulster’s view of the United States during the Home Rule period.  As 
Macmillan explained in his speech at the Princeton Theological Seminary centenary, Ulster 
Presbyterians felt pride in Scotch-Irish contributions to America, and because of the 
prevalence of emigration and historic connections even viewed America as a second home.  
Presbyterian unionists emphasized Scotch-Irish heritage and success on the frontier to 
underscore Ulster Scots’ distinctiveness and value to the United Kingdom.  They stressed the 
Presbyterian tradition of fighting for civil and religious liberties in the United States and the 
British Empire.  Such rhetoric helped to create a more united Ulster Presbyterian identity in 
the face of the Home Rule threat. 
 These positive uses of the United States were complemented by calls from various 
denominations on their American counterparts to oppose Home Rule, and the use of the 
American historical example to legitimize unionist stances.  America was also approached in 
a negative light by all three major Irish Protestant denominations through condemnation of 
Irish-American extremism, separatism, and funding of the Irish nationalist movement.  This 
was also reflected in the Irish Protestant view of Catholicism.  The example of Catholics in 
the United States was used to show the threat of Catholicism to a potential Dublin 
parliament.  Anti-Catholicism was used to unify Irish Protestants, who came from a diverse 
191 
 
array of social and political backgrounds, within the unionist movement.
166
  Anti-Catholicism 
was also used to appeal to American Protestants to aid unionists, as Catholicism was 
depicted as a shared menace to the American and British governments.  In contrast, Irish-
America was sometimes portrayed as an irreligious force that would work to destroy 
Catholicism as well as Protestantism in Ireland. 
 Religion and politics were intertwined in the Ulster unionist approach to America.  
As politics became increasingly sectarian, Irish Protestants called upon their American 
counterparts and criticized events in the United States.  The United States’ religious 
connections to Ulster were an important part of forming closer relations between Irish 
Protestants as they were increasingly divided from Catholics in the political sphere.  They 
were also vital to the formation of a more unified Irish Presbyterian identity and the 
emphasis on the “Ulsterman,” which aided in the evolution of unionism from an all-Ireland 
movement to one focused almost solely on Ulster. 
                                                 
166
 James Anderson, “Ideological Variations in Ulster during Ireland’s First Home Rule Crisis: An 
Analysis of Local Newspapers,” in Community Conflict, Partition and Nationalism, ed. Colin H. 





VII. “THE ULSTER BREED HAS NEVER KNOWN DEFEAT:” USES OF AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL EXAMPLES IN THE ULSTER UNIONIST CONTEXT 
 
 Confronted with the first Home Rule Bill in 1886, Irish historian W.E.H. Lecky 
wrote, “It would be difficult to conceive a policy more opposed to the best tendencies of the 
time.”  He described the unification of Italy led by the Count of Cavour and the unification 
of Germany under Otto von Bismarck.  Finally, Lecky recounted an example more powerful 
than the others in illustrating the “patriotism and courage of a great democracy,” as he 
praised the United States for overcoming the Civil War.  He believed that Americans had 
secured the unity of their republic for centuries to come.  Lecky concluded, “These have 
been the contributions of other nations to the history of the nineteenth century.  Shall it be 
said of English statesmen that their most prolific and most characteristic work has been to 
introduce the principle of dissolution into the very heart of their empire?”
1
 
 Lecky saw the best tendencies of the nineteenth century as the movements toward 
unity by the nations of the world.  The United States example was used to epitomize 
unification as the spirit of the age.  Unionists claimed that the British government was 
turning its back on the inexorable movement toward unity with its Home Rule policies. 
 Appeals to unity as the spirit of the age echoed in speeches and writings, in Ulster 
and in Parliament, throughout the Home Rule period.  Lecky called for the British 
government to abandon its plans for dissolution in 1886.  A Belfast clergyman declared the 
dismemberment of empires a “retrograde movement” at a meeting in support of the Great 
Unionist Convention in 1892.  Home Rule, he stated, was “counter to the spirit of the age, 
which was altogether in favour of union and consolidation, as witness united Italy, unity 
Germany, and the United States of America, who suffered the scourge of civil war to 
maintain their union.”
2
  Arthur Balfour praised the “drawing together of great nations,” in 
1912.  According to Balfour the spirit of unity was exemplified by the United States.  “The 
United States is the United States because, in the first place, starting as absolutely separate 
units, they first insisted, against enormous difficulties, in drawing the bonds of unity closer 
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and closer, and then were prepared to fight to the end to make that union yet closer.”
3
  Unity 
was embodied in the coming together of the thirteen colonies as the United States, the 
fighting of the North to save the Union with the South, and enshrined in the American 
constitution. 
 Unionists appealed to the American example of national unity to legitimize their 
attempts to preserve the Union between Great Britain and Ireland.  Other historical and 
constitutional examples from the United States were used by unionists to support their 
movement against Home Rule.  This chapter will first examine the ways the American 
Revolutionary War was utilized in unionist rhetoric.  Drawing upon ethnic connections with 
the Scotch-Irish, Ulster unionists emphasized themes of ethnic identity, legitimacy, 
militancy, and British coercion and betrayal.  Next, the chapter will highlight the American 
Civil War as an historical parallel to the situation of the Ulster unionists.  They used the Civil 
War to underscore both the obligation of the British government to fight to save the Union 
and the validity of Ulster militancy.  Finally, the chapter will explore the unionists’ use of the 
American constitution.  Unionists focused on American constitutional provisions and 
protections of minority rights to suggest solutions to Irish problems and emphasize flaws in 
the Home Rule system.  The United States played a significant role in unionist political 
thought and rhetoric throughout the Home Rule era.  Ulster unionists used American 
examples to emphasize the need to maintain unity between Great Britain and Ireland, and to 
provide historical justification for unionist actions. 
 
American Revolution 
 Ulster unionist attitudes toward the American colonial and revolutionary periods 
changed over time as the succession of Home Rule bills were introduced in Parliament.  The 
sense of ownership felt by Ulster Scots over the events in this period of American history 
formed part of the context for these attitudes.  In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, 
the Scotch-Irish were celebrated for having made up the backbone of American colonial 
society.  They were praised as a driving force behind the colonists’ victory in the War of 
Independence.  This role was emphasized by such groups as the Scotch-Irish Society of 
America.  The Ulster Scots themselves also perpetuated the Scotch-Irish mythology.  A 
Belfast News-Letter editorial in 1882 remarked, “When we look into the history of the great 
nation now known as the United States, we see enough to convince us that the Insurrection 
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would have been a failure but for the Irishmen who supported it.”
4
  As members of the same 
ethnic group, Ulster Scots considered Scotch-Irish achievements as victories for their “race” 
as a whole, even for those who remained in Ireland. 
 In 1775, American events dominated politics both at Westminster and in Ireland.
5
  
Eighteenth-century Ireland and America shared common political ideologies and heritage.  
The Ulster Scots also shared a Presbyterian political “language” which had influenced the 
American colonists.
6
  Ulster Presbyterians were linked to America through emigration, 
familial ties, and ethnic identity.  They also had valuable trade connections with North 
America.  After fighting broke out, citizens of Belfast wrote an address to King George III 
expressing their horror at the war.
7
  Public sentiment as displayed through newspaper 
articles, pamphlets, and public meetings revealed widespread sympathy for the colonists.
8
  
Financial matters and the rallying cry of “no taxation without representation” formed the 




 In Dublin, the Irish Parliament led by Henry Grattan and the Patriot Party used the 
time of war to demand concessions from the British government.  The Irish leaders felt 
commercial resentment at British wartime measures which constricted the Irish economy.  In 
response to Irish demands and after military demonstrations by armed Volunteers, “free 
trade” was granted to Ireland in 1779.
10
  “Legislative independence” was the next issue 
which gained momentum.  The Protestant Ascendancy in control of the Irish government 
celebrated ties to the Crown, but aimed to repeal the acts which granted the Westminster 
Parliament nominal power over the Irish Parliament.  The offending acts, Poynings’ Law and 
the Declaratory Act of 1720, were repealed in 1782, though in practice this did not result in 
any significant alteration to the way the Irish Parliament worked.
11
 
 Further reforms were demanded by the Society of United Irishmen, formed in 1791.  
Inspired by the American and French Revolutions, the United Irishmen gained the support of 
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some Belfast merchants, rural Ulster Presbyterians, Dublin intellectuals, and Catholic 
peasants.  The United Irishmen rose up in 1798 demanding a full break from Great Britain 
and attempting to establish an Irish republic.
12
  The Acts of Union were passed in 1800 




 Over the ensuing decades, Ulster Scots gradually became more associated with 
support of Union with Britain rather than the republicanism and radicalism of the United 
Irishmen.  The Ulster Scots’ stance was transformed in part by the hardening of sectarian 
feeling fueled by evangelicalism, and the increasing identification of religious denominations 
with political movements, à la Daniel O’Connell’s Repeal Association.  The Union had 
facilitated evolving economic conditions, leading to economic competition between 
Catholics and Protestants in Ulster.
14
  The benefits of the Union itself created unionists, as 
George Boyce has remarked.  The Ulster Scots came to celebrate the British connection as 
their best resource for improvements to their own lives.  Through the Union, they were able 
to champion ideals which they saw themselves as always supporting: civil and religious 
liberty, freedom, and economic progress.
15
 
 By the Home Rule era, the majority of Ulster Scots fervently supported the Union 
while continuing to celebrate the role of their ethnic group in the American Revolution and 
the United Irish rising.  Both of these events epitomized attempts to destroy connections with 
Britain.  The continued celebrations of these parts of Ulster Scots history were reconciled 
through a strain of “Old Light” Presbyterianism which allowed for either supporting or 
rebelling against the state so long as they continued their pursuit of civil and religious 
liberty.
16
  James Shaw wrote in an 1888 Liberal Unionist pamphlet: 
You are not, nor am I, ashamed of the fact that our ancestors were United Irishmen.  
We do not fear to speak of ’98…. But, at the same time, we were taught that every 
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object which our forefathers fought for had been attained.  Our forefathers took up 
arms against an Irish Parliament which represented only a small and interested 
faction; against an Irish Executive which was dominated by the narrow, prejudiced, 




According to Shaw, the demands that the Ulster Scots had made as part of the United 
Irishmen had all been answered by the Union.  This was why the Ulster Scots were now such 
loyal supporters of the British connection.  In this way, the Ulster Scots were able to 
continue to celebrate their roles in the United Irishmen and the American Revolution.  
Throughout these events, they believed they had embodied a spirit of determination to fight 
for their ideals, something they portrayed themselves as doing with great success under the 
Union. 
 Throughout the Home Rule crises, the American Revolutionary War example was 
utilized to develop themes of legitimacy, coercion, representation, ethnic identity, and 
militancy in Ulster unionist discourse.  Unionists attained information about the American 
Revolution from George Bancroft’s multi-volume series, History of the United States from 
the Discovery of the American Continent (1834-1874).  Dunbar Barton, Unionist MP for Mid 
Armagh, told the House of Commons in 1893 that, 
He was in an Ulster library the other day when he saw a number of men reading 
Bancroft’s History of America.  That was the book sinking into the minds of the 
people of Ulster.  It was from its pages they would learn the rights of a country and 
of a free people, and from which they should drink in those lessons of liberty which 




The Belfast News-Letter also cited Bancroft as an authority.
19
  Bancroft himself had 
emphasized the achievements of the Scotch-Irish in America in his books. 
Ulster Scots ethnic identity was touted through Scotch-Irish achievements and the 
identification of America as a Protestant nation.  America’s success was tied to the 
achievements of Protestant religion.  At a Royal Black Preceptory meeting at the beginning 
of 1885, District Master William McCormick remarked: 
Protestantism had no exceptional privileges in its favour when it pushed its way into 
American wilds, leveling all obstruction, and overcoming the numerous difficulties 
which presented themselves, changing the face of nature from forests and prairie, 
and vindicating the people’s right to liberty, struck the blow for freedom on the very 
threshold of their Constitution, which secured the priceless blessings of liberty for all 
and to all in the great Republic of the West.
20
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McCormack tied these pioneering, Protestant achievements to the modern-day Ulster 
Protestants, who led “in the van of progress and liberty.”  He continued, 
But, said some of its leaders here [in Ireland] Protestantism was not able, could not 
bear the strain, the tug in this case.  What! not able to hold its own because the 
people were being franchised, were being invested with the rights of subjects and 




For McCormick, America was the glorious example of the strength of Protestantism.  He 
credited Protestants with the great achievements of the United States.  Protestantism was 
strong enough to conquer the prairies and secure liberty through the American constitution.  
Therefore, it would be strong enough to face the democratizing electoral system being 
introduced in Britain and Ireland, which would give rising numbers of Catholics the vote.  
America was used as an example of the determined, pioneering spirit of the Scotch-Irish.  It 
was also an example of the strength of Protestantism as a religion and an influence within 
society. 
 After the first Home Rule Bill was introduced, unionists used the American example 
to illustrate their doubts about the system outlined within the bill.
22
  William Arthur, former 
Principal of Belfast’s Methodist College, questioned the tax system, which relied on the 
honesty of nationalist collectors: 
Of all the dreams impossible to broad day, I should have thought that the 
guaranteeing of English money by Imperial taxes and Imperial rents to be collected 
by Nationalist officials for a Receiver ‘behind a curtain’ would have been the last to 
flit across any human brain.  It would be something worthwhile to hear some genial 
Parnellite members tell a simple English one how perfect were Mr. Gladstone’s 
guarantees, how absolutely sound the security; and then to see how they would look 
at one another when by themselves.
23
 
Arthur then used the American Revolutionary War example to illustrate just how important 
tax policy was: “Whether was Bunker’s Hill fought about local rates or Imperial taxes?  
Were Receivers ‘absolute security’ in those parts?”
24
  Arthur’s use of the American example 
emphasized the validity and seriousness of his concerns over the tax provisions within the 
Home Rule Bill. 
 Tax policy was one of the main criticisms developed by the unionists against the first 
Home Rule Bill.  The bill did not provide for any Irish members in the Westminster 
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Parliament, yet Ireland would still be expected to contribute taxes.  The Belfast News-Letter 
credited the decision to keep Irish representatives from Westminster with a desire by the 
Liberal Party to get rid of Parnellite obstruction in the House of Commons.  An editorial on 4 
May 1886 commented, 
Unfortunately for this view of the case, there is no possibility of the obstructionists 
being got rid of.  The principle of “No taxation without representation” has for 
hundreds of years formed the basis of the privileges of the British citizen; and not 
even Mr. Gladstone can hope to be successful in forcing upon the people of Great 
Britain the new doctrine of taxation without representation.
25
 
The editorial admitted that this meant Parliament would have to continue to deal with 
obstructionist tactics of the Parnellites.  However, they stated, “Parliament has before now 
faced the obstructives and overcome them.”
26
  Obstruction was no reason to take away the 
basic rights of British citizens. 
Stewart Hunter, in his introduction of Joseph Chamberlain in Coleraine in 1887, 
remarked that according to the first Home Rule Bill, Ireland would not have any voice in 
foreign affairs, including being able to declare war and make peace.  He wondered how long 
Ireland would “pay and look pleasant” under those circumstances.  Stewart explained, 
“Taxation without representation cost Britain her American colonies in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century – (hear, hear) – and a repetition of the same error would undoubtedly have 
separated Ireland from England in the latter part of the nineteenth.”
27
  These issues of 
taxation and representation could have dire consequences for Britain.  Hunter feared that if 
Ireland lost its imperial connections through the Westminster Parliament, it would lead to 
complete separation.  However, he was not explicit on if this separatist movement would be 
led by the nationalists or the unionists in Ireland. 
 The nationalists also used examples from the American Revolution to support their 
own movement.  The Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union published some of their statements to 
illustrate the extreme policies of the nationalist party.  In an 1888 pamphlet on the Crimes 
Act, William Redmond was quoted as saying in Parliament,  
Where in the history of tyranny was there an Act more calculated to make the blood 
of men boil in madness in their veins, than this attempt to saddle on the people of 
Ireland a Bill which deprived them of all the rights dear to Irishmen.  The English-
blooded colonists of America, for less than this, threw off the yoke of England; and 
it was a pleasant thing for the English government to know that there was a spirit 
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amongst the people of Ireland which would induce them, if they had the chance, to 
oppose the measure with arms in their hands.
28
 
Redmond used the American example to threaten separation as the nationalists compared 
themselves to the American colonists.  The unionists’ reprinting of this speech illustrated 
their condemnation of such militant, extremist language.  Ironically, unionists themselves 
used the American Revolution in similar ways to promote their own movement. 
 In 1892, the Liberals once again came into power with a minority government.  
Unionists feared the possible implementation of Irish Home Rule, the bill for which was 
introduced in February 1893.  One of the main uses of the American example was to promote 
the theme of unionist legitimacy.  Unionists hoped to justify their arguments against Home 
Rule through appealing to the American Revolution.  They aimed to show that their position 
was reasonable and had historical precedent. 
 One of the facets of the theme of legitimacy was expressing the loyalty of the Ulster 
unionists.  John Ross, Unionist MP for Londonderry City, believed that England was bound 
by honor to stand by the Ulster unionists because of their steadfast loyalty to the British 
Empire.  Ross stated, “It is not a fortunate thing to drive people faithful to you to despair.  It 
was not a fortunate thing to maltreat and trample upon your North American colonies, and I 
doubt whether it will be more fortunate for England if she treats the loyal people of Ulster as 
she now proposes to treat them.”
29
  Ross portrayed the American colonists as faithful and 
loyal citizens of the British Empire.  When they were maltreated through taxation and 
coercion, they responded in such a way as to cause the British government regret.  This 
example illustrated the unionist sense of betrayal by the British, who were granting generous 
measures to disloyal citizens, the Irish nationalists.  This comparison brought legitimacy to 
the Ulster unionist cause through its emphasis on the failure of Britain to stand by its faithful 
citizens. 
 Barton also used the American colonial example to develop the theme of legitimacy 
for the Ulster unionist cause.  He emphasized the long-established nature of the Ulster 
settlement through his comparison with the American colonies.  He stated, 
He knew in the Nationalist papers they [Ulster Protestants] were described as 
modern settlers who had settled upon confiscated land, but were they to be called 
modern settlers who settled in 1611?  Why, what was the history of America, and 
when was the first New England state settled?  Not until 1620, nine years after the 
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settlement of Ulster, so that there was not one of the States of America whose people 
had such an old title to their lands or province as had the people of Ulster.
30
 
Barton neglected to mention Virginia as an older colony, with the first permanent settlement 
in 1607, as he aimed to highlight the age of the Ulster Plantation.  In any case, his point was 
valid: Irish Home Rulers might as well be seeking to evict European settlers from the United 
States if they sought to expel Britons from Ireland.  Barton’s statement also stressed that 
Ireland was the native homeland of the Ulster Scots, as their families had lived there for so 
long that they believed they belonged there. 
 Barton was one of the unionist members who most often used American examples in 
his critique of Home Rule.  Another comparison was with the grievances that Ulster would 
face under Home Rule, as compared to those of the American colonists before they rebelled.  
Barton reviewed, “Just before the War of American Independence [George] Grenville and 
other British statesmen told the British people that ‘America will complain, but America will 
submit.’  That was the talk going around – that America would complain but that America 
would submit – and that the loud murmurs of discontent and resistance would come to 
nothing.”
31
  Before the American Revolution, colonists’ complaints and threats of resistance 
were not taken seriously by the British government.  Ulster unionists likewise felt that their 
complaints and resistance of Home Rule were not really being considered by the British 
government. 
Barton believed that Ulster’s case against Home Rule was much greater than the 
American colonists’ case against British rule.  America was accepted as having legitimately 
rebelled – therefore, the unionists’ cause was even more justified.  Barton continued, 
What was the grievance of the American Colonists?  Nothing but taxation.  And 
what was the grievance of the people of Ulster?  Taxation was the least part of it.  
There had been revolutions in history founded and justified on questions of religion, 
upon questions of defence of property, and on the sentiment of liberty, and upon the 




By reducing the American case to a question of taxation, as was consistent with Irish 
interpretations of the American Revolution, Barton emphasized the legitimacy of the 
numerous objections of Ulster unionists against the implementation of Home Rule. 
 Barton also used the American example to justify the threat of Ulster rebelling to 
keep the Union intact.  He described the Ulster unionists as people who were resolute and 
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determined that the British government would not force the Home Rule Bill upon them.  He 
opined, 
This Bill if it became law would be as dead a letter as the Acts they tried to force 
upon the colonists of America, Acts which passed this House and the House of 
Lords, and which never operated in that country.  As certainly as the colonists of 
America refused to obey them, as certainly would the people of Ulster – and he 
begged to remind the House that those men who refused to obey the laws in America 




Barton concluded that he hoped the current situation would not yield similar results, but if it 
did fault would lie with the British government and not the unionists. 
 In this speech, Barton compared the Home Rule Bill to acts passed in the American 
colonies before the Revolution.  He asserted that Home Rule, if passed, would never be 
obeyed in Ulster.  He also underscored the Ulster roots of the Scotch-Irishmen who fought in 
the American Revolution.  Finally, Barton drew upon a strain within unionist thought in 
relation to the American example.  As unionists threatened to rebel against the 
implementation of Home Rule, they frequently used the example of the American colonists 
rebelling against the British.  Strikingly, this comparison meant that the Ulster unionists 
identified with Americans rebelling to break their union with Britain.  Unionists themselves 
would resort to rebellion to save the Union. 
 The link between the two periods in history, as Barton pointed out, was that the 
British would attempt use coercion on both the American colonists and the Ulster unionists.  
Barton described the force needed to implement Home Rule in Ulster, stating, 
To impose this proposed constitution upon Ulster they would have to use the Army 
and Navy of the Crown, and the forces of the Crown would have to be kept in Ulster 
year after year, therefore it was with considerable confidence that he told them that 
this law had no more chance of becoming operative than any of the other arbitrary 
Acts that Parliament had sometimes attempted to impose and enforce upon the 
colonies.  (An hon. Member: Coercion.)  Yes; and this was the largest coercive Bill 
that was ever introduced.
34
 
Barton believed that the British government would have to use coercion to force Ulster out of 
the Union.  The theme of coercion was developed as one of the worst things a British 
government could do against their own citizens: forcing laws upon them without their 
consent.  The Home Rule policy was all the more alarming because this coercion was a 
betrayal by the British of their loyal citizens.  The unionists used the American example to 
justify their planned response to this coercion.  Like the colonists they planned to rebel, only 
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this time it was to stay within the Union.  The American example was used to legitimize the 
Ulster unionist threat of resistance, since the American rebellion had clearly been successful. 
 One of the most prominent unionist gatherings during the second Home Rule crisis 
was the Great Unionist Convention of 1892.  At the Convention, the Earl of Erne stated that 
he saw comparisons of the event with the build-up to the American Revolution.  He 
commented, “If you seek a parallel, if you require a precedent, you must go back to the last 
century, to the events which culminated in the American War of Independence.”
35
  The Earl 
of Erne’s comparison illustrated the fervor of Ulster unionists against Home Rule, knowing 
that their actions could result in armed rebellion against the British government. 
 Thomas Sinclair, chairman of the Ulster Liberal Unionist Association, spoke to the 
crowd about the possibility of a new Irish government under Home Rule.  He stated, 
The early efforts of its Executive will be spent in devising means to deal with a 
passive resistance to its taxation coextensive with Loyalist Ulster.  (Loud and 
prolonged cheers.)  In all this we make no threat of blood or arms, we speak defiance 
to no one.  We merely allow those who desire the luxury of Home Rule to enjoy its 
legislation, and to pay for it themselves.  (Cheers.)  Our kinsmen of the American 
revolution have taught us to leave it to those that will force tyranny and injustice 
upon us to strike the first blow.  (Loud cheers.)
36
 
Like Barton, Sinclair saw the potential for future defiance or rebellion against the coercive 
implementation of Home Rule.  With the comparisons to the time of America’s Continental 
Congresses, the Great Convention had a sense of expectation as a turning point in Ulster 
history.  Anything could happen if Home Rule was forced upon them.  The Belfast News-
Letter described Sinclair’s words of defiance as “the spirit of the Convention; and it attracted 
the applause of thousands of Delegates, who were sent from every part of Loyal Ulster to 
declare to Great Britain, to declare to Disloyal Ireland and to the world that a Parliament in 
Dublin shall never be permitted to exercise dominion in the North.”
37
 
 Themes of legitimacy and coercion developed in Ulster unionist rhetoric against the 
second Home Rule Bill until the bill ended with defeat in the House of Lords.  Twenty years 
later, similar themes emerged in the rhetoric of Ulster unionists in their utilization of the 
American colonial and revolutionary periods during the third Home Rule crisis.  By the time 
of the Parliament Act of 1911, unionists had grown increasingly focused on Ulster rather 
than the rest of Ireland.  Unionist rhetoric was increasingly militant.  The Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF), formally established in January 1913, was the source of many comparisons 
with American rebels. 
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 Looking back on this period from 1922, Ronald McNeill, Ulster-born MP for St. 
Augustine’s, wrote in Ulster’s Stand for Union that many commentators viewed Ulster 
unionists’ militant attitudes as “mere bluster and bluff.”  McNeill wrote that the only reply to 
these perceptions was contempt.  “There never was anything further from the truth, as 
anyone ought to have known who had the smallest acquaintance with Irish history or with the 
character of the race that had supplied the backbone of Washington’s army.”
38
  McNeill used 
the Scotch-Irish role in the American Revolution to underscore the seriousness of the UVF 
threat.  They were not bluffing when they threatened to rebel against the implementation of 
Home Rule. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Hugh Morrison in his Modern Ulster.  He 
wrote, 
The Volunteer Army on which Ulster’s Provisional Government will depend in the 
event of Home Rule being forced upon us is a citizen army, drilled and armed on the 
system adopted by many of our forefathers when in the War of Independence in 
America they had to defend themselves against British aggression.
39
 
The American Revolutionary War example and Ulster ties to the Scotch-Irish were used to 
develop the themes of militancy and legitimacy of Ulster threats.  Ulster unionists relied on 
the ethnic identity of the Scotch-Irish to put their point across, emphasizing determined and 
pioneering “racial” characteristics. 
 Ulster unionist celebration of their connections to the Scotch-Irish revolutionary 
heritage in America was apparent in parliamentary rhetoric against the third Home Rule Bill.  
Andrew Long Horner, MP for South Tyrone, stated, 
The Ulster breed has never known defeat.  We are scoffed at as a minority.  We 
admit inferiority in numbers, but nothing else.  In a miserable minority in former 
times we yet changed the dynasty of this country.  In a miserable minority our race 
played the most conspicuous part against the mad legislation of the British 
government that led to the foundation of the American Republic.  Take care where 
this mad legislation of yours to-day will lead you.  We have done more as pioneers 
and colonists than any part of the United Kingdom.  Do you think the men who are 
of our blood and race, controlling, as they do, the greatest interests in our Colonies, 
will stand by and see you coerce us, your oldest Colony, by force to leave the shelter 
of the Imperial Parliament and accept the Government of men whose whole careers 
have been abuse and hatred of us and you?
40
 
Horner used the connection with the American colonial and revolutionary periods to prove 
the strength of the Ulster people, expressing the sense that Ulster could pose quite a threat to 
the British government.  He emphasized the power of the Ulster “race” through historical 
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example and colonial influence.  He also echoed the idea of Home Rule as coercion that had 
been underscored by unionists in 1893.  Horner also attempted to legitimize Ulster’s stance 
against Home Rule through the continued emphasis on the legislation as betrayal by the 
British.  Horner saw Home Rule as the British turning their most loyal subjects over to the 
domination of men who had abused and hated them. 
 Complaints arose in Parliament that Ulster unionists were making plans for resisting 
the implementation of Home Rule before they had even experienced life under a new Irish 
parliament.  In response, unionists used the American example to justify their threats.  In a 
1914 speech at Bristol, Andrew Bonar Law replied “to the allegation that Ulster was crying 
out before she was hurt.”  He stated, “The American colonies had done the same thing – they 
had revolted on a question of principle while suffering was still distant, and for a cause that 
in itself was trivial in comparison to that of Ulster.”
41
  Bonar Law developed the theme of 
legitimacy of the unionist cause by justifying the timing of Ulster’s threats through the 
Revolutionary War example.  He also minimized the grievances of the American colonists 
while amplifying those of the unionists. 
 In the House of Lords, George Curzon, representative peer for Ireland, pointed out 
that sympathy for minority parties fighting for their rights was a tradition of the British. 
When Parliament and the Puritans rebelled against the King, when the American 
Colonies revolted, when the French Revolution broke out – in every case of an 
insurrectionary movement in the small States of Europe, whether it was Italy, or 
Greece, or Poland, or Hungary, or to go further afield, Armenia, or the Balkans, or 
the Sudan, always on the other side  we have had sympathy with the minority which 
was rising against the majority, and we remember one case where a people were 
actually fighting against us, and we were told that they were persons rightly 
struggling to be free.  Yet when Ulster proposes to do exactly the same thing, simply 
because it does not fit in with your policy, you accuse them of the wickedness of 
plunging the country into Civil War.
42
 
Curzon accused the government of failing to sympathize with Ulster simply because the 
Ulster unionists did not fit in with government plans.  This contrasted with the British 
sympathy with the cause of the American colonists, even though they were fighting against 
them. 
 As in previous anti-Home Rule campaigns, criticisms against the form of the Home 
Rule Bill utilized the American example.  William Mitchell-Thomson, MP for North Down, 
warned, 
There remains, and of course, always will remain, the power of the Imperial 
Parliament to legislate for Ireland – the over-riding supremacy of this Parliament.  
This is inalienable.  You cannot divest yourselves of that even if you would.  If you 
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could, no doubt hon. Gentlemen would ask this House to divest itself of it.  It always 
remains in theory, but unless you control the Executive in the country, or unless you 
have the Executive with you, it does not exist in practice.  Everyone knows that is 
true.  It was the very attempt to enforce this over-riding supremacy against the 
wishes of an Executive that cost us our Colonies in America.
43
 
The end of salutary neglect and enforcement of Parliament’s basic right to govern the 
American colonies had led to the American Revolution.  With a new Irish parliament, 
Mitchell-Thomson believed, the nationalists would seize control of the Executive and rebel if 
the Westminster Parliament ever attempted to assert their inalienable supremacy.  This meant 
that the establishment of an Irish parliament would lead to threats of separation.  It also 
showed that Protestants in Ulster could not rely on the Westminster Parliament to intervene 
if their rights were ever threatened by a new, nationalist-controlled Irish parliament. 
 Another problem with the form of the Home Rule Bill lay with the breaking of fiscal 
union between Great Britain and Ireland.  Bonar Law asserted that fiscal unity was what held 
the country together.  Without that, complete separation and war were likely outcomes.  He 
stated, 
The experience and practice of the whole world has shown that the first and essential 
state to national unity is fiscal union.  Take the case of the United States.  It was not 
the War of Independence that made the United States a nation.  After the War of 
Independence, when they had different fiscal systems, there was so much jealousy 
between States inside and States on the sea border that they were more than once on 
the point of war with each other.  It was the work of Alexander Hamilton to give one 
fiscal system for the whole United States, and by doing so he made the United States 
a nation, and you are upsetting that arrangement.
44
 
In his criticism of the breaking of fiscal union, Bonar Law was likely drawing upon the 
influential work of F.S. Oliver.  Oliver published his Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on 
American Union, in 1906. 
 Oliver was a merchant who, while never formally entering into politics, became a 
significant figure in the movement for union of the Empire.  He lobbied politicians, and 
wrote pamphlets, letters to the editor, and books.  In Hamilton, his first book, Oliver made no 
secret of his personal agenda: he hoped that that the British public would use Hamilton’s role 
in creating unity between the thirteen American states as a source of inspiration for the 
creation of unity within the Empire.
45
  Oliver wrote of Hamilton, “The quality of his 
statesmanship, the nature of that inarticulate desire for union on which he built, the strength 
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and the obstinacy of those difficulties which he encountered at every turn, are subjects of 
universal interest.  He is no local hero, but one whose work and greatness have a meaning for 




 According to Oliver, though Hamilton played a limited role in the Revolutionary 
War he became the “master spirit of America” after the war ended.  He worked to unite 
“thirteen jealous allies whose only serviceable bonds were an aspiration towards 
independence and a common enemy.”
47
  Oliver’s Hamilton was probably the most prominent 
example of the comparison between the situation in the United Kingdom and the 
revolutionary period in the United States.  Oliver was also influential in his other writings on 
union of the Empire, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  Like Oliver, Ulster 
unionists drew inspiration from Hamilton and the revolutionary period in American history, 
because of the parallels in the goals they wished to achieve.  As Oliver wrote, “The final 
question with us, as with Hamilton, is how we may convert a voluntary league of states, 
terminable upon breath, into a firm union.”
48
  For the Ulster unionists, the effort was to hold 
their current Union together. 
 Ulster unionists throughout the Home Rule era used examples from the American 
colonial and revolutionary periods to discredit the system set up within the Home Rule Bills.  
The cry of “no taxation without representation” was used to criticize the representation 
system developed in the first Home Rule Bill.  They also used these historical examples to 
develop themes of legitimacy, coercion, betrayal, and militancy.  Ulster unionists 
consistently drew upon their ethnic connections with the Scotch-Irish of early America.  
They developed an ethnic identity emphasizing determination, pioneering spirit, and fighting 
for ideals. 
 They also used the American example to justify threats of resistance and violence if 
Home Rule was implemented.  Both America and Ulster faced coercive measures forced on 
them by the British government.  Unionists portrayed Ulster’s grievances against Home Rule 
as even greater than any grievances that the American colonists might have had against the 
British government.  According to unionists, both the American colonists and Ulster 
unionists were right to rebel against this tyranny, even if British legislation was technically 
constitutional.  This strain of thought is embodied in remarks made by Mitchell-Thomson 
during the third Home Rule crisis: 
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Our position in Ulster is perfectly clear.  It was stated for us in terms nearly a century 
and a half ago by the people of the State of Virginia in the famous resolutions which 
are called “The Botetourt Resolutions.”  I should like to read one of them.  It 
expresses our position in 1912, as it expressed in February 1775, and when 
confirmed in 1860, the view of the State of Virginia.  It says – “It is hereby resolved 
that we desire no change in our system of government while left to the free 
enjoyment of our equal privileges secured by the Constitution, but that should a 
tyrannical sectional majority under the sanction of the forms of the Constitution 




Like the American colonists, Ulster was perfectly happy to retain the connection with Britain 
as it stood at the time.  Like the Americans, Ulster would rebel if that system was changed 
through coercive measures.  The difference was that America rebelled to break the British 
connection.  Ulster unionists were willing to resort to violence and militancy to maintain the 
Union. 
 
War Between the States 
 Like the Revolutionary War, the American Civil War was one of the key points of 
comparison for Ulster unionists.  As in the prior example, it is similarly important to 
understand their views of the Civil War by first understanding the context of British and Irish 
perceptions of the war as it was happening.  One important difference in the case of the Civil 
War was that it was easily within living memory during the Home Rule period, ending only 
twenty years before the first Home Rule crisis.  Joseph Hernon’s short article on the “Use of 
the American Civil War in the Debate over Irish Home Rule” shows how politicians and 
intellectuals who had supported the Northern States later as Liberal Unionists used the Civil 
War example to oppose Irish Home Rule.
50
  Hernon writes that the principles of states’ rights 
in the Civil War, which helped to validate the Confederate standpoint, were used as 
examples by the Liberal Unionists.  They feared that if Ireland was granted Home Rule the 
Irish nationalists would use states’ rights principles to demand complete separation.
51
 
 Hernon rightly points out that there are limits to the logic of this parallel, because 
slavery as a moral issue played such a large role in the American situation.
52
  However, fear 
of states’ rights leading to Irish separation was not the only way that the Civil War example 
was employed in unionist rhetoric.  The Civil War, considered the greatest war in living 
memory at the time, was frequently used to develop themes of legitimacy of the Ulster cause, 
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the sense of betrayal by Britain because they would not fight to hold the Union together, and 
unity as part of the spirit of the age. 
 During the Civil War, British sympathy for the Confederacy led to severely 
heightened tensions with the United States.  This was complicated by Britain’s historic role 
in campaigning for emancipation.
53
  Abraham Lincoln himself had attempted to reassure 
southerners that he would not threaten the institution of slavery.  Onlookers in Britain and 
Ireland therefore believed that the war was only about preserving the Union contrary to 
principles of self-determination.
54
  William Gladstone, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer 
at the time of the war, famously supported the Confederacy on the basis of states’ rights 
principles. 
 The Civil War also had an important impact on Anglo-American trade relations.  
With the outbreak of war in 1861, Northern ships blockaded parts of the Confederacy.  The 
supply of cotton to Britain was cut off.  This resulted in increased business for the Belfast 
linen industry.  Belfast dominance in the industry was sparked for the rest of the nineteenth 
century, though profit margins fell after the end of the war.
55
 
 For some future British unionists such as John Bright and William Forster, the 
North’s fight to save the Union and emancipate slaves was more appealing than supporting a 
Southern government propped up by slavery.  For some British Tories, the Civil War was 
proof that a republican system built around notions of democratic representation could not 
work.  Irish Protestants were varied according to political creed.  Conservatives felt 
animosity toward the American republic and sympathy toward the Confederacy.  Radicals 
were pro-American and viewed the American republic as their model.
56
  Like the 
Revolutionary War example, Ulster unionists’ use of the American Civil War emphasized 
the Ulster Scots’ traditional identification with liberal and radical politics as they tried to 
maintain the Union. 
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As the United States came out of the Civil War and became increasingly prosperous, 
views became more sympathetic.  America’s growing strength on the world-stage at the end 
of the nineteenth century helped fuel notions of Anglo-Saxon racial unity between Britain 
and the United States.
57
  At the same time, the American Civil War became a prominent 
example for Ulster unionists searching for historical parallels to their own situation.  Kevin 
Kenny points out that both unionists and nationalists used the American Civil War and the 
example of Abraham Lincoln to address fundamental questions of national sovereignty, the 
idea of union, secession, political leadership, and civil war.
58
  Beyond these themes, unionists 
used the Civil War to expound ideas of morality, legitimacy, and betrayal. 
 During the first Home Rule crisis, unionists used the Civil War to develop several 
themes in their rhetoric.  With Gladstone’s conversion to Home Rule, many Ulster Liberals 
turned to an alliance with the Conservatives.  As the Liberal Party was faced with schism 
during the first Home Rule Bill, T.W. Russell, MP for South Tyrone, defended the stance of 
Liberal Unionists.  He stated in an 1886 Stirlingshire speech: 
My alternative is – ‘Maintain the Union, be scrupulous to redress every Irish wrong, 
be even generous in view of the past, but govern the Country.’  I am told that 
Democracy will not consent to do this.  Let us not be too sure of that.... The great 
Democracy of the United States answered to Abraham Lincoln, not to Jefferson 
Davis.  And to maintain the Union there the cannon thundered in the valley of the 
Shenandoah, the musketry rattled on the heights of Fredericksburg, and Grant fought 
and conquered at Richmond.  And the Union was maintained there, just as I firmly 
believe it will be maintained here.
59
 
Russell defended the Liberal Unionists’ choice to break from Gladstone, committing them to 
maintain Liberal social policies in Ireland while supporting the Union.  When faced with the 
question of whether Home Rule was inevitable, the Civil War provided an example of a 
people willing to commit everything to maintaining unity rather than separation.  Many 
Liberal Unionists maintained that they were willing to give every consideration to bettering 
the condition of Ireland other than destruction of the Union. 
Ulster’s Liberal Unionists used the American Civil War example to condemn 
Gladstone’s Home Rule stance.  Belfast Reverend R.J. Lynd wrote, 
Mr. Gladstone is not infallible.  Had he his will, the United States of America would 
now be cut into two kingdoms, and slavery would still retain its grim hold on the 
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kingdom of the South without any control from the North.  To us Irish Liberals, who 
loved him and followed him with a devotion and personal veneration seldom 
equalled, but never surpassed, there could not be a more melancholy spectacle under 
the sun than Mr. Gladstone as a Liberal leader presents now.
60
 
The former supporters of Gladstone recognized a pattern in his support of the Confederacy 
and his promotion of Irish Home Rule.  As implied by Lynd, an immoral cause would have a 
hold over a helpless minority in each case. 
 The unionists were concerned about the Irish Protestant minority, particularly within 
Ulster.  The United States had their own example of a significant loyal minority which would 
have been given over to the disloyal majority were it not for partition.  West Virginia 
seceded from Virginia following a series of conventions in Wheeling in 1861.  The 
partitioned region became a state in 1863. 
Principal William Arthur wrote of the West Virginia example in 1886, 
We are told of Home Rule in the United States: was there ever a State put away from 
the control of the National Legislature, to give entire practical control over it to a 
majority composed of men disloyal to the Union, and that against the protest of a 
powerful minority?  Virginia was divided because the minority in West Virginia, 
loyal to the union, claimed to be exempt from the régime of the disaffected majority 
in the bulk of the State; just as, if the worst came to the worst, Ulster should have to 
be freed from the yoke she dreads.
61
 
The West Virginia example was echoed by Ronald McNeill, writing in Ulster’s Stand for 
Union 36 years later: 
If the Union with great Britain was to be abrogated, which Pitt had only established 
when “a full measure of Home Rule” had produced a bloody insurrection and Irish 
collusion with England’s external enemies, Ulster could at all events in the last resort 
take her stand on Abraham Lincoln’s famous proposition which created West 
Virginia: “A minority of a large community who make certain claims for self-
government cannot, in logic or substance, refuse to same claims to a much larger 
proportionate minority among themselves.”
62
 
The West Virginia example was employed to show that the British government had no 
precedent for abandoning the loyal minority within Ireland to a disloyal majority.  In fact, as 
McNeill pointed out, it would be contradictory for Irish nationalists to demand self-
determination and then refuse the same to a strong minority within the country. 
 The Civil War example was used to deny Irish nationalists the right to compel the 
Westminster Parliament to change the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain within 
the Union.  Reverend George Salmon, Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of 
Dublin and Chancellor of St. Patrick’s Cathedral, believed that, like the South during the 
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Civil War, Irish nationalists might technically be allowed to demand changes such as Home 
Rule.  Despite its constitutionality, this did not mean that Parliament should grant Home 
Rule to them if it would lead to greater dangers.  Salmon stated at the special meeting of the 
Church of Ireland General Synod in 1886, 
I will remind you of what you can remember took place in America.  As far as I 
understand the law of their Constitution, the Southern States had a perfect right to 
separate from the Northern if they were so minded.  But the Northern States, when 
asked to submit to such a separation, decided that civil war was preferable.  You 
know what sacrifices of money, of valuable lives, were necessary to conquer the 
heroic resistance of the South.  But what evil or inconvenience that the North could 
have suffered from the existence of an independent nation in the South is within 
many degrees comparable to the danger to England from an independent Ireland.
63
 
In the United States, Civil War was preferable to the North than allowing the South to legally 
secede from the Union.
64
  Salmon felt that the threat of an independent Confederacy to the 
North was similar to that of a Home Rule Ireland to Britain, because of the dangers of total 
separation. 
 Unionists used the Civil War example to show that attempting to use Home Rule to 
pacify Irish nationalist would be futile.  At a March 1886 loyalist demonstration in Lurgan, 
Reverend Michael Beattie stated, “The integrity and unity of the United Kingdom was at 
stake.  England had won her empire by the sword; America won back the Federal States by 
the sword.  Were thirty-three millions of British people going to be dictated to by Parnell’s 
brigade?  (‘Never.’)  They should never accept Home Rule.”
65
  During the Civil War, the 
North had refused to pacify the South.  The British government should refuse to pacify Irish 
nationalists with Home Rule because the large majority of British people had a right to 
overrule the minority Irish nationalists.  If Home Rule was granted to the disloyal Parnellites, 
total separation from the Union would be an even greater threat. 
Speaking at an Orange Soiree near Lurgan in February 1886, Colonel Thomas 
Waring, MP for North Down, argued,  
I hope we shall show such a united front here as will justify your representatives in 
England in pointing out to both the Government and the people there that if they try 
experiments in the direction of Home Rule they run the risk of igniting a civil war – 
a war which, in the intensity and fierceness, would only be equaled by that between 
the Northern and Southern States of America, and which I venture to predict would 
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have a similar result – namely, that those who contend for disintegration shall 
succumb to those who contend for union.  (Applause.)
66
 
Waring developed the theme of not pacifying Irish nationalists by emphasizing that if the 
British government attempted to do so with Home Rule, it could lead to separation, and 
worse – civil war in Ireland.  Waring also implied that Ulster unionists could themselves be 
forced to fight to avoid separation. 
 The most prominent use of the Civil War example during the first Home Rule crisis 
promoted this theme of militancy.  Lord Randolph Churchill encouraged Ulster to defend its 
position within the Union in his famous Belfast speech on 22 February 1886.  Churchill used 
the Civil War example to show that a significant change to the Union could not occur 
without hostilities breaking out.  He stated, “No portentous change such as the repeal of 
Union, no change so gigantic, could be accomplished by the mere passing of a law.  The 
history of the United States will teach us a different lesson.”
67
  Churchill used the Civil War 
example to justify Ulster militancy. 
A few months later he underlined this theme of militancy in a May 1886 letter to 
William Young.  Churchill used his notorious phrase, “Ulster will fight; Ulster will be right; 
Ulster will emerge from the struggle victorious.”  In the letter he prefaced this phrase with 
the United States example.  Churchill explained that he: 
ventured to lay down that if Home Rule was to come within the limits of practical 
politics the action of the Northern States of America from 1861 to 1865 would have 
to be the model of the action of the Tory party under closely analogous perils, and 
that in a close imitation of American action, in spite of every conceivable danger, 
would be found the only method for the attainment of Imperial safety and for the 
preservation of Imperial unity.
68
 
Churchill was accused by opponents of encouraging sectarian hatred.  Some historians have 
accused him of inconsistency in his opposition to Home Rule as he opportunistically played 
the “Orange card.”  R.E. Quinault, however, has argued that Churchill’s words indicated his 
unfailing support of “enlightened unionism,” in that he was loyal to the Conservative policy 
of unionism but at times went against the Tories by supporting progressive measures that he 
hoped would strengthen the Union.  His use of the Civil War example, according to 
Quinault, showed that no matter what measures Ulster took to defend the Union, they would 
be justified by the results.  America’s peace and prosperity after the Civil War justified the 
extensive fighting that they had gone through.
69
  In addition, Churchill maintained that to 
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preserve the Empire, Britain would have to fight for the preservation of the Union with 
Ireland. 
 By the end of the decade, unionist rhetoric continued to emphasize fear of Irish 
separatism.  Unionists believed that the disintegration of the Union was more likely if Home 
Rule was granted rather than Ireland maintaining its current relationship with the rest of the 
United Kingdom.  A Times editorial of 1889 stated, 
It may be contended, indeed, that Ireland is divorced from this country by an 
alienation of sentiment so deep and lasting that there is no hope of reconciling her to 
England as Scotland was reconciled during the last century or as the Southern States 
of the American Union were reconciled to the North in our own time.  But if this be 
true, it is even more fatal to the hope of carrying into effect a Home Rule scheme 




Conservatives hoped that steady maintenance of the Union, coupled with constructive 
unionist policy improvements, would help Ireland to be reconciled with the rest of the United 
Kingdom.  If Home Rule was granted, it was likely that Irish nationalists would lead the 
nation in the opposite direction and pursue total separation. 
 J.A. Rentoul, MP for East Down, similarly expressed reservations about allowing 
Irish Home Rule.  He feared that nationalist sentiment would turn Irish members of the 
British army against Great Britain if the two sides came to any sort of conflict.  Within the 
second Home Rule Bill, one of the powers reserved to Westminster was the control over war 
and peace.  All soldiers and officers would come under the control of one army, just as in the 
United States at the beginning of the Civil War. 
 As Rentoul described, this was no protection from sectional or nationalist 
sentiments.  He stated, 
When the war began, each man seemed to consider that he was a member of a State 
first, and a member of the Republic afterwards; for we find that those generals who 
had been born in the Southern States went with the South, such as Johnston, and 
Jebb, and Lee; and that those generals who had been born in the Northern States 
went with the North; for example Sherman, and Grant, and Sheridan.  Now, will hon. 
Gentlemen consider whether or not the same result might not be expected in the case 
of a difference between the Irish Parliament, and the Imperial Parliament?
71
 
According to Rentoul, the passage of the Home Rule Bill would be dangerous because it 
would give credibility to nationalist sentiments that might lead Irish members of the British 
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Army to turn against Great Britain.  Home Rule would set up conflicts which would cause 
British-trained soldiers to fight against their own army. 
 In the same speech, Rentoul emphasized that by allowing Home Rule, the 
Westminster Parliament would be going against the worldwide trend toward unity, as 
described earlier in this chapter.  Rentoul stated, “In the entire history of the world, no nation 
has ever done, ever discussed, or even ever dreamed of doing to itself that which is proposed 
by this Bill.”  He then gave examples of Italy and France moving toward closer union, before 
moving on to the United States: 
The next case I will refer to is the United States of America, and this instance I need 
only mention.  The Southern were different from the Northern States in sentiment, 
greatly different in race, and different in both habits and education, yet one of the 
greatest wars of modern times was waged in order to preserve the Republic one and 
united.  The devastation there was nothing ordinary.  Bitter and irretrievable ruin was 
hurled upon tens of thousands, who wanted nothing except the mere sentimental 
gratification of a simple desire for Home Rule…. In La Vendée, and in the United 
States of America, we have two instances in the same century of the desperate 
lengths to which France and America went in order to prevent Home Rule, and yet 
we are told to grant Home Rule, and told that we are self-seekers, bigots, and fools if 
we do not grant it at once and with enthusiasm.
72
 
Through this use of the Civil War example, Rentoul attempted to discredit the possibility of 
Home Rule and defend the unionist stance.  He emphasized the great differences between the 
two sides in the conflict, which mirrored the differences between the unionists and the Irish 
nationalists.  He also emphasized the size and devastation of the Civil War, which illustrated 
the lengths to which the North was willing to go to preserve the American Union. 
Like the United States, Ulster unionists were faced with demands for Home Rule.  
They felt that the British government was not making any effort to combat these demands 
but simply accommodated them despite the threat of the destruction of the Union.  Ulster 
unionists observed the extreme measures taken by the North to prevent the implementation 
of Home Rule.  They resented being painted as bigots and fools by British Liberals and Irish 
nationalists because they wanted to do the same thing in their country.  In this example, 
Rentoul developed the themes of legitimacy of the unionist cause because of the similarities 
with the Northern states, and betrayal by the British who were unwilling to stand up to the 
nationalists’ Home Rule demands. 
The Duke of Argyll wrote in the Times that unionists were willing to stand against 
Home Rule at any cost because their cause was morally right.  He stated, “Every now and 
then, in public affairs, some question arises which goes directly to affect the progress of good 
or evil in the world.  In affirming that our own side is the cause of good, we do not mean that 
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our opponents are personally servants of evil.”  He then used the American example to 
highlight his point: 
Such was the great issue fought out in the American Civil War.  It was very easy 
then, from good motives, to take the wrong side.  Mr. Gladstone probably now sees 
that he did take the wrong one when he boasted that Jefferson Davis had “made a 
nation.”  It would have been a nation founded on slavery as its most cherished 
institution.  I have myself the deepest conviction that he is making a similar mistake 
now.  I feel quite sure that our cause, and not his, is the sacred cause.  Ours is the 
cause of personal liberty, of truth, and good faith between man and man – of the 




Argyll believed that just as Gladstone had misjudged the American Civil War, he was 
misjudging the Irish situation.  The North had proved that they were the morally right side in 
the Civil War.  Argyll emphasized the theme of unionist legitimacy through his attempt to 
discredit Gladstone based on his past support of the Confederacy.  He also emphasized the 
corrupt nature and immorality of the nationalist cause.  Argyll, who had supported the North 
during the Civil War, believed that unionists were similarly justified in their stance of 
preserving the Union.  They represented the cause of liberty, truth, and good faith, and the 
furtherance of “good” in the world. 
 By the time of the third Home Rule Bill, unionists questioned the sustainability of 
nationalistic sentiment in Ireland.  Hugh Barrie, MP for North Londonderry, stated in 
Parliament, 
The late Mr. W.E.H. Lecky, that great historian and brilliant Irishman, referred in 
one of his works to the spirit of secession which gave America great trouble in the 
last century.  That agitation, as he said, was spread over a much wider area than 
Ireland, was supported by a far larger proportion of the population, and was 
accompanied by an unmeasurably [sic] greater amount of earnestness and self-
sacrifice; yet it has now entirely disappeared.  In my opinion, and in the opinion of a 
growing number of people in Ireland, the demand for Home Rule in Ireland to-day is 
infinitely less than it was when the previous two Bills were before Parliament.
74
 
Barrie believed that during the American Civil War, the South had a much greater spirit of 
secession than the Irish.  He felt that by 1912 that spirit had faded away entirely.  He 
therefore expected that the lesser nationalistic sentiment in Ireland would also disappear over 
time.  Barrie’s argument was part of an overall theme in unionist rhetoric that the Irish 
nationalists did not truly represent the Irish people, who did not want Home Rule. 
 Another common theme used to argue against the implementation of Home Rule was 
the threat that a completely independent Ireland would pose to Great Britain.  To develop 
this theme, many unionists called upon the statements of American Admiral Alfred Thayer 
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Mahan.  Mahan had been a naval officer for the North during the Civil War.  He continued to 
serve in the Navy throughout the 1870s and 1880s.  Mahan gained most prominence through 
his written work on naval history, including The Influence of Sea Power upon History written 
in 1890.  He wrote an article on imperial federation that touched on the Irish situation in 
1902 which was often quoted by Ulster unionists.
75
  As described by Ronald McNeill, 
Ulstermen 
continually strove to make Englishmen realise that far more was involved than loyal 
support of England’s only friends in Ireland; they quoted such pronouncements as 
Admiral Mahan’s “it is impossible for a military man, or a statesman with an 
appreciation of military conditions, to look at a map and not perceive that if the 
ambition of the Irish Separatists were realised, it would be even more threatening to 
the national life of Britain than the secession of the South was to that of the 




Mahan’s pronouncement that Britain had more to fear from the separation of Ireland than the 
North did from the South resonated with unionists.  The confirmation of an expert in 
historical naval power of their fears of separation was used innumerable times to show the 
military dangers of Home Rule to Great Britain. 
 Unionists believed that demands for separation would inevitably follow the British 
government’s grant of Home Rule.  This would leave the government with the choice 
between full Union and complete separation.  Ulster unionists wondered if the British 
government would resort to civil war if the Irish nationalists attempted complete separation, 
as the North had done with the South.  An editorial in the Belfast Presbyterian Witness in 
1912 observed, 
The Southern States of America demanded in practical effect what the Irish 
Nationalists are now demanding – separation from the North, as the Irish 
Nationalists are demanding separation from Great Britain.  The North went to war 
rather than submit to it.  The British government in regard to Ireland represents the 
Northern States of that day.  But they do not fight; they surrender; and with their 
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As the editors of the Witness explained, the North went to war to save their Union, but the 
British government did not put up any fight to prevent Home Rule and future separation.  
Ulster unionists observed the British government surrendering their loyal citizens to Irish 
nationalists without any form of resistance.  The Ulster unionists’ sense of betrayal was 
heightened.  As Paul Bew asserts, it was this sense of British treachery which increasingly 
led unionists to turn their arguments from traditional pro-Union political theory.  They began 
to argue instead for the principle of self-determination, which in turn helped lead to partition 
and the establishment of a separate Northern Ireland Parliament.
78
 
 With the betrayal by the British, Ulster unionists felt that they could rely only on 
their own resources to prevent the implementation of Home Rule.  As war loomed in Europe, 
the situation was made even more serious.  Because of the dangers of a European-wide war, 
unionists argued that Ireland should not be granted self-government even if nationalist 
sentiment warranted it. 
 In any case, unionists believed that self-government had not been earned in Ireland.  
Ulster unionists felt that they would be justified if they resorted to civil war to prevent the 
implementation of Home Rule since the British government would not come to their aid.  In 
Parliament, McNeill expressed the view that civil war between Ulster, Irish nationalists, and 
the British government was imminent.  He opined, 
It seems strange that the present Government, who, if report speaks truly, such is 
their enlightenment, avoided the thirteenth day of the month for the summoning of 
Parliament, should have chosen to introduce this Bill on a very significant 
anniversary.  It was on the 11
th
 April, fifty-one years ago, that the first step was taken 
in the great American Civil War.  I say, in all earnestness and with all reverence, that 
I pray God that on this 11
th
 April, fifty-one years later, the Prime Minister may not 




11 April 1861 was actually the day before fighting officially broke out at Fort Sumter, the 
day that negotiations broke down between the North and South in the Civil War. 
 Throughout the third Home Rule crisis, unionist rhetoric ramped up the atmosphere 
of militancy with threats of civil war.  As pamphleteer Tom Bruce Jones wrote in 1914, the 
great lesson of the American Civil War was that it was impossible to withdraw at will from a 
union.  He wrote, 
Whilst men may join a union of States and so constitute a nation, yet neither these 
men nor their descendants can withdraw at will from that nation.  In other words, 
strangely paradoxical as it may appear, brothers will fight with brothers to preserve 
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for themselves and their children a common brotherhood of race.  The British 
Government would do well to ponder over some of these lessons to-day.
80
 
Put another way, the United States’ fight to preserve the Union during the Civil War justified 
Ulster unionists’ fight to defend the Union between Great Britain and Ireland.  Unionists like 
Jones believed this was true even if it led to civil war breaking out in their own country. 
 The American Civil War was used by unionists for a wide variety of purposes as 
they fought against Home Rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Ulster 
unionists used the Civil War to develop a theme of legitimacy for their own stances against 
Home Rule.  The Civil War was also used throughout the Home Rule period to express the 
theme of betrayal by the British because they so easily gave into demands for Home Rule 
against the interests of their loyal citizens.  The North had gone to extreme lengths to 
struggle for the American Union, but the British refused to fight for their Union with Ireland.  
During the first and second Home Rule crises, Ulster unionists used the Civil War to criticize 
Gladstone’s conversion to Home Rule and assert that his pro-Home Rule policies were as 
morally wrong as supporting the Confederacy.  As time went on, the American Civil War 
was used more and more to justify militant stances taken by Ulster unionists, including 
threats to resort to civil war to protect their own Union. 
 Unionists in both Britain and Ireland so identified with the side of the North that they 
even used poetry written during the American Civil War to express their own sentiments 
about the Irish situation.  Joseph Chamberlain quoted Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in an 
1887 Belfast speech, stating, 
This United Kingdom of ours has been built up by the sacrifices and the resolution of 
many generations.  It has stood the shock of the storm and the rage of the whirlwind.  
May we not say of it now, in the words of the American poet who lived to witness 
the greatest contest of our time, waged in order to defend the integrity of the 
commonwealth: “Sail on, O ship of State/ Sail on, O Union strong and great/ 




The American Civil War symbolized the power of the Union to endure threats of separation 
and disconnection if only there were people willing to fight for it. 
 
Constitution of the United States 
 Throughout the Home Rule period, the American constitution was frequently 
employed as an example in both the political and intellectual arenas.  Ulster unionist views 
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of the United States constitution undoubtedly were shaped by concurrent debates over 
Teutonism, “Greater” Britain and imperial federation, and democratic reform of the United 
Kingdom government.  These debates have been explored extensively by John Kendle, 
Christopher Harvie, Michael Burgess, Duncan Bell, and others.
82
  Unionists of the time 
would have been made aware of the details of the American constitution through the works 
of British intellectuals such as James Bryce and A.V. Dicey.
83
  The American constitutional 
example was frequently used by those arguing both for and against Home Rule in the United 




 This section will focus on themes which emerged in Ulster unionist rhetoric on the 
American constitution when applied to the Irish situation.  There was no coherent system of 
thought by unionists in their application of the American constitutional example.  They used 
the American constitution in different ways for their own purposes depending on the context.  
Rather than an exhaustive survey of the uses of the constitutional example, this section 
contains a sampling of themes intended to illustrate some of the ways in which unionists 
called upon the American constitution to support their own movement and discredit the 
Home Rule bills.  Democracy, constitutional provisions, minority rights and protections, 
federalism, and national unity were all important themes emerging in the unionist rhetoric. 
 Discussion of democracy was a significant theme emerging within unionist rhetoric 
on the United States.  The nineteenth century saw considerable changes to the British 
political system to make it more representative.  In the period 1828 to 1832 alone, the Test 
and Corporation Acts were repealed, Catholics achieved emancipation, and Parliament was 
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reformed.  Increasing numbers of British and Irish citizens were enfranchised through the 
Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884, with the majority of adult males finally getting the vote with 
the latter Act.  The traditional political leaders in the landed gentry began to feel pressure 
from below for a more democratic political decision-making process.
85
  In Ireland, the 
perceived threat of nationalists increased as greater numbers of the Catholic middle and 
working classes were enfranchised, solidifying the nationalist hold in the south.  Throughout 
the United Kingdom, the importance of the landed gentry in politics declined, leading some 
unionists to feel threatened by the onslaught of democracy. 
 An 1883 editorial in the Belfast News-Letter condemned the track that democracy 
had taken in the United States.  The editorial was examining attempts to implement new 
democratic reforms in what would become the Representation of the People Act of 1884.  
The News-Letter stated, 
M. de Tocqueville, in his splendid work on American Democracy, or rather 
“Democracy in America,” distinctly lays down the principle that “the government of 
the middle classes is the most economical.”  The government of the Democracy in 
America has resulted in the government of the people by Caucus wire-pullers…. 
[The United States] has developed the most debasing and corrupt form of 
administration on the face of the earth.”
86
 
The News-Letter condemned democracy as allowing for the debasement and corruption of 
American politics.  Their views were colored by the scandals of Ulysses S. Grant’s 
presidential administration and the machine politics of Tammany Hall.  The News-Letter 
portrayed democratic government as a way to use a veil of support from “the people” to 
benefit a small minority of corrupt politicians at the top. 
 William Ellison Macartney, Conservative MP for South Antrim, also condemned 
American democracy in a lecture in February 1885.  He believed that democracy led to 
mediocrity within politics and society, blocking the progress of potentially great and talented 
men: 
It would be shutting our eyes to one of the most prominent facts in the history of the 
world if we refuse to admit that distinguished men have rarely been found in a 
society that is stamped with mediocrity.  If they are born in it they never come to the 
surface.  They would neither be recognized nor esteemed.  In all probability, they 
would be suspected and ridiculed.  As in the United States, public affairs would have 
no charm for them, and would be left by their abstention to the manipulation of 
unscrupulous politicians.  The fact is admittedly one of the evils which ardent 
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Liberals see impending in the Republic of France.  The experience of a century of 
democratic government in the United States confirms its existence.
87
 
Macartney went on to say that because democracy represented the “controlling tendencies of 
the multitude,” it was intolerant “of individual opinion and personal independence, and its 
capacity for what I have taken as the definition of tyranny – the abusive exercise of power.”
88
  
Macartney believed that democracy led to socialism, communism, and tyranny.  The United 
States had shown its unworkability by itself having a corrupt political system.  It is safe to 
say, however, that these criticisms of American democracy grew less frequent as the United 
States became increasingly prosperous after the end of the Civil War, and as the extension of 
democratic reforms became ingrained within the British system. 
 During the first Home Rule crisis, another theme emerging within unionist rhetoric 
was constitutional provision.  American constitutional provisions and system of government 
were cited to criticize the system set up by the first Home Rule Bill.  Use of the American 
example was part of a larger framework of unionist criticism of the systems set up in each 
Home Rule bill.  Such criticisms generally focused on the formula for representing Ireland in 
the Westminster Parliament, Ireland’s financial relationship in the United Kingdom, and the 
formal constitutional relationship between the two countries.
89
  In 1886, Lord Salisbury was 
described in a unionist pamphlet as speaking 
with admiring regret of the difficulties which stood in the way of change in the 
Constitution of the United States.  In a young community not encumbered with 
traditions, or cursed with the privileged interests which have arisen to corrupt older 




Salisbury, who twenty years earlier had written that the American Civil War had proven that 
the experiment with democracy had failed,
91
 now admired the constitutional safeguards 
which made amending the constitution difficult.  Unlike the condemnations by unionists in 
previous years stating that democracy enabled corruption, Salisbury asserted that these 
constitutional safeguards protected against corruption. 
 George Goschen, MP for East Edinburgh, denounced the Home Rule Bill for the 
lack of central authority within the devolved system.  In a speech reprinted in the Belfast 
News-Letter, he stated, 
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Mr. Gladstone’s bill provided for neither such an authority as the United States 
Supreme Court to decide on the unity of legislation, nor such an authority as the 
Federal Executive.  I do not believe that the American public would for one moment 
tolerate such a paralysis of the Central Executive in any American State as would 
have resulted in Ireland from Mr. Gladstone’s plan.
92
 
Goschen admired the central Supreme Court of the United States and the Federal Executive.  
He also appealed to the American public as a judge of the quality of the Home Rule system.  
Without such central authority, Goschen believed the Irish government would be paralyzed 
with conflict and confusion. 
 Others maintained that the establishment of an Irish parliament would inevitably lead 
to great dangers, no matter what protections were inserted into the system.  A Belfast News-
Letter editorial of 1886 stated, 
Federalism in the United States had to endure a severe test, and now the power of the 
Central Government is greater than before.  As the Marquis of Lorne observes, a 
century’s history has shown the tendency to division in spite of carefully-worded and 
improved Constitutions, and a great civil war was necessary to put an end to the 
absolute sovereignty of the various States.  The States, however, maintain a degree 
of sovereignty, notwithstanding the efforts to centralise authority in Washington.  
Experience teaches that Local Governments are more liable to passion and injustice 
than a Central Government could possibly be; and a Local Government in Ireland, 
unable to resist peculiar influences, would be oppressive and intolerable, no matter 
what guarantees were given for the protection of personal rights.
93
 
The News-Letter called upon the example of the Civil War to assert that that United States 
was moving toward centralization rather than federated power.  According to the News-
Letter, the American example proved that Home Rule would be dangerous no matter what 
protections were put in place and how powerful the central government claimed to be.  
Smaller local governments could still wreak havoc when influenced by local passions.  With 
Irish nationalists already perceived as formidable foes, unionists could only predict that the 
situation would worsen when the Westminster Parliament was no longer able to provide 
protection. 
 National unity was another major theme to emerge in Ulster unionist discourse.  As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, unionists used the example of the United States to prove that 
unity was “the spirit of the age.”  Unionists insisted that there was no example in the history 
of the nations of the world of deliberately cutting an existing union into fragments.
94
  A 
Belfast News-Letter editorial pointed out that with Home Rule, the British government was 
asking the people of the United Kingdom to do something no other country would consider: 
“Ask the Italians to destroy the unity of their kingdom, and what would be the reply?  Ask 
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the Americans to tear up the Constitution of the United States, and they will point to the 
dreadful war between the North and the South to preserve the Union.”
95
  These countries 
were willing to defend their unions at all costs.  Within the context of those unions, they 
were giving increased power to central governments. 
 The Marquis of Lorne emphasized the power of the central government in an 1887 
speech.  He stated, “Indeed, it has been the constant desire of Americans and Canadians to 
make the central power a reality, and not the sham it was of old.  It is sufficiently evident that 
to have a strong central power the several parts endowed with legislatures must not be so 
strong as to defy the supreme Government.”
96
  Lorne insisted that the Civil War proved that 
no faction should be given Home Rule powers.  American analogies describing the relations 
between the federal government and the states were “of little or no use.  On the only occasion 
in which national aspirations other than those pertaining to the whole Union were indulged, 
the indulgence cost the minor nationalists their fortunes and their political rights, after a 
frightful war lasting four years.”
97
  The American federal system could not be copied with a 
Home Rule government in Ireland because the regionalized nationalist sentiments in the two 
countries were so distinctly different.  According to Lorne, the Irish situation meant that the 
United Kingdom needed an even stronger central government than the United States. 
 After the second Home Rule Bill was introduced, Ulster unionists again used 
examples of American constitutional provisions to criticize the bill.  In the Government of 
Ireland Bill Committee, H.O. Arnold-Forster spoke admiringly of the protection against the 
implementation of ex post facto laws in the American constitution.  He quoted the Federalist 
papers as saying, “Our own experience has taught us that additional fences against those 
dangers ought not to be omitted.”
98
  Arnold-Forster hoped that the bill would contain 
protections such as these even if it was unlikely that the Irish parliament would ever impose 
ex post facto laws.  He stated that, 
the Attorney General had shown no reason whatever why they should take a 
different view to that adopted by the framers of the American Constitution, and he 
had entirely failed to meet the contention of those who said there were a thousand 
reasons of the strongest kind why they should be anxious to give shape in the Bill to 
the proposals that were thought adequate by the framers of the Constitution.
99
 
The Liberal Attorney General in question was Sir Charles Russell, an Ulster Catholic.  
According to Arnold-Forster, protections thought vital by the framers of the American 
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constitution ought to be taken into consideration as the Westminster Parliament contemplated 
changes to the British constitutional system.  The American example was common currency 
amongst unionist parliamentarians as they criticized the Home Rule bills and attempted to 
shape the future of Irish governmental policy. 
 W.E.H. Lecky also used American constitutional provisions to criticize the second 
Home Rule Bill.  He posited that the greatest danger of a Home Rule parliament was unjust 
legislation, because the legislature would be in the hands of disloyal and dishonest men.  He 
worried about those men making laws concerning the seizure of property, due process of 
law, and just compensation, because the lawmakers themselves were the “teachers of 
spoilation.”  He found a solution in the American constitution which had not been considered 
in the bill: 
The invaluable article in the American Constitution which provides that no State can 
make a law “impairing the obligation of contracts,” has no place in Mr. Gladstone’s 
scheme, and it has been abundantly shown that his Legislative Council will be an 
absolute farce.  Even if it were a real representative of property, it could always, 
according to the provisions of the Bill, be overruled by the more numerous House in 
a little more than two years.
100
 
Without such protections over contracts and property as the United States constitution 
provided, Lecky feared that the Legislative Council, the upper house provided for in 
Gladstone’s bill, would be rendered useless by the lower house, the Legislative Assembly. 
 Dunbar Barton, MP for Mid Armagh, asserted that the weak upper house meant that 
minority rights would not be protected under Home Rule.  He believed that the American 
system offered much stronger protections of minority rights.  Barton stated, 
There was no comparison between the American Senate and this miserable House, 
which it was proposed to set up.  There were no limits of age or citizenship provided 
in the Bill as qualifications for seats in the Upper House, as there were in the case of 
the American Senate; there was nothing to prevent an alien from becoming a 
member, and he believed and dreaded that, like the Lower House and Irish society 
generally, it might be overrun and overwhelmed by American adventurers and 
returned Fenians, who, having paid their money, would exact this in return.
101
 
Barton’s views encapsulated the complex nature of the Ulster unionist relationship with 
America.  He admired the constitutional provisions in the United States and the minority 
protections provided for by the American Senate.  On the other hand, he feared Irish-
American extremists and returned Fenians.  He worried that without such protections as the 
American system provided, Irish-American extremists would flood Ireland and overrun the 
Irish government. 
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 Macartney also referred to minority rights within the American system.  He argued 
that even with all of their admirable protections in place, it was still possible to encroach on 
the rights of American minorities.  He cited: 
the defiance of President Jackson in the well-known case in which the Supreme 
Court of the United States came into contact with the local legislature of Georgia.  In 
that case the Cherokee Indians appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States 
against the proposals of the local legislature of Georgia in their regard, and the 
Supreme Court held that the proposals of the legislature of Georgia were invalid.  
But what was the effect of that decision?  President Jackson declared – “John 
Marshall has pronounced his verdict; let him execute it if he can.”  The Chancellor of 
the Duchy [James Bryce] in his book on the American Constitution, said that the 
case showed the powerlessness of the Supreme Court to help the unhappy 
Cherokees; and that the success of the resistance of the State of Georgia gave a blow 
to the authority of the Court.
102
 
To Macartney, the case of the Cherokees proved that no matter what provisions were put in 
place to protect minority rights, those protections were ultimately illusory.  Therefore, like 
the Cherokees, the Irish Protestants would always be at risk under a Home Rule parliament. 
 Related to constitutional provisions, another theme to emerge in unionist rhetoric 
was that of federalism.  Federal ideas as applied to the Irish situation were not new: Daniel 
O’Connell had been tempted by the federalist plans of William Sharman Crawford in the 
1840s,
103
 and Isaac Butt had originally started the Home Rule movement in the 1870s with 
ideas of a federal system in the United Kingdom that would help to address Irish 
grievances.
104
  While not a part of the constitutional system of the United Kingdom, 
federalism was frequently an undercurrent in British political thought.  The United Kingdom 
became a major “exporter” of federal systems to other places in the world, as described by 
Michael Burgess.  Federal systems were set up in Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, and 
Malaysia, and played an influential role in the unification of South Africa.
105
 
 Throughout the Home Rule era, federalist ideas were batted around by various 
politicians, either to illustrate parallels between federalist systems and the Home Rule bills, 
or to work as alternatives to Home Rule.  Another important element within federalist 
thought was imperial federation, which operated both within and outside of the Irish Home 
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Rule context.  At one time or another, Joseph Chamberlain, W.T. Stead, Lord Acton, J.R. 
Seeley, J.L. Garvin of the Observer, David Lloyd George, Walter Long, L.S. Amery, and 
Edward Carson all espoused federalist ideas.
106
  On the Irish nationalist side, federalism 
found champions in Moreton Frewen, William O’Brien, and T.M. Healy.
107
 
 Some unionists viewed the Home Rule bills as introducing a federal-state dynamic 
into the relationship between Britain and Ireland.  Carson questioned why the bills did not 
adhere more closely to the American system.  In parliamentary discussions on the second 
Home Rule Bill, Carson reasoned, “As in America, where they had a distinction between 
Federal matters and State matters, so under the Bill, where they had a distinction between 
Imperial matters and local matters, they would necessarily have disputes between the Irish 
Government and the Imperial Government.”
108
  Given the inevitability of conflict, Carson 
wondered why the Home Rule Bill failed to set up a court system similar to that of the 
United States.  He hoped for a Supreme Court to settle potential disputes between the two 
governments. 
 In a later speech, Carson again emphasized the parallels with the American system.  
He questioned, “The only parallel they had for the Constitution they were now setting up in 
Ireland was the Constitution of America.  It had been taken from the American Constitution, 
but why did not the Government follow the provision of the American Constitution, which 
set up a Federal Executive in each State?”
109
  In introducing the Home Rule Bill, the 
government had offered the United States as a point of comparison for the system set up in 
Ireland.  Carson wished for greater adherence to the American federal system, including a 
federated state-style government, to ensure protections of unionist interests and preservation 
of the Union. 
 On the other hand, Lecky argued that the federal system did not matter in the 
slightest if their same Irish nationalist opponents would be in charge of the Home Rule 
parliament.  He wrote, “It is this profound division of classes in Ireland that makes all 
arguments derived from the example of federal governments in Europe or America so utterly 
fallacious.  The first question to be asked before setting up a local legislature is ‘Who are the 
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men who are likely to control it?’”
110
  Lecky believed that the strong divisions in Ireland 
meant that unionists would not be represented in the new government no matter what system 
was in place.  Lecky propagated the negative view that the American federalist system would 
not make a difference with Ireland’s problems. 
J.A. Rentoul, MP for East Down, pointed out another inherent problem in the 
comparisons of federalism in the two countries.  Ultimately, the United States presented an 
example that was the opposite of Home Rule.  Rentoul argued, 
There was no one of the United States of America that claimed to be a nation or that 
asked for national privileges.  Each State of the United States gave up certain powers 
of its own, in order that it might be met by other States giving up those same powers 
to what I may term a supreme legislature which governed them all…. In the United 
States, then, it was not the case of a number of nations being restrained from 
exercising their proper rights and privileges, but of States voluntarily giving up to a 
Constitution, which they themselves had founded, certain of their rights, in order that 
they might assist in exercising similar rights over other States.
111
 
As Rentoul asserted, the federal system of government in the United States was not 
regulating a number of separate nations devolving power from a central government, as 
would be the case with Ireland under the Home Rule Bill.  The United States represented the 
exact opposite: a number of states coming together into a voluntary union with each other 
when they would have otherwise been separate.  It was apparent, therefore, that unity was 
enshrined in the American constitution. 
 By the time of the third Home Rule Bill, federal options were gaining more 
consideration.  This was especially the case after the passage of the 1911 Parliament Act 
meant that it was increasingly likely that some form of Home Rule would be passed.  By the 
end of the Home Rule period, the most important federalist thinkers were F.S. Oliver and the 
Earl of Selborne.
112
  With increased support for federalist options, unionists continued to 
criticize the Liberals for the system set up in the Home Rule Bill.  Many of these criticisms 
were based on the idea that it was the Liberal Party’s intention to eventually implement a 
federal system for the whole United Kingdom. 
 Oliver was active in this criticism.  In a series of letters to the Times, he questioned 
the tariff provisions within the Home Rule Bill.  He wrote, 
At what stage of the proceedings, for instance, was the tariff concession wrung from 
a Government pledged to the maintenance of Free Trade – a concession which will 
inevitably entail the erection of a Customs barrier between Ireland and Great Britain?  
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Of all the farcical features in the Bill this perhaps is the most absurd.  For it has been 
the aim hitherto of every confederation in the world to get rid of hindrances and 
restraints upon trade between its various members.  This principle of freedom is the 




Oliver argued that the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa had all fought and 
sacrificed to get rid of customs barriers.  Oliver believed that unity could not be maintained 
with customs barriers cutting through the heart of the United Kingdom. 
 The Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) saw the existence of customs barriers within the 
Home Rule Bill as creating a farce of the idea that the Liberal government ever intended to 
implement a wide-reaching federal system.  In 1912, the UUC issued a resolution stating, 
“The hypocrisy of the pretence that the present Bill is the forerunner of a Federal 
Constitution for the United Kingdom is shown by the Customs barriers proposed to be set up 
between Great Britain and Ireland, an arrangement unknown in any existing Federal 
system.”
114
  This was again an example of unionists calling for the Home Rule Bill to adhere 
more closely to existing federal systems such as that in the United States. 
 As during the previous Home Rule crises, unionists continued to use the American 
constitution to criticize the Home Rule Bill.  Lord Lansdowne, the leader of the Conservative 
Party in the House of Lords and, as Earl of Kerry, a Peer of Ireland, asserted that greater 
safeguards for the protection of minority rights were needed in the bill.  He warned, 
“Remember who are the men upon whom these safeguards are to be imposed.  They are the 
men who have announced that they mean to dethrone once for all the English Government of 
their country, the very Government whose supremacy is recognised in this Bill by these 
carefully drawn clauses.”
115
  The Senate was to be one of the main safeguards.  However, 
Lansdowne complained that the upper house provided for in the current Home Rule Bill was 
even weaker than that of the previous bill.
116
 
 Lansdowne also asserted that due process needed a place as a safeguard in the bill.  
He asked, 
Why is it that you have omitted from this Bill the admirable words which you 
inserted in your own Bill of 1893, and which found a place in the Constitution of the 
United States of America?  The noble Viscount [John Morley] knows the words I 
mean – the words which prohibit the Irish Parliament from depriving a person of life, 
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liberty, or property without due process of law, or whereby private property may not 
be taken without just compensation.
117
 
The due process provision was so important that Carson, MP for South Londonderry John 
Gordon, MP for North Down William Mitchell-Thomson, and southern unionist Lord 
Ashbourne all spoke in favor of its addition.
118
  Bonar Law emphasized that the significance 
of due process was affirmed by its place in the American constitution.  He stated, “The 
words were in the original Constitution since 1789, and the importance of them was felt to be 
so great that after the Civil War when the position of the States had once again been brought 




 William Moore, the MP for North Armagh, said that he argued for a provision of due 
process to be inserted into the bill because he was “one of the unfortunate people whose life, 
liberty, and property will be wholly at the mercy of the new Parliament that is being set 
up.”
120
  Given the state of the Home Rule Bill, Moore concluded that he was grateful that he 
did not have to rely on government safeguards.  He declared, “I am thankful that we have in 
Ulster Unionists and Protestants who will be much better safeguards than the right hon. 
Gentleman is willing to put in the Bill.  We are quite willing and ready to safeguard 
ourselves when a cowardly Government, in subservient obedience to the Irish vote, is going 
to filch our liberty and property from us.”
121
 
 The constitution of the United States was used by unionists in positive and negative 
ways throughout the Home Rule period.  Criticisms of the American democratic system fell 
away as the United States grew more prosperous and powerful at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  At the same time, democratic reforms gained a greater place in the British 
constitution.  Subsequently, unionists’ use of the American constitutional example seemed to 
reflect a sense of respect and admiration for the American system. 
Unionists used the American constitution mainly to support criticisms of the Home 
Rule government structure.  This in turn would lend legitimacy to their own movement 
because of the inability of Liberal governments to guarantee protections for Irish Protestants.  
The use of American constitutional provisions evolved throughout the Home Rule crises 
depending on the specifics of each bill: calls for greater central authority and a Supreme 
Court in 1886; appeals for protections against ex post facto laws and the impairment of 
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contracts in 1893; demands for a stronger upper house and due process provisions in 1912 
and 1913.  Throughout the period, unionists were concerned with the protection of minority 
rights as provided for under the United States constitution but which they feared would be 
under attack in a nationalist-controlled Home Rule parliament. 
The American constitution was also used to argue both for and against the 
implementation of a federalist system.  Some unionists contended that a federal system 
would be worthless in protecting the Protestants of Ireland and other minority groups.  
Others reasoned that American-style federalism should be more strictly adhered to than had 
been provided for in the Home Rule bills.  Most seemed to agree, however, that the 
American system tended to work to bring disparate sections together rather than separate 
them as the Home Rule bills were attempting to do.  Thus, to support their own movement, 
Ulster unionists claimed that the American system embodied the spirit of national unity. 
 
Conclusion 
 The examples of the American Revolution, Civil War, and constitution formed 
important parts of unionist rhetoric as they defended their own movement and discredited the 
Home Rule bills.  The idea of unity embodied in the history and government of the United 
States, as discussed throughout this chapter, was one of the most common illustrations that 
unionists made through employing the American historical and constitutional example.  
Unity was seen as the global spirit of the age, exemplified by the United States. 
American historical and constitutional examples were common currency in Irish 
unionist political rhetoric, indicating familiarity with American history and political system.  
Unionists did not have uniform views toward the American constitution, but used the 
examples of democracy, constitutional provisions, minority rights, federalism, and national 
unity as ways to discredit the Home Rule system.  The success of the United States by the 
turn of the century meant that any parallels that could be drawn to the American political 
system would help to lend credibility to unionists’ stances. 
However, unionists’ uses of United States examples reflected a much deeper 
connection to America.  Ulster unionists took ownership of the events in colonial and 
revolutionary America.  They claimed kinship with the “race” that had formed the backbone 
of Washington’s army, consistently drawing upon ethnic connections with the Scotch-Irish.  
Ulster unionists celebrated the achievements of the Scotch-Irish as pioneers and fighters for 
their beliefs, characteristics which they also claimed to embody.  Ulster unionists also felt 
linked to the United States through religious ties, as they believed that Protestantism was 
responsible for the achievements of America. 
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Ulster unionists used the Revolutionary War example more broadly to condemn 
British coercion tactics.  Like the American colonists, they would fight against the British if 
coercive laws – in the form of Home Rule – were implemented against them.  Unionists also 
used the American example to express their doubts about the Home Rule system, such as 
their cries against taxation without representation in the first Home Rule crisis. 
The Civil War example was also used to justify unionist stances.  Like the Northern 
States, unionists believed they were in the moral right in the fight against Home Rule.  The 
United States proved that civil war was preferable to splitting up a union.  The Civil War 
example was used to express the unionist sense of betrayal that Britain would not fight to 
maintain the Union.  The British did not protect their loyalist minority as the United States 
had done with West Virginia. 
Reflected in the use of American examples, the unionist image of America became 
more important over time as unionists sought to justify militant stances.  The American 
example, with its emphasis on Scotch-Irish connections, both aided and reflected the 
Ulsterization of the movement.  While Ulster unionists became increasingly localized and 
separated from the rest of the United Kingdom, they maintained their own vision of America 






 After pursuing a policy of nonintervention in Northern Irish affairs for decades, the 
United States government faced a turning point in the 1970s.  Following the partition of 
Ireland and the establishment of the Irish Free State, interest in Irish-American nationalism 
significantly decreased.  Irish neutrality in World War II, and increased Irish-American 
success and assimilation, further diminished levels of participation in nationalist 
organizations.
1
  However, cultural interest in Ireland continued to grow in the United States.  
At the beginning of the Northern Irish Troubles in 1968, the majority of Irish-Americans 
remained uninvolved.  Those who were interested in the conflict generally supported 
unification but opposed the tactics of the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
2
 
 In the 1970s, Irish-American organizations began to gain prominence.  They played 
important roles in fundraising for the republican movement and lobbying the American 
government on the Irish question.  The Northern Ireland Aid Committee (Noraid), the most 
prominent organization accused of funding the Provisional IRA, was founded in 1970.
3
  By 




 Several Irish-American organizations for lobbying and addressing Irish affairs in 
government were also formed.  The “Four Horsemen,” Senators Edward Kennedy and 
Daniel Moynihan, Speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, and New York Governor 
Hugh Carey, joined together to combat IRA fundraising in America and pressure the United 
States government to end its policy of nonintervention.
5
  They lobbied for a statement on 
Northern Ireland from President Jimmy Carter.  Carter took special interest in the conflict 
because of his pursuit of a human rights agenda.  On 30 August 1977, he condemned 
violence and promised American aid and investment if a peaceful settlement was achieved.
6
  
The Four Horsemen also influenced President Ronald Reagan to continue American 
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involvement in the Northern Ireland situation.  Reagan was active in encouraging 
compromise during the negotiations that produced the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement.
7
 
 Northern Ireland played an even greater role in the foreign policy of President Bill 
Clinton.  Up to the Clinton presidency, American governments had never been willing to 
challenge their relationship with Britain over the Northern Ireland question.
8
  Influenced by 
the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration initiated dialogue with both nationalists 
and unionists.  Clinton had a strong personal commitment to Irish issues.  He visited 
Northern Ireland three times during his presidency.  George Mitchell, the Special Envoy for 
Northern Ireland, was pivotal to the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.
9
  
The United States also made a considerable impact through economic investment.  The 
presidential administration of George W. Bush, for the most part, continued Clinton’s 
policies on the peace process.  Acting mainly through the Special Envoy for Northern 
Ireland, the Bush administration helped to influence IRA weapons decommissioning and the 
power-sharing agreement in 2006.
10
  However, despite the United States’ regard for 
appearing impartial and maintaining Anglo-American relations, Ulster unionists have had 
remarkable difficulties in shaping the role of the United States on the Northern Ireland 
question. 
 Unionists were more suspicious of American involvement in the peace process than 
their nationalist counterparts.  Many unionists viewed the United States as inherently 
unsympathetic and felt isolated against the perceived pro-republican stances of America.
11
  
Unionists continually attacked American government involvement, and condemned Noraid 
and other organizations supporting the IRA.
12
  However, for most of the 1970s, unionists did 
little to present their own views to Americans.
13
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 The attempts made to engage with the United States were generally unsuccessful.  
Several unionist delegations made visits to America.  Most prominent were the visits of Ian 
Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).  Paisley mostly focused on his 
religious connections when in the United States, taking part in a worldwide network of 
fundamentalist Protestants.
14
  Paisley was condemned by Irish-Americans and became a 
target of negative media attention.
15
  The DUP was joined by the Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP) in 1982 to organize “Operation USA,” an intensive tour of the United States to 
promote unionist views.  Frustratingly for the DUP and UUP, the tour generated little interest 
in America.
16
  Unionists also attempted to call upon surviving Scotch-Irish organizations for 
support, such as the Loyal Orange Institution, the Scotch-Irish Society of the United States, 
and the Ulster-Irish Society.
17
  A small number of grassroots supporters formed new 
organizations such as the Northern Ireland Service Council and the Ulster American 
Loyalists.  However, with little encouragement forthcoming from Northern Ireland, 
membership quickly declined.  Some of their American supporters were a liability for the 
unionists because of their extremist views.
18
 
 More recently, David Trimble, leader of the UUP, became very active in pursuing 
connections with the Clinton administration.  Worried about perceptions of having a 
nationalist agenda, Clinton invited Trimble to the White House in September 1995.  The 
UUP attempted to establish a presence in Washington.  They created an American strategy 
involving contacts with the White House, the United States Senate and House, business 
leaders, and Irish-American groups.
19
  Unionists still faced negative portrayals in the press, 
especially compared to Irish nationalists.  While they had some success in drawing attention 
to the unionist cause, little impact was made on the American government’s Northern Irish 
policy.
20
  In Northern Ireland, unionists remained ambivalent about the direction of the 
American strategy.
21
  During the Bush administration, relations shifted so that the DUP, 
rather than the UUP, played a greater role in interacting with the United States government.
22
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 For much of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the Ulster unionist 
approach to America was marked with inconsistencies.  Unionists were uneven in their 
message and tactics.  They hoped to draw upon the huge well of Americans of Scotch-Irish 
descent, but found them so assimilated as to offer little support.
23
  Individuals who did 
attempt to promote unionist views in the United States could not rely on those in Northern 
Ireland for regular assistance.  Unionists felt that the British government should have the 
primary responsibility for looking after their interests in the United States.  However, they 
were also distrustful of the British Information Services and British Embassy, especially after 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.
24
  Unionists frequently denounced American 
government involvement in the Northern Irish situation.  They also condemned Irish-
American participation, but were reluctant to engage with their adversaries when in the 
United States.  The UUP and DUP were criticized for not having long-term strategies for 
getting views across in America.  Delegates to the United States felt there was a complete 
lack of understanding of unionism.  According to Andrew Wilson, all of these frustrations 
with the United States amplified the sense of embattlement and isolation in Ulster.
25
 
 The unionists’ inability to successfully deal with the United States had roots in the 
relationship between unionists and America during the Home Rule era.  The Ulster unionist 
response at the turn of the twenty-first century echoed the problems and precedents of the 
anti-Home Rule campaign between 1880 and 1920.  During the Home Rule era, Ulster 
unionists had a multifaceted relationship with the United States.  They felt a sense of anxiety 
over Irish-American extremism, apprehension of American involvement in the Irish 
question, and opportunity in finding support for the unionist movement.  At the end of the 
nineteenth century, opposition to Irish-American extremism and appeals to America for 
support were important factors in the development of unionism as a political movement.  The 
United States had an impact on unionist policy and political thought as unionism evolved in 
the early twentieth century to become more Ulsterized, militant, and eventually accepting of 
partition. 
 During the Home Rule era, unionist attitudes to the United States were divided 
between political action and thought.  Unionists had an uneven record of appeals and 
responses to the United States and Irish-America, as the focal point for unionist action 
shifted from the national arena at Westminster to a more localized base in Belfast.  However, 
the unionists increasingly used an idealized, imagined America to support and legitimize 
their own movement.  This was illustrated through the use of American historical and 
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constitutional examples, and through the fostering of an Ulster identity based in part on 
Scotch-Irish heritage and Protestant connections. 
 Many factors influenced unionist views of the United States during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The role of America in the world was evolving as 
the country embraced imperialism, including increased military power to rival the British.  
America was an important part of Ulster’s political and economic activity.  Economic 
markets in the United States for linen and shipbuilding provided support for Belfast’s 
developing industries.  Ulstermen had long-standing personal interconnections with America 
through emigration and shared religious experiences.  The United States was also influential 
on the key political issue for Ulstermen, Irish Home Rule.  American government 
intervention and Irish-American extremism colored views and influenced reactions to the 
Home Rule movement. 
 Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, unionists increasingly 
associated Irish-America with extremism.  Irish-Americans, led by Patrick Ford, John 
Devoy, and Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa, joined the Fenian Brotherhood and Clan-na-Gael.  
They participated in attempted invasions of Canada, the dynamite campaign and land wars, 
and supported the Home Rule movement in large numbers.  Nationalist leaders from Ireland 
frequently visited the United States to garner financial, political, and organizational 
reinforcement.  They mobilized Irish-Americans in support of Home Rule and independence. 
 Unionists reacted to Irish-American extremists with anxiety and fear of how they 
would impact a potential Dublin parliament.  At the same time, unionists actively cultivated 
the image of a violent and extremist Irish-America as they argued against Irish nationalists.  
Unionists developed a pattern of responses which were utilized throughout the Home Rule 
period.  They emphasized the influence and monetary control of Irish-American extremists 
over Irish nationalists.  They monitored speeches in America, accusing nationalists of 
concealing their true separatist intentions in Westminster while revealing them in the United 
States.  They also closely read the Irish World and other Irish-American newspapers. 
 In the 1880s, Parnellites were accused of pandering to Irish-American extremists to 
win monetary support.  The Irish Parliamentary Party’s funding was connected to Ford and 
the Skirmishing Fund, which had financed the dynamite campaign of 1881 to 1885.  
Unionists believed that dynamite outrages and land agitation would never cease as long as 
Irish-American extremists controlled the finances of the movement.  They charged 
nationalists with committing outrages not for ideological reasons but because that was what 
Irish-America demanded in return for funding.  In the twentieth century, unionists indicted 
nationalists for being funded by bitter Irish-Americans who cultivated hatred of England.  
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Irish-Americans were portrayed as seeking revenge for past grievances through separatism 
and consorting with Britain’s enemies, especially during World War I.  Irish-Americans were 
not idealistically seeking Irish independence, but hoping to exact vengeance by undermining 
the British government. 
 Unionists sought to discredit the nationalist movement by emphasizing that they 
were under the control of a foreign power.  They accused nationalists of having little genuine 
support from the Irish or Irish-Americans, who were under the coercion of an extremist 
minority.  They believed that constructive unionist policies had to a large extent addressed 
the grievances of the Irish people.  Therefore, Irish nationalists were forced to turn to the 
United States for support.  Nationalist leaders were portrayed as separatist, violent, and unfit 
to govern Ireland. 
 As the role of Irish-America changed within nationalism, unionist responses to Irish-
American extremism changed over time.  While levels of responses to Irish-American 
extremism were relatively high during the first and third Home Rule crises, they were much 
less in 1893 when Irish-America was factionalized and weak.  By the twentieth century, 
unionists were active in attempting to discredit Irish-American influence by targeting people 
in the United Kingdom through pamphlets, leaflets, speeches, and letter-writing campaigns.  
The image of an extremist Irish-America provided a representation by which unionists could 
characterize Irish nationalism in general to the British public.  Irish-American violence and 
separatism legitimized unionists’ interpretations of nationalism as a whole. 
 The extremist atmosphere created by the emphasis on Irish-American violence and 
separatism also legitimized unionist militancy.  Irish-American extremism created a 
precedent for militancy, as well as for gunrunning from outside of Ireland.  Unionists felt 
justified in turning toward militancy, believing that they should go to the furthest possible 
lengths to protect Irish loyalists from the threat of nationalist extremism.  Unionists at times 
also maintained that American Protestants could be relied on if they were forced into civil 
war to prevent the implementation of Home Rule. 
 They also resented the United States government’s role in influencing the Home 
Rule settlement.  The Irish-American vote was seen as swaying politicians even though 
unionists maintained that Americans in general did not support nationalist aims.  The 
American government was involved to a limited extent with British government policies 
over coercion and the dynamite campaign.  They did not get significantly drawn into the 
Irish question until World War I, when the unionists’ loyalism forced them to take greater 
consideration of American views because of the exigencies of war. 
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 Unionists were skeptical about the importance of American government views, 
maintaining that the United States should not have influence over British domestic policy.  
They also urged the United States government to cease its involvement in the Irish situation.  
Unionists believed that the more Americans knew about the truth of Ireland’s condition, the 
less they would be inclined to interfere.  They also hoped that if Americans could be 
convinced of the merits of the unionist case, the Irish themselves might be convinced that 
national independence would be of no benefit. 
 The United States also presented opportunities for unionists.  They hoped to take 
advantage of the long history of transatlantic links between Ulster and America, formed 
through two and a half centuries of emigration, and Protestant networks developed since the 
colonial era.  Anglo-American rapprochement and the prevalence of Anglo-Saxonism meant 
that Americans were shaking off the Anglophobia that marked much of the nineteenth 
century.  Unionists hoped that if they could convince Americans to be neutral on the Irish 
question, they would have more control over their own fate. 
 They were also anxious to show that the movement against Home Rule had 
international appeal.  Unionists attempted to claim support from the United States, 
publicizing declarations of sympathy and monetary donations from American organizations 
and individuals.  Unionist organizations in both the north and south of Ireland conducted 
correspondence with Americans and developed propaganda materials for American 
audiences.  One of the main goals was to counter deceitful nationalist propaganda in the 
United States. 
 To counter nationalist visits overseas, unionists also conducted tours of the United 
States to publicize their own cause, though these were relatively rare.  R.R. Kane, G.H. 
Smith, William Johnston, and the Coote delegation all attempted to cultivate Anglo-
American friendship and Protestant unity overseas.  They fostered transatlantic connections 
through Orange and Protestant links.  Each also emphasized historic ties between Ulster and 
America, as well as shared Protestant values.  Kane, Smith, Johnston, and the Coote 
delegation all faced difficulties in their tours, which limited their effectiveness in spreading 
the unionist message.  Kane and Smith were reluctant to cross the border from Canada and 
present their message outside of the Empire, Johnston was limited to an Orange audience, 
and the Coote delegation suffered from a lack of organization and their hesitation to come 
face-to-face with nationalist opponents. 
 Unionists drew upon their historic connections to religion and the Scotch-Irish in 
America to find support for their own movement.  The American religious establishment was 
influenced by Ulster religion, with considerable contributions from Scotch-Irish immigrants.  
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Since the colonial era, Presbyterian clergy had traveled from Ulster to America.  Later, 
revivalists and Princeton-educated ministers came to Ulster from the United States.  Both 
societies developed similar evangelical and fundamentalist religions, with influence of 
religion over the development of political culture.  Connections between Ulster and America 
were maintained through links of individual ministers, voluntary societies, and transatlantic 
religious organizations. 
 Further support was found through emphasizing ties with the Scotch-Irish in 
America.  The Scotch-Irish were in a unique position in American society, as English-
speakers with a long history of immigration.  They were able to claim a place among the 
“native” Americans, joining nativist or Anglo-Saxonist groups.  The Scotch-Irish also at 
times identified with Irish-Americans, joining nationalist organizations.  Their language, 
mobility, and adaptability meant that they played diverse roles in American society.  The 
Scotch-Irish were motivated by American social, economic, and political circumstances, 
which may explain why more aid based on the historic connection to Ulster was not 
forthcoming.  The high levels of assimilation and success for the Scotch-Irish in America 
limited the source of support for Ulster unionism. 
 However, those who did join Scotch-Irish organizations did so because they chose to 
celebrate an overt Scotch-Irish identity, indicating a desire to remain connected to Ireland.  
This was part of an American trend of expressing identity through associational culture and 
celebration of ethnicity.  The increasing prominence of the Scotch-Irish ethnicity in the late 
nineteenth century was primarily due to the foundation of the Scotch-Irish Society of 
America (SISA).  They promoted historic contributions to American society and preserved 
ties to Ireland.  Despite large numbers of members who were natives of Ireland, the SISA 
focused on life in the colonial era and early republic.  By the time Andrew Jackson came to 
the presidency, the Scotch-Irish no longer had to fight their way through the wilderness but 
had risen to the top of American politics and society.  By emphasizing the success and 
assimilation of early immigrants, the Scotch-Irish were helping to create myths about their 
place in American society that persist to some extent to the modern day. 
 Members of the SISA encompassed a wide range of views on the Irish problem.  At 
times, members did express overtly unionist views, but this was more common in the 
Pennsylvania Scotch-Irish Society after the demise of the national organization.  Both 
societies maintained close ties with Ulster through correspondence and visits back to their 
home country.  By the turn of the century, these ties were weakened because of the failure of 
the national organization.  The peak of literary contributions on the Scotch-Irish in America 
had also passed by the time of the third Home Rule crisis. 
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 The Loyal Orange Institution in the United States was more vocal in its support of 
unionism.  The Orangemen combined the celebration of ties to Ulster with promotion of anti-
Catholic policies in the United States.  Correspondence and visits between Orangemen in 
Ulster and America helped to maintain close ties between the two areas.  The ability for 
Ulster unionists to draw upon the American Orange Order was limited by factionalism within 
the movement, though Orange activity did increase throughout the third Home Rule crisis.  
Overall, unionist attempts to foster a transatlantic unionist and Protestant community were 
limited by the diversity and assimilation of the Scotch-Irish in American society, 
shortcomings within the Orange Order and Scotch-Irish organizations themselves, and 
unevenness in the unionist approach to their appeals to America.  Because of their historic 
ties to the United States, unionists felt that they warranted greater support from Americans 
than their nationalist counterparts.  This made the lack of support even more frustrating for 
unionists. 
 While unionist political activity in regard to the United States was uneven in its 
appeals and reactions throughout the Home Rule era, the role of America in unionist political 
thought increased.  Scotch-Irish emigrants were influential to how Ulster unionists defined 
themselves.  Ulstermen celebrated Scotch-Irish heritage as they developed a separate identity 
in the early twentieth century.  They claimed ownership of the actions of their “racial” 
brethren across the Atlantic.  They celebrated Scotch-Irish achievements in civilizing the 
frontier, and in government, religion, and industry.  The shared experience of emigration in 
Ulster also helped to foster unity within the unionist movement.  The identity of Ulster was 
linked to an image of revolutionary and frontier America in which the Scotch-Irish fought to 
uphold liberties and were determined to stand up for what they believed was right.  During 
the Home Rule era, Ulstermen claimed the same determination and pioneering qualities for 
themselves. 
 Ulster unionists also drew upon American examples to defend their political stances, 
justify militancy, and discredit Home Rule.  They claimed the United States example 
exemplified the worldwide trend toward unity.  Twice in its history the United States 
illustrated that closer union was vital.  With its Home Rule policies, the British government 
was turning its back on unification as the spirit of the age. 
 The American Revolutionary and Civil Wars also provided historical precedents for 
the actions of Ulster unionists.  Militancy was justified through America’s fighting against 
the coercion of the British in the Revolutionary War, as well as the North fighting to preserve 
the Union in the Civil War.  The American constitutional example was also used by 
intellectuals, theorists, and politicians to suggest solutions to Irish problems and critique 
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proposed Home Rule systems.  These cases of emphasis on the American example and 
Scotch-Irish heritage increased the Ulsterization and militancy of the unionist movement. 
 American involvement in the affairs of Ireland and Northern Ireland has persisted 
from the Home Rule era through to the modern day.  The historiography has been dominated 
by emphasis on nationalist traditions and Anglo-American political policies.  However, 
Ulster unionists also saw themselves as having an important stake in these proceedings.  
They both repudiated and attempted to find opportunities in American involvement.  At the 
same time, they promoted an image of themselves which had close ties to the United States. 
 Ulster unionists were less insular and more internationally focused than they are 
generally portrayed.  The United States in particular was important in influencing how Ulster 
unionists conceived of themselves and their movement, as well as their reactions to Irish 
nationalism.  An idealized and imagined America played a significant role in justifying and 
legitimizing unionist stances.  However, political activity regarding America was 
inconsistent during the Home Rule period.  Unionists renounced Irish-American extremism, 
were apprehensive of American government participation in Irish issues, and hoped for 
opportunities in the United States.  The Ulster unionist approach to the United States was 
marked by unevenness and contradictions which limited their effectiveness.  They 
paradoxically both spurned and sought American involvement.  These conflicting tactics in 
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